I am hardly the first to compare Ukraine 2022-4 with Israel 2023-4, but those who make the connection rarely seem to take it anywhere interesting. Case in point: hostage politics.

Both Russia (in Kherson and Mariupol) and Hamas have taken civilian hostages that they have been mistreating and falsely portraying as PoWs on dubious grounds. In both cases, extrications have been achieved both using military and diplomatic means, but there are also cases of hostages dying when such attempts failed, or seemingly being executed to discourage such attempts. The 2022 Olenivka prison massacre ( en.wikipedia.org/wiki/O… ) is an example that has much in common with yesterday's Rafah revelation; here, too, the Russians were quick to blame Ukraine's overconfident attack, but cracks appeared soon in the theory.

Where the two cases differed starkly is in how the respective societies reacted. The difference is not in Israel's favor. The continued presence of the hostages in Israeli messaging has likely been a boon on the international front, and, if nothing else, was well-intended and justified. Yet it has now become a weakness through which Israeli society has been hacked, with the largest trade union calling for a general strike to obstruct Israel at a defensive war and open her to similar attacks any time in the future. In Ukraine, the massacre has instead buttressed the will to victory and given the president additional rhetorical ammunition to ask allies for actual ammunition. Russian attempts at shocking Ukrainian civil society into submission have largely fallen flat; the average "must we fight this war to the last Ukrainian?" comment is still coming from a Russian bot farm or else from a cozy sofa in the USA or Western Europe. Another case, in early 2024, had just as little consequences ( reuters.com/world/europ… ).

Has Israel just gotten too soft to become a people at war? Has the notorious Jewish disagreeability become a breaking point shattering society at its "solemn hour"? Have women's tears corroded unyielding iron? All such explanations could just as easily predict the opposite effect (try comparing TFRs and religiosity to see which country is more based!). Two explanations that I cannot this easily dismiss are:

1. Wrong course set at the onset in Israel: too much focus on bringing the hostages home, not enough on defending the country. Just look at any Israeli communications -- official and otherwise -- except for military TG channels. Ukraine, too, pulled at heartstrings (justifiably so) after Bucha and Irpin, but she made sure to always follow up with invitations to donate, which helped redirect the story from one of victimhood and pity to one of participation and courage. (Any time you voluntarily donate towards a goal, you emotionally bind yourself a bit further to this goal. You can do this with purpose!)

2. Major cities unaffected in Israel: Putin's 2022 mistake of going at Kyiv convinced most Ukrainians that this time, the war would not stay localized to the Russian-speaking East or other border zones. Meanwhile, the Gazan pogrom-raid was beaten in the agricultural south, not even reaching Beer-Sheva. Scary, but still far away! Except that of course it is not that far away when taking Israel's small size into account, and hardly so when combined with the Hamas rocket attacks on the rest of the country. And it didn't just hit the kibbuzim; the Nova festival brought slices of the entire civil society to ground zero. Thus I'm not actually convinced that this "split-screen effect" materialized in 2022. What's the view from Israel?

Are these it? Am I missing something?

From the comfort of an American suburb or a German town, I have no authority to demand a country I haven't visited in 20 years to mobilize itself into a new Sparta. But understanding why morale works in one place and fails in another is always an interesting question, and not an entirely theoretical one for those of us living in the increasingly fragile soap bubble of Western Europe. I believe we could all use a bit more morbid curiosity.