Tom Barrack, Donald Trump’s ambassador to Turkey and envoy to Syria, has now had his brief formally expanded to include Iraq.

He has managed something rare in the Middle East. Turks, Kurds, Arabs and Persians, who agree on very little, seem to agree that he is not to be trusted. A common dislike for a diplomat this strong has not been seen for decades.

Surely, everyone hears something different in his remarks.

Kurds hear abandonment after years of fighting Islamic State alongside the United States. Arabs hear the old colonial officer, especially after his remarks to Lebanese journalists. Turks hear Sèvres, Sykes-Picot and the familiar fear that outside powers are once again trying to redraw the region from above.

But Barrack is only part of the story.

The larger question concerns the domestic structures his worldview flatters. In Turkey, the quarrel over Barrack has collided with a deeper argument inside the opposition over devlet aklı, raison d’etre, reason of state, the deep state, and the future of the CHP, at a moment when the courts are being used to reshape the country’s main opposition party from within.

I also write about three important points regarding the Kurdish process in Turkey, all of which I discussed in my recent interview with Amargi: Bahçeli’s latest roadmap, Erdoğan’s calculated distance from the process, and why the attack on the CHP should change how we read the Kurdish question today.