Hearing a lot about the contradiction between China/CCP/Xi being more confident and China/CCP/Xi being more paranoid. Here are a few potential hypotheses that respond to that--and are not necessarily mutually exclusive--in no particular order, and I offer for conversation, but not as an endorsement of any of them: 1) There is no contradiction. The US is confident democracy is the best system, and yet still there are all sorts of fears of decay from within (if people stop adhering to democratic norms, are pulled by the forces of populism) and about interference from without (Russian meddling, etc.). These two can co-exist. 2) It is a sign of increasing precariousness within the system for those who are tasked with managing it, particularly as the system takes a more personalist turn. If you are a ganbu, an official, or someone whose business depends on Xi and the larger apparatus looking favourably upon you, you are going to be highly risk adverse and thus unlikely to want anything to happen on your watch that would make it look like you are not showing Xi the proper respect or following the party line. Internal fear creates the appearance of externally oriented fear. 3) It is inherent to the nature of the party. It was forged in circumstances of struggle and adversity and it cannot escape that. That is how it engages the world and a high risk intolerance continues even when the risks themselves are diminishing. 4) It is a function of lessons learned, particularly from the USSR. There is confidence in the model, and the restrictions and paranoia are part of the functioning model--not leaving yourself upon to peaceful evolution that will bring collapse. Again, not endorsing any of these, but a few thoughts to throw out there....