Your reference to Foucault and the postmodern resonances of "reforming the international discourse system" triggered the imagination, so I'll bite. It strikes me that this a matter of framing, which is to say, it is more than controlling the narrative, history, the story; more than defining what counts as true or false; more than separating speech and language; text and talk.

There are some Orwellian moments in the statements made by Chinese state media — suggestions that truth is indeed inherent in words and phrases. And by extension that use of the right words can functionally challenge and engage "dominant" Western thought and discourse and serve to "correct" a presumptive Western bias to a more Sinocentric or pro-Chinese set of perspectives. Indeed language and speech both have been claimed (Arendt, Deleuze) to have these "agonistic" qualities, qualities that lend them to functional uses in shaping discursive realities.

But it seems to me that the Chinese approach you describe here there's a failure to recognize the distinction between discourse and interaction. Discursive reframing or retelling, say of one's historical past and expected future, is understandable and convincing only from within the interpretive frame that such a maneuver operates within. Or, only Chinese familiar with Communist Party narratives of China's past and future would understand the reframing being communicated. Those in the West, speakers of the (dominant) "international discourse," would have to be convinced of the truth of these new Chinese discursive claims and operations; before then being able to accept or reject them as reasonable corrective interventions. (I may be mixing my Habermas and my Luhmann here.)

Put more plainly, the Chinese party line seems not to recognize that any reforming the international discourse will have to be done by reasonable political actors engaging honestly and sincerely in friendly conversation. Discursive reform is accomplished by means of mutual understanding and a binding commitment to continue talking (what they call shadow of the future in IR and game theory). I don't see that level of awareness, and the insensitivity with which so many official Chinese statements are made, makes me wonder whether there's a self referentiality inherent in communist rhetoric and narration — a functional need to define truths/terms and "write" history that compromises its ability to engage in the open spaces of non-dogmatic political interaction.

I'm sure Godard made a film about it; if not Adam Curtis must have an essay film about it ;-)