Three thoughts regarding the conventional thinking on cross-Strait stability:

- A veneer is better than nothing. As unlikely as it ever was to actually be implemented, at least One Country, Two Systems provided the veneer of a viable path to peaceful reunification. With that option now gone, what do political leaders of either side say to placate the other? The DPP has already flat out rejected 1C2S as a possibility and the KMT has been painted into a nationally irrelevant corner with Xi linking 1C2S to the 1992 Consensus. Since Ma took all the low hanging cross-Strait development fruit, there has not been any serious enhancement or progress since 2016. When the dust settles over HK, I fear CCP eyes will slowly turn to Taiwan. With a "no to 1C2S" DPP as the most likely party they will face over the decade, what can the CCP do to make it at least appear they have a genuine path forward? And what can Taiwan say to placate Beijing? - Peace is preferable to war. Of course this is true but sadly this is often realized only in retrospect. Historical examples abound where peace was cast aside when it should so obviously have been preferred. - Taleb's Turkey Problem. The problem with the status quo is it's only the status quo until it isn't. Just because things have been working out all year doesn't mean an axe won't suddenly appear on the fourth Thursday in November. Baring other regional developments, if the DPP solidly wins again in 2024, I fear we'll see the CCP's axe start to be sharpened.