Russian Fighters Can Lob 250 Glide-Bombs In Two Days And Demolish Ukrainian Defenses. And Just One Weapon Can Stop Them.

Hamstrung by poor training, crude weaponry and a culture of centralized control, the Russian air force struggled to support Russian ground troops in the first two years of Russia’s wider war on Ukraine.

But in recent weeks, in the sky over Avdiivka—a former Ukrainian stronghold just northwest of Russian-occupied Donetsk in eastern Ukraine—that changed.

Lobbing satellite-guided glide-bombs from 25 miles away, Russian pilots hammered Avdiivka in the weeks before a dozen Russian brigades and regiments finally—after four months of costly assaults—forced the Ukrainian 110th Mechanized Brigade to retreat west out of the ruins of the nearly lifeless city.

Now that the Russians finally figured out how to support their ground troops from the air, expect them to repeat the tactic in other sectors of the 600-mile front line. The Avdiivka glide-bombing campaign could “herald a change in Russian operations elsewhere along the front line,” the Institute for the Study of War in Washington, D.C. stated.

The Russian air force has a thousand front-line fighter-bombers—around 10 times as many fighter-bombers as the Ukrainian air force has. But that overwhelming superiority didn’t translate into full control of the air over Ukraine as Russian field armies attacked starting in February 2022.

“From early March [2022], the [Russian air force] lost the ability to operate in Ukrainian-controlled airspace except at very low altitudes due to its inability to reliably suppress or destroy increasingly effective, well-dispersed and mobile Ukrainian surface-to-air missile systems,” Justin Bronk, Nick Reynolds and Jack Watling explained in a November 2022 report for the Royal United Services Institute in London.

For the first year of the wider war, Russian pilots couldn’t risk flying near the front line. But they also lacked the long-range precision munitions that would allow them to support the ground forces from a safe distance. Ukraine’s air-defenses effectively had neutralized Russia’s aerial advantage.

But it didn’t last. Strapping wings and satellite-guidance kits to 550-, 1,100- and 3,300-pound KAB or FAB bombs, the Russians developed a crude glide-bombing capability. Flying high and fast, a Sukhoi fighter-bomber can lob two or more KABs at targets 25 miles away. That’s far enough to reduce, if not eliminate, the risk from Ukrainian SAMs.

The KAB glide-bomb quickly became one of Russia’s most fearsome weapons. Ukrainian troops described the unique terror of the giant, silent bombs exploding with no warning—and with enough firepower to topple buildings and pulverize bunkers.

As the Russian army concentrated much of its combat power for a push on Avdiivka, the KAB came into its own. The Ukrainian 110th Brigade in Avdiivka counted on the city’s hundreds of multi-story buildings to double as elevated observation posts and firing positions.

The Russian KABs systematically demolished many of the buildings. “These bombs completely destroy any position,” wrote Egor Sugar, a trooper with the Ukrainian 3rd Assault Brigade, which covered the 110th Brigade’s retreat from Avdiivka on Friday. “All buildings and structures simply turn into a pit after the arrival of just one KAB.”

At the peak of the aerial campaign this weekend, Sukhois lobbed a staggering 250 KABs in 48 hours. Soon, the 110th Brigade had nowhere left to hide in Avdiivka’s ruins. The depleted brigade fled west this weekend, surrendering the smoldering city to the similarly depleted, but more numerous, Russian regiments and brigades.

It was, according to ISW, probably the first time in two years that Russian air power had played a decisive role in Russian ground operations.

But it wasn’t inevitable. And it wasn’t without cost. On Saturday, a Ukrainian missile battery—perhaps one of its three batteries armed with U.S.-made Patriot missiles—shot down three Russian Sukhois 60 miles east of Avdiivka. The Ukrainian military claimed it shot down a fourth Sukhoi on Sunday.

The Ukrainians clearly have the means of shooting down glide-bombers and preventing another devastating KAB bombardment. What they lack is capacity. The United States was the biggest supplier of Patriot missiles to Ukraine. But starting in October, Russia-aligned Republicans in the U.S. Congress began blocking aid to the Ukrainian war effort.

Now Ukraine’s stock of 90-mile-range Patriots is “dropping to a critical level,” according to Anton Gerashchenko, a former advisor to the Ukrainian interior ministry.

It’s possible the arrival, in the coming weeks or months, of the first of Ukraine’s new ex-European F-16 fighters will help to compensate for the dwindling Patriots.

“Key tasks for these aircraft are likely to be pushing back even further the Russian bombers that launch missiles against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure, as well as the interception of Russian tactical aviation,” explained Mick Ryan, a retired Australian army general. “This includes the destruction or degrading the effectiveness of glide-bomb-launching Russian aircraft.”

But the F-16s will have to fight their way past Russian fighters and through Russian air-defenses in order to get shots at the glide-bombers. It’s risky.

No, Patriots are Ukraine’s best defense against Russia’s KABs. And in the absence of Patriots, the Russians no doubt will attempt to duplicate their successful bombardment of Avdiivka.

More Ukrainian cities will suffer a thunderstorm of Russian glide-bombs. More Ukrainian cities will fall.