By late March last year, barely a month after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the war was already at a stalemate. And this is where we are now, at the end of the war’s first year. Russia can’t win because NATO has its global standing on the line and will support Ukraine to the end, but Ukraine and NATO cannot win for fear of a Russian nuclear escalation.

As a recent report in Culturico makes clear, part of the myth of stable nuclear deterrence rests on the assumption that nuclear powers would never consider using nuclear weapons first. But that is certainly not the posture of Russia or, for that matter, NATO.

The prospects for negotiations look minimal and a long-term violent stand-off is all too plausible, but many questions still remain. Has Russia lost global status? Can it maintain its army at the level needed given its formidable losses to date? Can its current rate of armaments production be maintained? And what changes might be under way in terms of domestic support for Vladimir Putin?

On the other side, will NATO and – especially – the United States, maintain the current level of support for Ukraine? Are there new weapons and tactics that can alter the balance of military power in Ukraine’s favour? What end to the war does the White House seek, and could it be achieved without a dangerous escalation by Putin? Is there any room for negotiations, however informal and unofficial?

On the question of global status, Russia certainly lost status during the first month of the war, when its forces failed to take Kyiv and Donbas, couldn’t overrun – let alone occupy – Kharkiv, and were unable to take control of Ukraine’s Black Sea coast down to and beyond Odessa.

Despite this, global opposition to Russia’s aggression is nothing like Western politicians might have expected. Last week’s column sought to explain this, and since then a report revealing more about Global South attitudes has been published by the European Council on Foreign Relations, following a survey of 15 countries including India and Turkey. As The Guardian noted, the survey “revealed sharp geographical differences in attitudes to the war, democracy and the global balance of power… suggesting Russia’s aggression may be a historic turning point marking the emergence of a ‘post-Western’ world order”.

When it comes to the size of the Russian army, there is no doubt that losses have been great. Putin was expected to announce a further mobilisation during his ‘state of the union’ address this week, but chose instead to use the address to withdraw from the New START strategic arms treaty with the US, which aims to limit nuclear arsenals. Another mobilisation is still possible, especially with the recent losses in the Donbas, but there is little sign of one yet.

As to armaments, Russia does have problems with sourcing key components for missile guidance thanks to Western sanctions, and this is limiting missile accuracy. But if the missiles are to be used for attacks on cities where accuracy is not essential, then it is less significant.

Moreover, Russia has little difficulty in maintaining high levels of ammunition production for heavy artillery, with many factories running triple shifts. Mass bombardment is a persistent feature of the Russian war plan in much of Ukraine and it can probably be maintained, even if the ability to make advances on the ground is proving exceptionally difficult. In any case, the end result is capturing ruins and little else, a situation reminiscent of Roman historian Tacitus’s famous line: “They made a desert and called it peace.”

As to Putin’s determination to continue, there is little sign of change. Right back at the start of the war, Putin made much of the need to face down NATO, and since then the move to a proxy war with deeply embedded NATO involvement enables him to emphasise this need at every opportunity. Russia, in Putin’s view, is now fighting for its survival as a powerful independent state. And he is having some success in convincing Russians of this, including younger people who may not agree with the war but will buy into the idea of defending a Russian homeland under threat.

In parallel with this has been a notable hardening of repression against internal opposition. Last year about 20,000 people were detained for political and anti-war protests. Most were imprisoned for short periods but released with cautions that mean they risk up to five years in prison if they take part in further protests. Furthermore, the Financial Times recently reported that: “At least 440 people – artists, priests, teachers, students and doctors – have had criminal cases opened against them, according to OVD-Info. Many are awaiting trial in jail, and some face sentences of up to 15 years. Others have fled the country.”

Meanwhile, arms continue to flow into Ukraine from the US and NATO allies, though Washington is careful to control the pace and capabilities of missiles, effectively determining the evolution of the whole conflict. Within the US security establishment there is a rough divide between those advocating complete victory and others concerned with the risk of escalation.

Among the former is much of the foreign affairs establishment and some voluble retired generals, but many current military heads are far more cautious. Last week the chair of the joint chiefs of staff, General Mark Milley, said Russia had already lost the war in terms of its failure to achieve its original aims.

However, he believes the conflict will end with negotiations. He told the Financial Times: “It will be almost impossible for the Russians to achieve their political objectives by military means. It is unlikely that Russia is going to overrun Ukraine. It’s just not going to happen.”

But he added: “It is also very, very difficult for Ukraine this year to kick the Russians out of every inch of Russian-occupied Ukraine. It's not to say that it can't happen… But it’s extraordinarily difficult. And it would require essentially the collapse of the Russian military.”

Some support for this view also comes from US establishment think tanks such as the well-connected Rand Corporation, but none of this adds up to any prospect of a negotiated end, at least not yet.

If there was any change in the political mood, then a wealth of experience of conflict resolution is available to guide mediators, and no shortage of competent intermediaries would come into play. Processes vary. They can involve individuals or small groups with no direct connection with either party to a conflict.

Conflict resolution is the main work of some groups. For others, such as the Community of Sant'Egidio, it is part of a much wider process of community and transnational engagement. The Quakers also have a long history of involvement, but almost always quietly and very much behind the scenes.

Any indication of cautious movement by one side that is not immediately ruled out by the other can be the start of a process known as ‘Track II’ diplomacy. An example would be a small group of retired diplomats and academics drawn from both parties meeting in a neutral venue for two or three days to enable each side to get a feel of where the other is coming from.

Such meetings can be vigorously denied by their respective governments or power brokers as having any kind of status whatsoever, the point being that they really don’t have any status – they are merely concerned parties looking for possible routes to progress. It may even be possible for meeting participants to feed back to people acting as links to decision-makers where even those links have no official status. Everything is deniable so anything becomes possible.

This does not mean that we are anywhere near this kind of engagement with Ukraine. But if circumstances do change, there is plenty of scope for progress that eases the way for official involvement. Given the air of pessimism that’s current in diplomatic circles, that is at least something to hold on to. That, and the strange way in which some senior serving US military do not see either side winning; perhaps they will become more vigorous in their willingness to stand up and say so.