Shades of Gray Zone

Russia’s war against Ukraine has destroyed the remnants of Europe’s cooperative security order. Countries between the EU and NATO on the one side and Russia on the other were forced to realize that they must pick sides. Ukraine is the primary victim of Russia’s imperial ambitions to subjugate countries in the gray zone. While the war rages on with few advances by either side, Ukraine seems to be on a path toward westward integration and has severed all ties with Russia.^[1] Georgia, Moldova, and the Western Balkans are also feeling the precariousness of being in between the camps. While the EU had rejected Russia’s logic of spheres of influence in the past, Moscow’s brutality forced it to shift perspective. The EU now unambiguously views enlargement as a geopolitical necessity, even if unity among EU states on accepting new members cannot be taken for granted. NATO enlargement is again on the agenda as well. Meanwhile, Russia’s plans to form a Eurasian counterweight to the EU are floundering, with only its autocratic neighbor Belarus clearly in its camp. As zero-sum dynamics are intensifying in Eastern Europe, the gray zone is taking on different shades, but it is not yet disappearing.

Ukrainians are aware that they are in an existential struggle against Russia, which was reinforced by the revelation that Russians committed scores of atrocities in occupied territories.^[11] According to the Munich Security Index 2024, for an overwhelming majority of Ukrainians, only a complete Russian withdrawal from all their territories, including Crimea, would therefore be acceptable terms for a ceasefire (Figure 2.1). Despite the limited success of Ukraine’s counteroffensive, ­80 percent of Ukrainian citizens believe that their country will win the war. Meanwhile, Ukrainians unambiguously see their future in the West. Clear majorities want to join both the EU and NATO (Figure 2.2), and expect to do so within five years’ time.

Europe long believed that the logic of spheres of influence had become obsolete, instead seeing the shared neighborhood as one where countries in between could engage with EU- and Russian-led frameworks alike. European nations made repeated attempts at forging partnerships with Russia and saw Ukraine as a bridge between East and West. This vision came with a reticence to enlarge the EU and NATO eastward. But Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine shattered this vision of cooperative security and forced Europeans to recognize the importance of enlargement as a “geostrategic investment.”^[12] Moving countries out of the gray zone suddenly became a priority. The EU granted Ukraine and Moldova candidate status and opened accession negotiations with them in record time. It also granted Georgia candidate status, despite significant concerns about the state of democracy and the rule of law in the country.^[13] At the Vilnius Summit in July 2023, the NATO countries reiterated that Ukraine and Georgia will become members. 

With Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova pursuing westward integration, Russia’s only remaining ally in Eastern Europe is Belarus. When Alexander Lukashenko’s regime relied on Putin’s support to crack down on protestors following the sham presidential election in 2020, it traded “sovereignty for regime survival.”^[17] Accordingly, Belarus has played a central role in Russia’s attack on Ukraine. Lukashenko allowed Russian troops to use Belarus as a launch pad for their failed assault on Kyiv. Minsk further provides weaponry, offers training grounds, and participates in the systematic abduction of Ukrainian children.^[18] Russia has also allegedly deployed tactical nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles to Belarus.^[19] Lukashenko’s regime has thus been Russia’s “co-aggressor,”^[20] even if it has not committed Belarussian troops to the war so far. 

Russia may have failed to draw Georgia, Moldova, and the Western Balkans into its camp, but it still seeks to spoil their westward integration. The pro-­­Russian oligarch and founder of Georgia’s governing party, Bidzina Ivanishvili, is held responsible for the country’s recent democratic backsliding and tilt away from the EU, against the wishes of the majority of the Georgian public.^[21] Russia has also used threats of fueling separatism in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to sow instability. Moldova, too, has been a victim of Russian meddling, especially since February 2022.^[22] Russia has stirred unrest in the breakaway region of Transnistria, threatened to cut gas deliveries, and interfered in municipal elections to undermine the pro-European president, Maia Sandu. Little progress on the path to EU membership has also kept the door open for malign Russian influence in the Western Balkans, particularly in Serbia, as well as in Bosnia and Herzegovina.^[23] Serbia not only depends on Russia for its energy supply, but Russia can also leverage its historic ties with the Serb population, links to paramilitary and organized crime groups, and penetration of the information environment. These factors help explain why popular support for EU accession in Serbia is the lowest in the region.^[24] 

In this post-cooperative era of European security, countries stuck in the gray zone between the two camps are in a dangerous place. Ukrainians are already paying the highest price for Russia’s imperial ambitions. Georgia, Moldova, and the Western Balkans are also feeling the impact of Russian coercion. It is in the hands of EU and NATO members to shrink the gray zone. This means actively supporting countries on their path toward EU and NATO membership and setting more ambitious milestones along the way. The EU should concretize the notion of staged accession and reward reform progress with gradual access to its institutions and policies. This should include regular invitations of candidate countries as guests to European Council and Council meetings.^[26] NATO Allies should, where necessary, extend bilateral security guarantees in the interim phase until accession. Above all, EU and NATO members should double down on their financial and military support for Ukraine, because a Russian victory would be catastrophic not only for Ukraine – a battle-hardened Russia with an economy on war footing would rearm quickly and look for its next victim. Nobody in Europe would be safe from Russian aggression and hybrid warfare at a time of growing doubt about the future of the US security umbrella.^[27] A Russian victory would also set a dangerous precedent for conflicts beyond Europe, showing that the sanctity of borders is no longer and that aggression and war crimes are worthwhile.^[28] Decision-makers in Europe and the US must therefore combat “Ukraine fatigue,” help Kyiv to victory, and shrink the gray zone.