In Jakarta, Political Kingmaking Starts Now

Indonesia’s next presidential election may not be until February 2024, but the race is already heating up. With a population of 270 million, Indonesia’s presidential elections in some ways resemble those of the United States, with massive rallies and enormous sums of money spent. Yet while U.S. politics is marked by polarization, ideological alignments in Indonesia are often less clear. And since 2014, one man has dominated Indonesian politics: President Joko Widodo, better known as Jokowi.

Raised in a slum, Jokowi became a successful businessman before entering politics; his rise from city mayor to president seemed to herald a new era in Indonesia. But Jokowi climbed the ladder in part by cannily co-opting established political interests. His ruling coalition now spans seven parties and controls 81 percent of parliamentary seats. Indonesian presidents can only serve two terms, and a post-Jokowi era now beckons. Suggestions that the leader might seek to extend his rule have now faded, leaving a few open possibilities for Indonesia.

It’s still early to predict what might happen in the 2024 election, but history shows the campaign may be light on content. “Indonesian elections have almost no policy in them at all. It’s about which groups of oligarchs and party bosses will support whom. And then it’s sort of an extended popularity contest,” said Ben Bland, the director of the Asia-Pacific program at Chatham House.

This pattern looks set to continue, with parties already publicly sizing up candidates—assessing their electoral prospects and the price they might pay for support. Despite the lack of clear policy divisions, leaders’ personalities and the interest groups that align with them matter. Seen from this perspective, the three leading candidates present three distinct paths for Indonesia: the continuity of an imperfect but democratic brand of politics, a reactive authoritarianism that harkens back to the era of the dictator Suharto, or a move to embrace growing religious radicalism.

Ganjar Pranowo, the governor of the province of Central Java, represents the first of this set of choices and is widely seen as the candidate to beat. Until recently, he led the polls, and he draws comparisons to Jokowi for his relatively humble origins. Ganjar is the son of a policeman, and his nomination by Jokowi’s party—the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P)—seems to confirm the rise of a generation of politicians who took public office after Indonesia’s democratization in 1998 and lack ties to elite families or the military.

Unlike Jokowi, Ganjar was involved in anti-dictatorship activism against Suharto’s rule in the 1990s, joining the opposition party that would eventually become PDI-P. Ganjar entered parliament in 2004 and rose through the political ranks. His emergence as a presidential front-runner owes a great deal to his social media savvy and the tacit support of Jokowi. (Traditionally, Indonesian presidents do not outright endorse their successors, and it’s worth noting that Jokowi is not the party leader of PDI-P.)

At 71 years old, Ganjar’s most significant opponent, Indonesian Minister of Defense Prabowo Subianto, epitomizes Indonesia’s older political generation. He is a former lieutenant general and the former son-in-law of Suharto—once seen as the dictator’s heir apparent. He has been accused of involvement in massacres during Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor and of being involved in the disappearances of Indonesian pro-democracy activists during his time in the military.

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Despite a period of exile, these accusations proved no impediment to Prabowo running for president in 2014 and 2019, nor becoming the defense minister when Jokowi moved to compromise with him after the 2019 vote. Since returning to public service, Prabowo has dropped hints of dissatisfaction with the path of Indonesia’s current political arrangements, suggesting that so-called Western-style democracy might not suit Indonesia and floating reforms that would end the direct election of the president and local officials.

The third leading candidate, Anies Baswedan, is a former governor of Jakarta with ties to Indonesia’s radical Islamist movement. These links raise concerns among Indonesia’s religious minorities, which make up 13 percent of the population, as well as many moderate Muslims. During his 2017 campaign for governor, Anies abandoned his own moderate reputation—as a Fulbright scholar at ease in cosmopolitan settings—to ally with hard-line Islamist forces who accused the incumbent governor, a Christian, of blasphemy. The governor, Basuki Purnama, also known as Ahok, was later sentenced to two years in jail over the charges.

The display of religious and ethnic chauvinism shocked many Indonesians, and Anies has since sought to rehabilitate his image with gestures of interfaith tolerance. As a politician with national ambitions, he appears wary of totally alienating religious minorities. Still, Anies has maintained ties with the leader of the hard-line Islamic Defenders Front, which was central to the anti-Ahok movement, and Indonesia’s largest Islamist party has emerged as a key backer of his presidential bid. Should Anies win the presidency, it could further empower the conservative social forces that have contributed to the recent passage of troubling laws such as a notional ban on extramarital sex.

However, things are rarely clear cut in Indonesian politics. Although Jokowi remains an immensely popular figure, reformers’ hopes that his 2014 victory would represent a break with Indonesia’s old way of doing politics have trickled away as he entered into one deal after another with entrenched interests in pursuit of his development agenda. After all, the law banning extramarital sex passed under his watch, along with others weakening Indonesia’s national anti-corruption commission and undermining labor and environmental protections.

This deal-making makes some observers wary of predictions for reform. “In 2014 and especially 2019 it really seemed like there was everything to play for,” Bland said. “But, after the elections we ended up with the sort of grand coalitions and deals that are business as usual in Indonesia.”

If elected, Ganjar looks set to inherit many of the deals struck by Jokowi—including within the party. PDI-P is the only party large enough to nominate a presidential candidate without entering into a coalition. As was the case for Jokowi, Ganjar’s rise hinged on his successful political courtship of Megawati Sukarnoputri—a former president, the chair of PDI-P since 1999, and perhaps Indonesia’s most important political insider (as well as the daughter of Sukarno, the country’s first president). Megawati still rules the party as a personal fiefdom. In seeking her backing, Ganjar had to make elaborate shows of deference; when PDI-P announced his nomination to the press, Megawati placed a formal peci cap on his head as he bowed before her.

Operating within Megawati’s system can lead to some other awkward contortions. Ganjar—apparently at the party chair’s command—recently became one of a handful of prominent political figures to oppose hosting Israel’s under-20 national soccer team in Indonesia for this year’s U-20 World Cup, citing the example of Sukarno’s position on Palestine. The controversy led FIFA to ditch Indonesia as host at the last minute. In soccer-crazy Indonesia, it also dealt a blow to Ganjar’s popularity.

Local media are now speculating that Ganjar may inherit Jokowi’s alliance with Prabowo as well. A key early backer of Jokowi’s political career, Prabowo became his political foe, clashing in two bitterly contested presidential elections. His refusal to acknowledge Jokowi’s victory in 2019—resembling that of then-U.S. President Donald Trump a year later—sparked violent protests in Jakarta. In a move that may have surprised those unfamiliar with Indonesian politics, Jokowi’s method of defusing the crisis was to offer Prabowo the ministerial position. In the years since, they seem to have built a strong relationship, and Jokowi is now trying to play matchmaker for Ganjar and Prabowo.

Jokowi recently hosted a meeting of key party leaders in his coalition that was widely interpreted as an attempt to persuade Prabowo and other power brokers to back a Ganjar-Prabowo alliance. Such a pairing would likely appeal to many voters, which is doubtless part of Jokowi’s calculations. Playing a key role in shaping the winning coalition would help him cement his legacy. Jokowi may also desire to lock Anies out of power; according to insiders, Jokowi harbors a private dislike of Anies due to the central role he played in the downfall of Ahok, who Jokowi counted as a friend.

But playing second fiddle may be hard for a man of Prabowo’s vaulting ambition. Although he was polling second behind Ganjar, he pulled ahead in at least one recent poll after the U-20 World Cup imbroglio. Whether Prabowo would be open to allying with his current rival remains an open question, and he has hinted at going in either direction. Observers can certainly expect many twists before Indonesia’s General Election Commission starts formally registering candidacies between Oct. 19 and Nov. 25.

Given the circumstances, Prabowo could be tempted to roll the dice one last time. Under Indonesia’s election laws, presidential candidates must take more than 50 percent of the popular vote to win outright. Prabowo currently stands a good chance of making it to a second round. In a Ganjar versus Prabowo race, the latter might profit from his past alliances with Anies. In Prabowo’s absence, Ganjar and Anies would fight over his second-round support. And one cannot rule out an Anies-Prabowo second-round contest, which would be greeted by reformists with profound trepidation.