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WikiLeaks
Press release About PlusD
 
Content
Show Headers
08 NAIROBI 2610; 08 NAIROBI 2253; 08 NAIROBI 2212; 08 NAIROBI 1328 08 NAIROBI 906; 08 NAIROBI 804; 08 NAIROBI 706 CLASSIFIED BY: Mitchell Benedict, Political Counselor, DOS, POL; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) Summary 1. (C) Due to the threat of spillover effects from instability in Somalia, the Government of Kenya views effective border control as its top national security concern. Using multiple funding sources, including 1206 funding, the United States' security sector assistance in Kenya supports the development of both land and sea border security forces to counter border security threats, especially the threat of incursions from Somalia-based militias, some of which have ties to terrorist organizations. (See ref A on maritime security.) The development of the land-based force has focused on two types of units: conventional army infantry battalions and an elite Kenya Army Special Operations Force (KSOF), of which the Kenya Army Ranger Strike Force (RSF) is a part. In 2008, congressional concerns were expressed regarding the further development of the KSOF/RSF when its parent unit at the time, the 20th Parachute Battalion, was alleged to have committed human rights violations during combat operations in the Mt. Elgon region of western Kenya. However, the Kenyan Ministry of Defense (KMOD), in close consultation with the U.S. Mission, has provided the deployment histories of soldiers to be trained and made organizational changes necessary to ensure that the new unit is not contaminated by these allegations. In June 2009, Human Rights Watch raised concerns regarding the conduct of Kenyan military forces that deployed to the Mandera region of northeastern Kenya, including one of the units that we provided assistance to with 1206 funding; however, no assistance has been provided to this unit since that deployment. 2. (U) This is the second in a two-part series of cables outlining current U.S. security sector assistance to Kenya. End summary. Background 3. (C) Due to the threat of spillover effects from fighting in Somalia, the Government of Kenya (GOK) views border control as one of its top national security priorities. In 2003, at the request of the Kenya Ministry of Defense, the United States began to assist in the development of military units capable of responding to cross-border security challenges. With 1206 and other funding, the United States supports the development of both land and sea border security forces to counter the threat of incursions from Somalia-based militias, some of which have ties to the U.S.-designated terrorist organizations al Shabaab and al Qaeda. The development of the land-based force has focused on two types of units: conventional army infantry battalions and an elite Kenya Army Special Operations Force/Ranger Strike Force (KSOF/RSF) company. The DOD executive agent for training the KSOF/RSF is the Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAF), in coordination with the Kenya-U.S. Liaison Office (AFRICOM permanently assigned personnel as part of the Mission country team). The KSOF/RSF training is ongoing. KSOF History and Structure 4. (C) In 2005, U.S. Special Operations Forces established episodic engagement with a company-sized element of the 20th Parachute Battalion called the Ranger Strike Force (RSF - then composed of approximately 99 soldiers), and conducted basic infantry training over the course of several Joint Combined Exercise Training events. From March 2008 to March 2009, SOCAF conducted a series of command-level visits and meetings with Kenyan Army leaders to shape future plans for the Ranger Strike Force development. 5. (C) The Kenyan Army plans to establish a 900-man KSOF Battalion located at GilGil, Kenya by September 2011. This unit will consist of 450 front line troops organized into three companies with an additional company in support. Battalion staff, a headquarters company, a heavy mortar platoon, a reconnaissance platoon and an anti-tank platoon will complete a Kenyan doctrinal light infantry battalion of 900 men. The unit is currently designated as a rapidly deployable motorized unit. However, Kenyan aspirations are to expand deployment options to include Air Mobile (helicopter) and Airborne (parachute) when the necessary platforms become available to move and train the unit. U.S. trainers believe that the Kenya Army is on track to form the unit as described and in the proposed time, exceeding their original expectations. Current KSOF/RSF Engagement Strategy 6. (C) Since October 2007, U.S. forces have engaged a company (plus)-sized RSF and mentored this unit through a six-week basic and advanced light infantry course based on the U.S. Army Ranger model. The first training class started with about 100 new recruits. Those who satisfactorily completed the course work remained together as the first company of the new unit and are now the mid-level leaders and trainers for new members. In the last year, two additional tranches of over 200 new recruits have been assigned to attend the training curriculum. Due to the rigors of this training and subsequent attrition, unit strength is currently about 240 soldiers. The original unit split into two companies in October, and a third company will form in January of 2010 with a mixture of new recruits and volunteers from other units. Allegations of Human Rights Abuses in Mt. Elgon 7. (C) Since its inception, the Kenyan Army has considered the KSOF/RSF to be "in development" and has no plans to field or employ them until they become operational in September of 2011. In March 2008, other elements of the 20th Parachute Battalion (i.e., Headquarters, Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie companies) deployed to the Mt. Elgon region in western Kenya to participate in a joint police-military operation to secure the area from the Sabaot Land Defense Force, a local militia that since 2006 had engaged in a violent campaign to control land and local resources (Refs F and J). A number of credible human rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch, subsequently alleged that security forces (including the military) committed human rights abuses during the operation (Refs E and G-I). In March 2009, in response to these concerns, the Chief of General Staff of the Kenyan Army transferred all KSOF-designated forces from the 20th Parachute Battalion to the 5th Kenya Rifles (Ref B). In addition, the U.S. Mission has incorporated a by-name Leahy vetting process that includes deployment history to screen out any potential student who may have deployed to Mt. Elgon to support the controversial operation. Training of Army Infantry Battalions 8. (C) In 2003-2004, we began providing support to two regular Kenyan Infantry Battalions of 250-450 soldiers each, the 5th and 7th Kenya Rifles. Training for these battalions included field intelligence, basic maneuver and firepower, and command and control. Equipment provided to these units included approximately $3.8 million worth of vehicles (HMMWV's and trailers for fuel, water, and cargo), personal protective and navigational equipment, and handheld radios. Small arms and ammunition were provided in 2006 with 1206 funding. 9. (C) The Kenyan battalion level leadership underwent the entire training program first, and they became the primary trainers for the battalions. Training cycles lasted approximately four weeks each and included team, section, and platoon-level training. The last training event with 7th Kenya Rifles was June - September 2008. Allegations of Human Rights Abuses in Mandera 10. (C) In October 2008, Kenyan police and military forces launched a joint disarmament operation in the remote Mandera Triangle area of North Eastern Province, an area that borders both Somalia and Ethiopia, in response to a violent conflict between warring militias from the Garre and Murulle clans (both ethnic Somali subclans). When word of the operation (and reports of human rights abuses) surfaced, two PolOffs traveled to El Wak, a border town on the Kenya-Somali border in the southern part of Mandera District, to document the abuses (Refs C and D). While the visit made clear that abuses had occurred (PolOffs interviewed and photographed injuries of some of the victims), it appeared that the police, including the Administration Police, were the primary offenders during the operation in that town. 11. (U) In June 2009, Human Rights Watch released a more comprehensive report about the Mandera Triangle operation entitled "Bring the Gun or You'll Die." The report documented testimony from local communities from other towns in the area of the operation alleging that senior army commanders were also "present and supervised the large-scale beating and torture in at least some of the affected communities." Human rights abuses documented included beatings and rape. 12. (C) While it is still unclear the extent to which military forces participated in the abuses, they were present and their active participation, or at least tacit approval, seems likely. (Note: Like in Mt. Elgon, the Government has failed to investigate or hold accountable anyone in the police or the military for abuses. End note.) After the release of the report, Post learned that the 7th Kenya Rifles had deployed to the Mandera Triangle for the operation. However, the United States has not provided any assistance to this unit since the operation. Comment 13. (C) Both the KSOF and the border security infantry battalions are critical elements of the Kenyan military's land-based border security efforts. As we have seen with previous deployments, however, it will be important to balance our shared interests in the development of a strong border security capacity with the respect for human rights. As such, human rights training, conducted by the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies, will remain a critical component of our 1206-funded engagement. We will continue to insist on thorough investigations of alleged abuses, and that those responsible be held accountable. 14. (C) By fiscal year 2011, the KSOF/RSF should be a capable force for border security missions. However, its effectiveness over the next two to five years depends on consistent, measured support from the United States as they fully integrate into Kenya's military force structure. To date, over $14.7 million has been spent on training and equipment related to this program. Section 1206 has provided a significant portion of this funding. However, the goal is to transition as soon as possible to the more institutionalized Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. Lacking sufficient FMF funds limits our ability to further assist these units at a critical point in their development. 15. (C) The KSOF is central to Kenya's national defense strategy and can directly support our peace and security goals in the region. However, our ability to continue providing material and follow-up support to this program is in jeopardy without a change in the funding strategy. The counter-terrorism focus of 1206 funding also limits our ability to provide direct assistance in the capacity building of Kenya's border forces along its other historically problematic borders. Kenya routinely sees border incursions from militia groups from both Ethiopia and Sudan, and while neither is necessarily linked to terrorist organizations they constitute another significant security threat to the populations living in these border areas. RANNEBERGER

Raw content
C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 000009 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/05 TAGS: MARR, MASS, MOPS, EAID, PHUM, SO, KE SUBJECT: Security Sector Assistance in Kenya, Part II: Land Border Security Training REF: 09 NAIROBI 2535; 09 NAIROBI 443; 08 NAIROBI 2660 08 NAIROBI 2610; 08 NAIROBI 2253; 08 NAIROBI 2212; 08 NAIROBI 1328 08 NAIROBI 906; 08 NAIROBI 804; 08 NAIROBI 706 CLASSIFIED BY: Mitchell Benedict, Political Counselor, DOS, POL; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) Summary 1. (C) Due to the threat of spillover effects from instability in Somalia, the Government of Kenya views effective border control as its top national security concern. Using multiple funding sources, including 1206 funding, the United States' security sector assistance in Kenya supports the development of both land and sea border security forces to counter border security threats, especially the threat of incursions from Somalia-based militias, some of which have ties to terrorist organizations. (See ref A on maritime security.) The development of the land-based force has focused on two types of units: conventional army infantry battalions and an elite Kenya Army Special Operations Force (KSOF), of which the Kenya Army Ranger Strike Force (RSF) is a part. In 2008, congressional concerns were expressed regarding the further development of the KSOF/RSF when its parent unit at the time, the 20th Parachute Battalion, was alleged to have committed human rights violations during combat operations in the Mt. Elgon region of western Kenya. However, the Kenyan Ministry of Defense (KMOD), in close consultation with the U.S. Mission, has provided the deployment histories of soldiers to be trained and made organizational changes necessary to ensure that the new unit is not contaminated by these allegations. In June 2009, Human Rights Watch raised concerns regarding the conduct of Kenyan military forces that deployed to the Mandera region of northeastern Kenya, including one of the units that we provided assistance to with 1206 funding; however, no assistance has been provided to this unit since that deployment. 2. (U) This is the second in a two-part series of cables outlining current U.S. security sector assistance to Kenya. End summary. Background 3. (C) Due to the threat of spillover effects from fighting in Somalia, the Government of Kenya (GOK) views border control as one of its top national security priorities. In 2003, at the request of the Kenya Ministry of Defense, the United States began to assist in the development of military units capable of responding to cross-border security challenges. With 1206 and other funding, the United States supports the development of both land and sea border security forces to counter the threat of incursions from Somalia-based militias, some of which have ties to the U.S.-designated terrorist organizations al Shabaab and al Qaeda. The development of the land-based force has focused on two types of units: conventional army infantry battalions and an elite Kenya Army Special Operations Force/Ranger Strike Force (KSOF/RSF) company. The DOD executive agent for training the KSOF/RSF is the Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAF), in coordination with the Kenya-U.S. Liaison Office (AFRICOM permanently assigned personnel as part of the Mission country team). The KSOF/RSF training is ongoing. KSOF History and Structure 4. (C) In 2005, U.S. Special Operations Forces established episodic engagement with a company-sized element of the 20th Parachute Battalion called the Ranger Strike Force (RSF - then composed of approximately 99 soldiers), and conducted basic infantry training over the course of several Joint Combined Exercise Training events. From March 2008 to March 2009, SOCAF conducted a series of command-level visits and meetings with Kenyan Army leaders to shape future plans for the Ranger Strike Force development. 5. (C) The Kenyan Army plans to establish a 900-man KSOF Battalion located at GilGil, Kenya by September 2011. This unit will consist of 450 front line troops organized into three companies with an additional company in support. Battalion staff, a headquarters company, a heavy mortar platoon, a reconnaissance platoon and an anti-tank platoon will complete a Kenyan doctrinal light infantry battalion of 900 men. The unit is currently designated as a rapidly deployable motorized unit. However, Kenyan aspirations are to expand deployment options to include Air Mobile (helicopter) and Airborne (parachute) when the necessary platforms become available to move and train the unit. U.S. trainers believe that the Kenya Army is on track to form the unit as described and in the proposed time, exceeding their original expectations. Current KSOF/RSF Engagement Strategy 6. (C) Since October 2007, U.S. forces have engaged a company (plus)-sized RSF and mentored this unit through a six-week basic and advanced light infantry course based on the U.S. Army Ranger model. The first training class started with about 100 new recruits. Those who satisfactorily completed the course work remained together as the first company of the new unit and are now the mid-level leaders and trainers for new members. In the last year, two additional tranches of over 200 new recruits have been assigned to attend the training curriculum. Due to the rigors of this training and subsequent attrition, unit strength is currently about 240 soldiers. The original unit split into two companies in October, and a third company will form in January of 2010 with a mixture of new recruits and volunteers from other units. Allegations of Human Rights Abuses in Mt. Elgon 7. (C) Since its inception, the Kenyan Army has considered the KSOF/RSF to be "in development" and has no plans to field or employ them until they become operational in September of 2011. In March 2008, other elements of the 20th Parachute Battalion (i.e., Headquarters, Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie companies) deployed to the Mt. Elgon region in western Kenya to participate in a joint police-military operation to secure the area from the Sabaot Land Defense Force, a local militia that since 2006 had engaged in a violent campaign to control land and local resources (Refs F and J). A number of credible human rights organizations, including Human Rights Watch, subsequently alleged that security forces (including the military) committed human rights abuses during the operation (Refs E and G-I). In March 2009, in response to these concerns, the Chief of General Staff of the Kenyan Army transferred all KSOF-designated forces from the 20th Parachute Battalion to the 5th Kenya Rifles (Ref B). In addition, the U.S. Mission has incorporated a by-name Leahy vetting process that includes deployment history to screen out any potential student who may have deployed to Mt. Elgon to support the controversial operation. Training of Army Infantry Battalions 8. (C) In 2003-2004, we began providing support to two regular Kenyan Infantry Battalions of 250-450 soldiers each, the 5th and 7th Kenya Rifles. Training for these battalions included field intelligence, basic maneuver and firepower, and command and control. Equipment provided to these units included approximately $3.8 million worth of vehicles (HMMWV's and trailers for fuel, water, and cargo), personal protective and navigational equipment, and handheld radios. Small arms and ammunition were provided in 2006 with 1206 funding. 9. (C) The Kenyan battalion level leadership underwent the entire training program first, and they became the primary trainers for the battalions. Training cycles lasted approximately four weeks each and included team, section, and platoon-level training. The last training event with 7th Kenya Rifles was June - September 2008. Allegations of Human Rights Abuses in Mandera 10. (C) In October 2008, Kenyan police and military forces launched a joint disarmament operation in the remote Mandera Triangle area of North Eastern Province, an area that borders both Somalia and Ethiopia, in response to a violent conflict between warring militias from the Garre and Murulle clans (both ethnic Somali subclans). When word of the operation (and reports of human rights abuses) surfaced, two PolOffs traveled to El Wak, a border town on the Kenya-Somali border in the southern part of Mandera District, to document the abuses (Refs C and D). While the visit made clear that abuses had occurred (PolOffs interviewed and photographed injuries of some of the victims), it appeared that the police, including the Administration Police, were the primary offenders during the operation in that town. 11. (U) In June 2009, Human Rights Watch released a more comprehensive report about the Mandera Triangle operation entitled "Bring the Gun or You'll Die." The report documented testimony from local communities from other towns in the area of the operation alleging that senior army commanders were also "present and supervised the large-scale beating and torture in at least some of the affected communities." Human rights abuses documented included beatings and rape. 12. (C) While it is still unclear the extent to which military forces participated in the abuses, they were present and their active participation, or at least tacit approval, seems likely. (Note: Like in Mt. Elgon, the Government has failed to investigate or hold accountable anyone in the police or the military for abuses. End note.) After the release of the report, Post learned that the 7th Kenya Rifles had deployed to the Mandera Triangle for the operation. However, the United States has not provided any assistance to this unit since the operation. Comment 13. (C) Both the KSOF and the border security infantry battalions are critical elements of the Kenyan military's land-based border security efforts. As we have seen with previous deployments, however, it will be important to balance our shared interests in the development of a strong border security capacity with the respect for human rights. As such, human rights training, conducted by the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies, will remain a critical component of our 1206-funded engagement. We will continue to insist on thorough investigations of alleged abuses, and that those responsible be held accountable. 14. (C) By fiscal year 2011, the KSOF/RSF should be a capable force for border security missions. However, its effectiveness over the next two to five years depends on consistent, measured support from the United States as they fully integrate into Kenya's military force structure. To date, over $14.7 million has been spent on training and equipment related to this program. Section 1206 has provided a significant portion of this funding. However, the goal is to transition as soon as possible to the more institutionalized Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. Lacking sufficient FMF funds limits our ability to further assist these units at a critical point in their development. 15. (C) The KSOF is central to Kenya's national defense strategy and can directly support our peace and security goals in the region. However, our ability to continue providing material and follow-up support to this program is in jeopardy without a change in the funding strategy. The counter-terrorism focus of 1206 funding also limits our ability to provide direct assistance in the capacity building of Kenya's border forces along its other historically problematic borders. Kenya routinely sees border incursions from militia groups from both Ethiopia and Sudan, and while neither is necessarily linked to terrorist organizations they constitute another significant security threat to the populations living in these border areas. RANNEBERGER
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VZCZCXYZ0000 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHNR #0009/01 0461332 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 051128Z JAN 10 ZDK FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0318 INFO IGAD COLLECTIVE RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE RHMFISS/CJTF HOA RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
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