#SITRep #Sudan On January 24, 2026, the UAE-backed Rapid Support Forces (RSF)’s 46th Group claims to have shot down a Turkish-made Baykar Akıncı drone near Dilling in South Kordofan.

This incident suggests the RSF may have identified a vulnerability, as multiple Akıncı drones have reportedly been downed across the wider Kordofan–Darfur region, though the losses could also stem from human error or limited operator proficiency within the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF).

Although videos often circulate showing soldiers firing machine guns or light anti-aircraft weapons at drones, it is more likely that a Chinese-made air defense system was responsible, specifically the FK-2000 combined gun-missile system or the FB-10A short-range surface-to-air missile.

After the drone is hit and visibly damaged, infantry fighters frequently film themselves firing at it, reinforcing morale and promoting the narrative of ground forces defeating advanced aerial platforms.

The RSF have repeatedly claimed the destruction of Turkish-made Bayraktar drones during Sudan’s civil war, including on July 10, 2025, when a Baykar Bayraktar Akıncı was shot down over El Fasher in North Darfur; on August 24 and 26, 2025, when another Akıncı was reportedly downed over Nyala in South Darfur; on September 4, 2025, over the Marshang area of South Darfur; on September 13, 2025, when a third Akıncı was claimed destroyed over Al Khoei in West Kordofan; on October 7, 2025, when another Akıncı was reported shot down near El Fasher in North Darfur; and on December 10, 2025, when RSF statements said a Turkish-made Bayraktar drone was downed in Western Kordofan.

Based on open estimates that a Bayraktar Akıncı can cost approximately $30 million per unit (figures vary, with some industry estimates ranging from around $30 million to over $50 million per unit depending on configuration and sensors), the six reported losses so far would represent a roughly $180 million in losses.

Ultimately, this suggests the war is not de-escalating, and there are growing concerns that an openly aired Saudi-UAE rivalry could further intensify the conflict.

More about how the UAE-Saudi spat can affect the Horn of Africa region in Basha Report’s Substack