Why the Islamic Republic Still Stands? The Answer Lies in Its Onion-Like Structure

On wednsday evening March 11, the Speaker of Iran’s parliament Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf wrote on his Twitter account: I have three recommendations for you: take to the streets, take to the streets, take to the streets.

Meanwhile ddressing the people of Iran, Reza Pahlavi tweeted: for your own safety, leave the streets and remain in your homes.

An Iranian user on X wrote: It’s a strange situation: the opposition says stay home; the government says take to the streets.

Since the beginning of the Israeli and American attacks on Iran, the nights in Tehran have known no silence. From the sky comes the roar of fighter jets; from the streets come the chants of “Heydar, Heydar” by Basij members and other forces loyal to the Islamic Republic, whose role is to instill fear in potential opponents of the regime. “Heydar” is a nickname of Ali, the first Imam in Shi’a Islam, who is also remembered in Shia history for his role in early battles against Jewish tribes in the early years of Islam.

The large squares of the city are filled with crowds who, after a day of fasting during Ramadan, spend the night in something resembling a collective carnival alongside other like-minded supporters and loyal believers of the Islamic Republic.

These people are called the regime’s “hard core.”

The expression “the hard core of the regime” (haste-ye sakht-e nezam) in Iranian political discourse refers to the network of forces, institutions, and social bases that constitute the most loyal, resilient, and uncompromising supporters of the Islamic Republic.

Layers of this hard core bear the primary responsibility for safeguarding the ideology and survival of the regime and serve as its defensive shield in times of crisis. Their loyalty is unwavering, and under no circumstances do they withdraw their support.

This core also includes appointed and security institutions that function as the ultimate decision-makers in major strategic matters and constitute the innermost circle of power. Their survival is inseparable from the survival of the system and vice versa.

For this reason, the Islamic Republic uses every means at its disposal to preserve their loyalty and satisfaction, since their disillusionment or defection could threaten the stability of the entire structure. They are widely regarded as the backbone of the ruling order.

Over the past four decades, much of the Islamic Republic’s material and symbolic capital has been invested in building and preserving this hard core.

“Velayat-e Faqih” (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist) is the sole source of political and religious legitimacy in the Islamic Republic. The system persuades its loyalists that obedience to the Supreme Leader is a religious duty. As the first leader of the system stated, preserving the system is “the most obligatory of obligations,” and even essential religious duties such as prayer, fasting, or pilgrimage may be set aside if necessary to protect it. Even if you are someone who merely wishes to participate in decision-making at the level of a village council, you must meet a set of requirements, including Iranian citizenship, being at least 25 years old, and belief in and practical commitment to Islam and the absolute guardianship of the jurist.

A large portion of the regime’s hard core, especially those connected to the IRGC, has deep economic interests in the country. At a time when corruption and sanctions have severely affected the livelihoods of much of the population, the economic survival and wealth of these individuals are closely tied to the survival of the system itself.

Both small and large privileges are distributed across this network of loyalists: from full coverage of healthcare to permits to import luxury cars and the ability to purchase basic necessities at prices below market rates in stores affiliated with the armed forces.

During his long leadership, Ali Khamenei has consciously built parallel institutions alongside the main structures of the state. As a result, the system is not a fragile structure that collapses when one pillar is removed. Rather, because of its layered nature, even if some upper layers of power are damaged, the system can still reproduce its internal cells and suppress its opponents.

For example, the Islamic Republic maintains multiple intelligence and security bodies, including the Ministry of Intelligence, the IRGC Intelligence Protection Organization, the Police Intelligence Protection Organization, and the Judiciary’s Intelligence Protection Organization.

In addition, nearly every institution, large or small has its own internal security office. These units operate under the broader national security oversight structure and monitor even the smallest aspects of employees’ organizational behavior.

Beyond all this, more than a hundred institutions operating as “Supreme Councils” have formed a dense and complex governance structure that helps sustain the system.

In the Islamic Republic, not everyone has access to the layers of power. From the earliest years of the regime’s establishment, a strict vetting system called “Gozinesh” was created to recruit personnel, a kind of loyalty test. Based on ideological and political criteria, it ensures that those entering the power structure are the most loyal elements to the principles of the revolution.

Over the decades, whenever one of the figures inside the vast apparatus of the Islamic Republic has attempted to break away, the system has used various methods, including repression and imprisonment, to ensure that their fate becomes a lesson for others. The use of advanced surveillance systems and parallel intelligence bodies within the very core of power suffocates any sign of disobedience or doubt at its earliest stage.

Therefore, when you think about the Islamic Republic regime, you should think of something resembling several onions intertwined, rather than a simple top-down hierarchical structure where removing one part causes the entire system to collapse. Even if all military commanders were killed, a Basij member in a small town would still know what his duty is in preserving the system and would carry it out without waiting for organizational orders. That duty could be blocking streets, arresting protesters, or distributing food among the remaining loyal forces.