"Are you referring to the world or to your world? Seems to me there is a critical difference." Both: the shared structure of existence that any attentive observer encounters (predation of other living creatures as a condition of living which violates the Golden Rule, impermanence, disproportionate suffering, injustice), and my own lived apprehension of that structure. These are features that philosophical pessimism, Buddhism, Schopenhauer, Leopardi, and others have independently converged on, not idiosyncratic impressions nor materialist reductions.

"Your responses, correct me if I am wrong, seems to presuppose that I am working with idealistic belief where you are working with facts?" My starting point is phenomenological in a strict sense: what does existence disclose prior to metaphysical reconciliation? Frameworks are then tested against it, not the other way around. So I’m not assuming you’re working with “idealistic belief” while I’m working with “facts.” I’m saying that your framework permits moral coherence to be restored teleologically through Christ properly understood, higher synthesis, or ultimate reconciliation, whereas mine does not allow coherence to be deferred beyond the structure of this world as it actually appears.

In my case, lower-level observations about suffering, predation, and moral inversion exert pressure upward on higher-order beliefs. When those beliefs require the world to be ultimately just, I experience contradiction - not speculation, but experiential incoherence. That’s the limit condition Abraxas names for me. If there’s a disagreement here, it’s about whether the world we inhabit is theologically redeemable without remainder.