Following our recent interview with Tariq al-Shoufi, leader of the Suwayda Military Council, we are now publishing an interview with Najib Abu Fakhr, head of the Political Bureau of the Southern Syria Military Council. For context, Tariq al-Shoufi is the deputy commander of the Southern Syria Military Council and the founder of the Suwayda Military Council. According to Najib Abu Fakhr, there will be an integration of the councils from the south, the coast, the northeast, and other regions in the future.
Attached are two documents: a 2017 report from the Syrian intelligence services discussing the activities of Najib Abu Fakhr (sent by him) and a declaration from the Southern Syria Military Council appointing him as head of the political bureau.
Interview with Najib Abu Fakhr, head of the Political Bureau of the Southern Syria Military Council.
Najib Abu Fakhr
1) Could you introduce yourself? Where were you born? What is your background? What were you doing before and during the civil war? And at the end of the Assad regime last December?
My name is Najib Hazaa Abu Fakhr. I was born in Suwayda in 1972, I come from an agricultural background. I graduated in International Relations from Damascus University in 2002 and represented my university in cultural seminars abroad.
Before the war, I worked in investment rationalization and sustainable development, but my projects clashed with the regime’s monopoly. In 2010, I was imprisoned for publishing critical articles and spent 17 months in detention, where I met key political figures, including Mashaal Tammo (a Syrian Kurdish opposition figure who spent many years in prison and was assassinated in 2011).
My involvement in the revolution began in prison. After my release in 2011, I participated in protests and the National Salvation Conference. I later moved to Turkey and Jordan, organizing conferences and media training for activists.
Since 2015, I have focused on arming and protecting Druze communities against extremist threats, negotiating hostage releases, and supporting military coordination. I have participated in various political and ethnic dialogue initiatives, including the Syrian Federation workshops and Turkmen and Kurdish conferences.
Currently, I head the Political Bureau of the Southern Syria Military Council and am a founding member of the Syrian Alternative Movement, which will be announced soon.
2) How did you react to the fall of the regime? And the takeover by HTS and Ahmad al-Shara in the past three months?
All Syrians were very happy with the fall of a regime that had been sitting on our chests for more than half a century. It was a long time. Even if they had been angels, this period would have been unbearable. They were not angels in any case.
As for me, I was not surprised by Mr. Ahmed al-Sharaa taking power with the support of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham. Rather, I believe this was necessary for an important reason: the prestige of the organization in front of the rest of the factions. If any weak faction had taken over Damascus, the country would have entered into conflicts between the factions themselves to share influence. Therefore, its tight control was in the interest of temporarily stabilizing the country.
But after that, while we were waiting for the birth of a participatory state, surprises began to unfold—starting with the dismantling of the army and the state, the appointment of foreign mujahideen to sovereign positions, and ultimately the monopolization of national decisions, especially sovereign ones. This was shocking, although expected.
3) What motivated you to work within the Military Council of Southern Syria?
We were always looking for a way to overthrow the regime. We failed many times because of the international influence on the Syrian file. That is why, during the establishment of the Military Council of Southern Syria, I always used to say: We are the fruits of failure until today, but failure itself will turn into success as a result of the experience we have gained.
Hence, the Military Council was the fruit of experiments. First, it does not carry the entire Syrian burden, which was a major obstacle, and second, it is consistent with the possible reality. We started the experiment with great enthusiasm because the south, in particular, represents significant political weight, and we learned from the experience how important it is for the entire Middle East, not just at the Syrian level.
4) How many groups/factions are within the council? How many men does that represent?
The factions affiliated with the Council are distributed across the Syrian desert and the governorates of Daraa, Suwayda, Quneitra, and the Damascus countryside. However, not all of them are active now as we are allowing space for the new era to demonstrate its ability to govern the country fairly. If not, they will be activated.
5) Were these groups active during the civil war?
Yes, these groups were active during the past fourteen years in different factions, but after the Astana Agreement and the de-escalation, most of them turned into security cells within the council, which was established in 2020 to bring them together after they had dispersed again.
6) What are your demands as a group?
Our demands as a group are to establish a strong, constitutional, democratic, pluralistic, and participatory state that meets the aspirations of the Syrian people, is capable of developing its resources, and serves not only as a protective and caring state but also as a welfare state.
7) Some major Druze factions have not joined the council, such as Liwa al-Rijal al-Karama and Liwa al-Jabal. How do you feel about that?
The goal of the Military Council is to control uncontrolled and indiscriminate weapons and to organize small factions. As for the large and organized factions, coordination can be made with them in the future, and tasks can be shared if necessary.
8) What is the role of the Druze shaykhs in your project, organization, and discourse? Specifically, what role does Shaykh Hikmat al-Hijri play?
Sheikh Hikmat Al-Hijri is a sheikh whose speech is that of a Syrian nationalist who calls for the same goals that concern us. Therefore, he is the spearhead of the Syrian national project, and from here, we are with him on the same goal.
9) Clashes took place yesterday in Jaramana between security forces and Druze factions. How do you see the situation? And how do you envision resolving this crisis?
The Jaramana problem was resolved diplomatically. Of course, we do not want blood to be shed in Syria again. Today, a murder also took place in the village of Al-Tha’la between the Druze and the Bedouin tribes, and a child from the Bedouin tribes became its victim, unfortunately. But tomorrow, we will be keen to contain the strife, resolve the issue by amicable means, and hold the perpetrator accountable for what he did, so that the fire does not spread to the entire country.
10) There was a special government envoy to Suwayda, Mustapha Bakour. Do you have any communication channels with him?
Yes, we are in constant contact with Dr. Mustafa Bakour. He is a good person, dedicated to his work, and loved by the majority in As-Suwayda because he is both hardworking and noble.
11) It seems that the Suwayda Military Council is close to the SDF and also to groups from the Syrian coastal region. Is that the case? What is the nature of these ties?
Relations with the Syrian Democratic Forces have not been severed, but they are not useful yet. They are not completely serious. They are looking for employees and do not want partners. We in the Military Council of Southern Syria have tried many times, but we have not cut ties in any way, even though their involvement is limited to words and promises. As for the so-called Coast Council, there is continuity, but it is newly established. We wait until its construction is effectively completed. Perhaps cooperation will occur if circumstances require it in the future.
12) Do you want a decentralized or federal state? Or even autonomy for the Suwayda province?
We want to establish a free, decentralized Syrian state in principle. However, if Syria continues to be controlled by unilateral will, as is happening now, marginalizing all Syrians, we will persist in seeking a federal state similar to those of the European Union and other countries in the civilized world. This is because such a system is more flexible, free, and fair as well.
13) Israel is invading southern Syria. What is your perspective on this development? Could Israel become an ally in a potential confrontation with jihadist groups or security forces?
In the event of a confrontation with jihadists, we do not rule out an alliance with any regional power in order to achieve victory. Originally, the Military Council was established to contribute to the fight against terrorism with the international coalition, and this is part of our prior alliances.
14) What is your message to the new government in Damascus?
Our message to the new government in Damascus is that the Syrian people are waiting to realize their dreams of building a free, participatory, and constitutional state in which all Syrians can take part. Only Syrians should govern their country, not foreign mujahideen. What you are doing is undermining the Syrian dream and will force us to explore new paths to help realize the aspirations of the Syrian people, so that Syria can become a safe country, not just for one part of it, but for all of its diverse population.
15) What is your message to the West?
Our message to the West is to pay more attention to Syria and not turn a blind eye to the core of what is happening there. Syria’s diversity should not be reduced to a single narrative. The freedom of belief must be preserved and protected. If you fail to uphold what is your moral duty, it becomes a deliberate act. You have abandoned the Syrian people twice in their time of suffering: once when they were being bombed by the Assad regime, and again when the disciples of Al-Qaeda seized power, with your tacit approval and disregard for the gravity of the situation. History will remember, and so will we.
This document — provided by Abu Fakhr himself — is a report from the Syrian Political Security Directorate, dated January 1, 2017, discussing the formation of the “Mountain Brigade” in Suwayda Governorate and the role of Najib Abu Fakhr. Below is a refined translation of the key sections:
A recent formation, the so-called “Mountain Brigade,” has been created by merging several armed local groups in the Suwayda Governorate under a unified leadership. This formation aims to defend the governorate and provide support to the army and relevant authorities when necessary, according to their claims (as noted in our telegram to the Information Branch No. 448/B S. dated 1/17/2017).
These factions had previously attempted to unify under a single command at the National Defense Center in Suwayda, led by Rashid Salloum, the commander of the National Defense. However, this effort failed (refer to our telegram No. 5286/B S. dated 7/24/2016 to the Technical Branch, a copy of which was sent to the Information Branch).
We have gathered intelligence suggesting that this brigade will be funded from abroad, with Jordanian intelligence support, particularly through a figure named Najib Hazaa Abu Fakhr, who is originally from Suwayda and currently resides in Jordan. He is also one of the key figures behind the Sindyan Conference for the Druze community held in Turkey in 2014. Abu Fakhr has several warrants out for his arrest and was previously detained by the Air Force Intelligence in Damascus for his opposition activities.
At this time, no visible movement of these groups has been observed on the ground.
Information also points to the creation of this brigade as a preparatory step for potential external intervention in the Suwayda Governorate, should the partition plans advocated by countries opposed to Syria come to fruition.
There are indications that Jordan, under King Abdullah’s leadership, is actively seeking involvement in the Suwayda Governorate, including efforts to hold a Druze conference in Jordan. Additionally, Ayman Safadi, the Jordanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is also a member of the Druze community, has been involved in these efforts. This is evident in Jordanian media, especially visual platforms, which highlight the involvement of the Druze community in Jordan.
Moreover, Najib Abu Fakhr recently published an article on the Sandyan page, which he manages. In it, he warns that Suwayda is in imminent danger due to the presence of ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra along its borders, which threatens the region’s minorities, particularly the Yazidis, who were targeted and exterminated by ISIS. Abu Fakhr stresses that Druze leaders must act within international forums to secure official crossings with Jordan, which, according to him, would only open unless […].
This document is an official decision from the Military Council of the Southern Sector, dated March 11, 2022, assigning Mr. Najib Abu Fakhr to manage the Political Bureau.
