Great article. Especially good is "6. The Strongest Objections", because it is not afraid of philosophy and metaphysics. But Zurek himself tried to avoid those, at most he used 'the ontological commitment was already in the question' defenses.

But maybe it was wise of Zurek to avoid those, because Deivon Drago arrived at a very Everett-like-picture here, despite aiming for a "conservative upgrade" to the orthodox framework. Zurek also did work with consistent histories, so he did not overcommit to Everett. And he had no trouble with probabilities or "reproducibility and repetition" to give probabilities their "naive" meaning (as compared to the elaborations of Everettians and QBists).

I guess a real "conservative upgrade" of the orthodox (Copenhagen-like) framework would rather have to "dethrone" observation as the one and only method to know anything (Heisenberg's mistake, probably inherited form Descartes), and clarify that preparation and "filtering" are not necessarily observations.

(I know, I am late to the party. Came from Peter Woit, and had to first read a bit to learn whether Deivon Drago is afraid of philosophy and metaphysics.)