Zhang v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2023 CanLII 123767 (CA IRB)
ID File / Dossier de la SI : 0001‑C3‑00110‑01 AH
UCI / ICU : 63161754
Reasons and Decision − Motifs et décision
Public proceeding/ Procédure publique
REASONS FOR DECISION
[1] The Minister of Public Safety and Preparedness (the Minister) referred Ms. Zhang to the Immigration Division (the Division), seeking a Deportation Order against her. He asserts that due to her 11-year employment with the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO), Ms. Zhang is inadmissible to Canada for security reasons under paragraphs 34(1)(f)x(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (the IRPA).[1] The Minister submits the OCAO is an organization that engaged in acts of espionage against Canada, and against Canada’s interests, by infiltrating and gathering information on overseas Chinese communities in Canada and other countries, targeting Chinese dissidents such as Falun Gong practitioners and other minorities including Uyghur and Taiwanese populations, as well as Chinese Canadian citizens.[2]
[2] Ms. Zhang initially conceded to the allegations in the 44(1) Report, after which the Minister provided oral submissions.[3] However, at the resumption of her hearing, she changed her position: she withdrew her prior concessions regarding membership in the OCAO.[4] While she concedes that she was an employee of the OCAO, she argues that this does not make her a member of the OCAO for the purposes of inadmissibility.[5] She seeks a favourable decision.
DECISION
[3] I find the Minister met the burden of proof and established that Ms. Zhang is a foreign national who is inadmissible to Canada on grounds of security under s. 34(1)(f)x(a) of the IRPA for having been a member of an organization where there are reasonable grounds to believe the organization engages, has engaged and will engage in an act of espionage against Canada, or contrary to Canada’s interests. A Deportation Order is attached to these reasons.
BURDEN and standard OF PROOF
[4] The burden of proof belongs to the Minister.
[5] By operation of s. 33 of the IRPA, the facts that constitute inadmissibility include facts arising from omissions and, unless otherwise provided, include facts for which there are reasonable grounds to believe they have occurred, are occurring or may occur. Reasonable grounds to believe must be more than a mere suspicion, but less than the standard applicable in civil matters of proof on a balance of probabilities. It applies to questions of fact and must be based objectively on compelling and credible evidence.[6]
ISSUES
[6] The determinative issues are as follows:
Issue 1: Is the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office an organization that engaged in espionage against Canada or Canada’s interests?
Answer: Yes.
Issue 2: Does Ms. Zhang’s employment at the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office make her a member of that organization for the purpose of inadmissibility?
Answer: Yes.
ANALYSIS
Uncontested Facts
[7] The following facts are established on reasonable grounds to believe, based on the documentary evidence that includes interviews CBSA conducted with Ms. Zhang, and concessions and testimony by Ms. Zhang at her admissibility proceeding:
• Ms. ZHANG is a citizen of China. She does not have Canadian citizenship and she is not a Permanent Resident of Canada. Therefore, she is a foreign national.[7]
• Ms. Zhang was employed by the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, or OCAO, from 2008 to 2019.[8]
• In March 2019, her employment moved from the OCAO to the Overseas Chinese Federation.[9]
• Ms. Zhang retired in 2020.[10]
Issue 1: The OCAO is an organization that engaged in espionage against Canada or Canada’s interests.
Legislative Framework
(1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on security grounds for
(f) being a member of an organization that there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage in acts referred to in paragraph (a), (b), (b.1) or (c)
(a) engaging in an act of espionage that is against Canada or that is contrary to Canada’s interests.
[9] The Minister is required to establish the following with respect to the first issue:
• The OCAO is an organization;
• The OCAO has engaged in espionage; and
• The espionage is against Canada or contrary to Canada’s interests.
Organization
[10] The IRPA does not define “organization”. Jurisprudence outlines factors to consider in determining whether a group constitutes an organization under s. 37 of the IRPA, organized criminality, which is applicable to organizations under s. 34:[11]
The word “organization” is to be given a broad and unrestricted interpretation to prioritize the security of Canadians. It is necessary to adopt a flexible approach in assessing whether the attributes of a particular group meet the requirements of the IRPA, given their varied, changing, and clandestine nature.[12]
Several factors could assist in deciding as to the existence of a criminal organization – such as identity, leadership, a loose hierarchy, a basic organizational structure, an occupied territory, and regular meeting locations.[13]
While generally none of these factors is essential, some level of structure and continuity must be present for a criminal organization to exist due to their institutional advantages.[14]
Position of the Parties – Organization
[11] The Minister alleges there are reasonable grounds to believe that the OCAO is an organization because it was a government department or a government office of the Chinese government, or the People’s Republic of China (PRC). He cites the PRC’s website where the OCAO is identified as an administrative office which assists the Premier in handling affairs related to overseas Chinese. It names specific responsibilities and functions, which include Consulate protection and overseas Chinese affairs. The Minister notes that staff members dedicated to overseas Chinese are estimated to be in the tens of thousands and the OCAO has attachments, PRC embassies, consulates, and representative agencies in almost every country, to personally liaise with overseas Chinese communities. Prior to 2018, the OCAO was an administrative office under the state Council of the PRC, responsible for liaising with and influencing overseas Chinese. In 2018, it merged into the United Front Work Department (UFWD), carrying out the work of and being controlled by the UFWD.[15]
[12] Ms. Zhang did not make submissions as to whether the OCAO was an organization.
Findings – Organization
[13] Based on jurisprudence and the Minister’s documentary evidence, as well as Ms. Zhang’s testimony, I find reasonable grounds to believe the OCAO is or was an organization for the purpose of inadmissibility under s. 34 of the IRPA.
[14] According to the objective country evidence, which has not been disputed, the OCAO is an external name of the UFWD of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It is tasked with conducting Overseas Chinese affairs work, or qiaowu.[16] In research by Dr. To, the term Overseas Chinese (OC) is a generic term used to describe all ethnic Chinese people residing abroad. Some use the term to describe both Chinese nationals living outside of China, as well as ethnic Chinese of foreign citizenship. The PRC’s focus is all ethnic Chinese, no matter what their origin or citizenship.[17] Qiaowu work, a means of influencing overseas ethnic Chinese people, intensified after the violent crackdown against students demonstrating in Tiananmen Square in 1989.[18]
[15] A diagram from 2007 shows the OCAO and its direct relationship to the State Council, provincial and town level OCAO organizations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the All-China Federation of Returned OC, the Zhighong Party, OC frontline services, as well as all Ministries and Embassy’s/Consulates. It also shows the OCAO falls under a “guided relationship” by the CCP Propaganda/Publicity Department.[19]
[16] I find the OCAO has had a long history with a specific title or identity, a structure with hierarchy, continuity of leadership and reporting lines, specific functions, and responsibilities. Its work objectives are or were carried out by thousands of employees in various locations throughout the world. Its overarching goal is or was to influence overseas Chinese, through a variety of means.[20] There are reasonable grounds to believe the OCAO remains active today, having been subsumed by the UFWD 2018. I find reasonable grounds to believe it is an organization for the purpose of inadmissibility under s. 34(1)(f)x(a) of the IRPA.
Espionage against Canada
[17] “Espionage” is not defined in the IRPA. Jurisprudence has defined it as a method of information gathering, by spying, by acting in a covert way,[21] or through “surreptitious or covert information gathering.”[22] The prohibited conduct implies that the acts are carried out knowingly and with intent to do so.[23] However, there need not be an illicit outcome as a goal.[24]
[18] Though not binding on the Division, the Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada’s (IRCC) Enforcement Manual describes “espionage against Canada” as meaning espionage activities conducted by a foreign state or organization in Canada and/or abroad against any Canadian public or private security sector entity on behalf of a foreign government.
Espionage contrary to Canada’s interests
[19] “Contrary to Canada’s interest” is not defined in the IRPA, and jurisprudence on the subject is limited. The principles from jurisprudence can be summarized as follows:
• “Canada’s interests” is not equivalent to “things Canada is interested in”; a nexus to Canada’s national security is required to engage paragraph 34(1)(a) of the IRPA.[25]
• It is not enough that the acts committed are contrary to Canadian values or democratic principles.[26]
• Section 34 of the IRPA may operate whether or not there is a connection to national security or the security of Canada; Parliament intended that the provisions relate to security in a broader sense.[27]
[20] The IRCC Enforcement manual includes a non-exhaustive list of examples that may constitute espionage “contrary to Canada’s interests”:[28]
• Espionage activity committed inside or outside Canada that would have a negative impact on the safety, security, or prosperity of Canada, including but not limited to financial, economic, social, and cultural factors.
• Espionage against Canadian commercial or private interests.
• The use of Canadian territory to carry out espionage activities that may be contrary to Canada’s national security and public safety and therefore against Canada’s interests.
• Espionage activity directed against Canada’s allies may be contrary to Canada’s interests.
[21] While the Enforcement Manual is not binding on the Division, it provides guidance, policies, and procedures for IRCC and CBSA staff. The Court has referred to these factors recently in Weldemariam, 2020 FC 631 and Gao, 2022, FC 64.
Positions of the parties - Espionage
[22] The Minister submits the OCAO is or was involved in infiltrating overseas Chinese communities in Canada, targeting Chinese dissidents in Canada such as Falun Gong practitioners and other minorities including Uyghur and Taiwanese populations, as well as Chinese Canadian citizens.[29] He asserts the OCAO engaged in covert action and intelligence against them, manipulating them. The Minister emphasized that managing the overseas Chinese community’s behaviour is accomplished through incentive or disincentive, intelligence gathering and surveillance against overseas Chinese communities, and the OCAC engaged in espionage and operated in Canada.[30]
[23] The Minister’s evidence includes open-source materials from PRC publicly available websites, Wikipedia entries, news articles from agencies in various countries, IRB responses to information requests, Human Rights reports, and a 2009 Doctoral Thesis entitled “Hand-In-Hand, Heart-to-Heart: Qiaowu and the Overseas Chinese” (hereafter “Dr. To’s Thesis”).
[24] The Minister also relies on Gao,[31] where the Federal Court recently upheld an Immigration Officer’s finding that the OCAO is an organization that engaged in espionage against Canada’s interests. The Federal Court found that it was reasonable for an Immigration Officer to conclude that the OCAO engaged in covert and surreptitious intelligence gathering against the overseas Chinese communities and other minorities around the world. Similarly, it was reasonable to conclude this included overseas Chinese communities in Canada and allied countries, which can be considered contrary to Canada’s interests.[32]
[25] Ms. Zhang made no substantive submissions on whether the OCAO was an organization that engaged in, is engaging in, or will engage in espionage against Canada or its interests.[33] She also made no objections to the evidence provided by the Minister, nor did she provide objective evidence to counter the Minister’s documentary evidence.
[26] However, Ms. Zhang argues that the Minister cannot rely on findings from Gao because he did not disclose the CBSA Report in that case, which concerns the OCAO.[34]
Findings
[27] Overall, I find the Minister’s documentary evidence to be reliable and persuasive. There are reasonable grounds to believe the OCAO is an organization that engaged in espionage against Canada, and against Canada’s interests.
[28] The Minister argues they did not disclose the CBSA Report from Gao in Ms. Zhang’s proceeding because the report is a client-specific report from the National Security Screening Directorate of CBSA and disclosing it would place the CBSA in jeopardy of legal action.[35]
[29] It is problematic that the CBSA Report underlying Gao and the first instance decision is not in evidence. The Minister has not provided the identical evidence in Gao to the Division in this case. However, the Minister has submitted some of the same evidence in this case that was before the Division in Gao, such as Dr. To’s Thesis. I find Gao has some applicability to Ms. Zhang’s case as it also relates to an alleged member of the OCAO, and because the Federal Court addressed findings on the OCAO as an organization that has engaged in espionage against Canada or contrary to Canada’s interests.
[30] Gao establishes that it is open to the Division to find the OCAO is an organization described in s. 34(1)(a) of the IRPA as the Federal Court found that it was reasonable for the decision maker to do so in that case. Recognizing that while there is different evidence before the panel in this case and I must undertake my own analysis of the issues, Gao provides an example of a similar case where the OCAO was found to be an organization engaged in espionage against Canada or Canada’s interests.
[31] Excerpts of relevant segments of the Minister’s evidence are summarized below.
Dr. To’s Thesis - The Evolution of qiaowu and the OCAO
[32] Dr. To’s Thesis, published in 2009, constitutes a five-year in-depth examination of a wide variety of sources. It includes Chinese government policy documents and public statements, and other states’ evidence. I find it to be reliable, persuasive and probative. It substantiated the CCP’s attempts to impose a wide extension of social order upon OC both inside and outside of China, involving the absorption or destruction of social groups that obstruct its complete control through qiaowu. Qiaowu evolved into a comprehensive set of regulations, laws and policies overseen by a framework of government and non-governmental entities.[36] Qiaowu analysts describe OCs as a “vital treasure trove of human resource.”[37] Salient points in its evolution, and some of the activities undertaken include:
• The first iteration of the OCAO was established in 1922.[38] Another iteration of the OCAO launched in 1978 to re-establish qiaowu policy.[39]
• Practically, qiaowu has two aims: attract the OC back into the fold of the Chinese nation state and convey and project to them the nation state agenda. Its policy has two categories: policy for the OC in China, including returned Chinese and relatives and dependents of returned Chinese residents in China, and policy for the external Chinese diaspora and ethnic Chinese of foreign nationality. A pro-active effort, it takes advantage of the economic, political, and cultural opportunities between China and the OC.[40]
• Implicit in its goals is the elimination of potential threats and rival discourses that may challenge the CCP and its hold on power. It can be described as a massive operation involving incorporation and co-optation of the OC at every level of society and managing their behaviour and perceptions through incentive or disincentive to suit the situation and structural circumstances that the CCP desires.[41]
• Qiaowu implementing organizations followed centrally established policies while specialized bureaus handled particular aspects. The CCP and the State Council shared leadership for the key-coordinating functions, instructing and guiding the entire qiaowu apparatus by formulating relevant policy and ideological direction. Subordinate units attended to the practical aspects by cooperating and coordinating with each other to implement these policies.
• Overall, there were five major qiaowu organizations working closely together at all administrative levels to achieve its goals. Two operated under central government lines while the other three were intimately linked with the CCP and the UWFD.
• The OCAO, a direct report to the State Council, re-emerged in 1978 and became the leading OC affairs organ for the PRC. It served as the national level government body devoted to the co-ordination and implementation of OC policy through provincial and country level representation.
• OCAO responsibilities included (1) drafting qiaowu policy and planning, interrelated laws and regulations, drafting, supervising, inspecting, and implementing affairs; (2) intelligence gathering and dissemination, researching on both domestic and foreign OC affairs; and (3) co-ordinating through the super-structure by assisting the State Council executive in handling all OC matters, including overall planning, coordination and guiding of OC work with other government divisions and social organizations, and co-operating with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by guiding consular offices and embassies in with OC work.[42]
• All divisions within the OCAO maintained close relations to the relevant CCP Central Committee Departments and various government ministries and agencies. The extensive links filtered down to provincial and city/town OCAO levels. Local OCAO offices worked with other local level organs of the Foreign Affairs Office, which operated under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Economic and Trade Commission, the UFWD and the Propaganda Department.[43]
• Other major qiaowu organizations included the All-China Federation of returned Overseas Chinese Association and the UFWD. They shared the responsibility of advancing various aspects of OC affairs, managing the framework, formulating technique and policy, and implementing those designs.
• The UFWD reported to the CCP Central Committee; it is key to ensuring that qiaowu is implemented according to the wishes of the CCP. It works with the relevant government ministries and OCAO to achieve its objectives.[44]
Policies, tactics, and espionage
[33] According to Dr. To, the OCAO employs qiaowu policy, a discourse concealed from the public with techniques that are a very private part of OC policy. It is a form of people-to-people diplomacy, based upon emotional exchange and integration according to basic human sensibilities, needs and desires. It is a continuous effort to employ social and psychological tools to influence the choices, directions, and emotions of the OC by dispelling their negative suspicions and misunderstandings concerning China, replacing them with a positive understanding.[45]
[34] Qiaowu methodology is based in Marxist-Leninist mass line tactics, techniques, and strategies: using people-to-people skills to effect relationships between the Party and the masses to win over non-CCP community leaders, neutralize Party critics, build temporary alliances of convenience, and systematically shut down adversaries. It is rooted in the UFWD and conducted on three pillars: OC associations, OC media, and OC schools. It is coordinated at all levels of class, society and government party and organizations, both inside and outside of China. Qiaowu functions based on a systematic approach of persuasion, influence, and manipulation to guide and direct many OCs to infiltrate the inner workings of the OC communities, selectively imparting to them only what they needed to know and denying them access to information that may affect the success of the OCAO and the CCP’s qiaowu work.[46] The key to its success is its set of specific tools for managing the OC through effective and efficient platforms, supported by co-ordinated and well resourced infrastructure.[47]
[35] The qiaowu administration engages in efforts to maintain a benevolent public face through long term inclusive forms of co-optation and transformation work seeking sentimentality, loyalty, and support. Espionage and/or stealing of commercial secrets is an area of mobilizing that is not necessarily a part of qiaowu. However, PRC nationals are encouraged to provide information or technology for China’s development in the form of de-centralized micro-espionage. Many of the targets are often unaware they are being subjected to such manipulation while others require more persuasion, incentive, or corrective tools to ensure obedience.[48]
[36] OCs are mobilized through various micro-management techniques and methodologies that may include aggressive, coercive, or clandestine methods of mobilizing overseas communities, potential sources of espionage:[49]
• Appealing to their ethnic pride and sympathies in “helping the motherland advance” by inviting targets to share information and offer them favours for their co-operation.
• The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Ministry of State Security (MSS) units recruit potential candidates for intelligence gathering before they leave China or offer favours for their co-operation. Once abroad, handlers with links to these units cultivate relations with them through Chinese friendship and cultural groups.
• Using a carrot-stick approach: targets may be provided stipends while abroad and offered jobs and housing when they return. They or their relatives in China are threatened if they refuse to assist.
[37] For the vast majority, qiaowu is executed in the context of cultural and economic development, and as such appears completely benign.[50]
[38] In 2007, the Consulate General of the PRC in Vancouver characterized the OCAO main functions as Consular Protection to Chinese citizens and Overseas Chinese Affairs. The latter included widely contacting and serving overseas Chinese to, amongst other functions, unite with overseas Chinese and push forward the cause of peaceful reunification of the motherland.[51]
[39] In a 2014 publicly available website, the State Council of the PRC identified the OCAO as being subordinate to it, describing the OCAO as an administrative office to assist the Premier in handling affairs related to overseas Chinese. Some [my emphasis] of the OCAO’s major responsibilities demonstrate the depth and breadth of its involvement in all aspects of managing overseas Chinese, both domestically and abroad, including those returning to China and whose families reside in China. They include: studying, researching formulating, supervising and coordinating the implementation of guidelines, policies and regulations concerning overseas Chinese affairs domestically and abroad; providing information to the Central Committee of the CPC and the State Council; and reviewing recommendations suggested by the relevant ministries and local governments.[52]
[40] The above information is also found in Dr. To’s Thesis, thereby demonstrating reasonable grounds to believe that there has been a continuation and evolution of the implementation of qiaowu since his published findings from 2009.[53]
[41] Alex Joske, an analyst for the International Cyber Policy Centre at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) published a comprehensive report in 2020 entitled “The party speaks for you: Foreign interference and the CCP’s unified front system.” His sources included numerous Chinese based resources, Dr. To’s Thesis, and other reputable reporting agencies.
[42] Joske described the united front system as network of party and state agencies responsible for influencing groups outside the party, particularly those claiming to represent civil society. The network manages and expands the United Front, a coalition of entities working towards the party’s goals. The activities in this system are known as united front work, and the CCP’s role in the system is often covert or deceptive. The united front system reaches into foreign political parties, diaspora communities and multinational corporations. The OCAO, subsumed by the UFWD in 2018, is one of the primary organizations involved in united front work abroad influencing the Chinese diaspora.[54]
• The CCP expropriates its political system through the united front system, a long-lived core system of the CCP that serves as a network of party and state agencies responsible for influencing groups outside the party. Amongst other impacts, it undermines social cohesion, exacerbates racial tension, influences politics, harms media integrity, facilitates espionage, and increases unsupervised technology transfer.
• The UFWD is a CCP Central Committee department that coordinates and carries out united front work. In 2014, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau was one of 12 bureaus under the UFWD, which coordinated its united front work.[55]
• United front work encompasses a broad spectrum of activity, from espionage to foreign interference, influence, and engagement, where there is no clear distinction between overseas and domestic work. Premier Zhou Enlai, one of the PRC’s founding revolutionaries and a pioneer of the CCP’s United Front advocated using the legal to mask the illegal. Its work is constantly evolving with the CCP’s global ambitions.
• A non-exhaustive list of the overseas functions of united front work include increasing the CCP’s political influence, interfering in the Chinese diaspora, suppressing dissident movement, building a permissive international environment for a takeover of Taiwan, and intelligence gathering.
• The Ministry of Education and party committees in Chinese universities lead united front work on campuses. The Ministry works with the UFWD to hold regular conferences on ‘university united front work’, maintains its own database of united front work targets, including relatives of overseas Chinese. Education officials also study official guidance on united front work and describe the education system as ‘an important battlefield’ for its work.[56]
• United front work targeting the Chinese diaspora involves several agencies. The UFWD, or OCAO that it subsumed in 2018, and the All-China Federal of Returned Overseas Chinese are two of the primary agencies interfering with the diaspora and both are part of the “five Overseas Chinese”.[57]
• The International Liaison Department is viewed internally as an international version of united front work.[58]
• Most, if not all of China’s embassies have several diplomats tasked with interfering in the diaspora, a kind of activity that officially came under the UFWD’s ‘unified management’ in March 2018 which resolved the overlapping responsibilities between the OCAO, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and UFWD.[59]
• Intelligence agencies conduct and take advantage of united front work; the decades long practice of information gathering through the networks facilitates intelligence activity.[60]
• Numerous groups are targeted by united front work, including overseas, and returned overseas students, overseas ethnic Chinese and their relatives in the PRC, ethnic and religious minorities, etc. They are targeted to bring them under the party’s leadership and are used to co-opt and influence others. There is no clear distinction between domestic and overseas united front work: all bureaus of the UFWD and all areas of united front work involve overseas activities.[61]
• Some aspects of united front work are opaque. Many united front activities are likely to be supervised by provincial or even municipal UFWDs, some of which have a greater overseas focus than the central UFWD.[62]
• A UFWD Deputy Minister, Director of the State Council OCAO from 2018 onwards had mostly worked in the OCAO since 1982.[63] A second UFWD Deputy Minister from 2018 onwards, responsible for the international united work front, had worked in the OCAO and the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese from 1991 to 2018.[64]
[43] The evidence establishes reasonable grounds to believe the OCAO engaged in espionage in allied states:
• In 2014, Australia’s Sydney Morning Herald enumerated several examples of Chinese surveillance of university students in Australia, identifying the OCAO as the State Council agency responsible for united front work among the Overseas Chinese. The Chinese Consulate denounced the statements as groundless with ulterior motives.[65]
• A 2018 Staff Research Report on U.S.-China Economic Security Review describes the UFWD as the primary organization responsible for united front work within China and United Front operations targeting Chinese communities abroad, where the UFWD follows direction set by the CPPC. [66] That year, the OCAO merged into the UFWD of the CCP, retaining use of the OCAO when dealing with public statements and the outside world.[67]
• Chinese intelligence services specifically targeted ethnic minorities such as Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities living overseas, threatening to send their families to internment camps if they do not agree to spy for China. The purpose of such coercion is to gather details about Uyghurs abroad and to sow discord within exile communities in the West and intimidate people to prevent them from speaking out against China.[68]
• A former Chinese agent of influence in New York confirmed that China’s low-level spy operations are run through its UFWD and the OCAO, whereas high-level operations that require more finesse are run through the Chinse military’s General Staff Department, 3rd Department.[69]
• In 2019, the UK discovered that China was positioning spies in its UK Parliament, with MI5 revealing that one individual was functioning for China, who was working as a “legal advisor” for the OCAO.[70]
[44] The evidence establishes that a key role of the OCAO has been and intelligence gathering on dissidents and ethnic minorities external to China.[71] It is reasonable to conclude that if the OCAO engaged in espionage in allied states, it also engaged in espionage in Canada. The documentary evidence also gives examples of individuals in Canada being targeted, which I find to be credible and persuasive evidence:
• In 2006, Ottawa refused to renew a PRC diplomat’s visa following reports he was gathering information on Canadian Falun Gong practitioners.[72]
• Dr. To found that “…China relies on infiltrating overseas Chinese communities in Canada specifically, and other countries around the world….they do this to put pressure on dissidents such as Falun Gong and other democracy activists.”[73]
• Dr. To cited a specific example of Chinese students in Canada who were pressured by PRC authorities to be “sleeper” agents by using threats concerning their relatives in China, visa issuance and future job prospects.[74]
• David Kilgour, a former Canadian member of Parliament co-authored a book entitled “Bloody Harvest – the killing of Falun Gong for their organs” in which he detailed the espionage and intimidation the party state deploys against Falun Gong abroad.[75]
• In 2018, a former Chinese diplomat (Chen Yonglin) who defected in 2005 reported that the Chinese government uses both threats and rewards to incentivize Chinese students abroad to act as CCP informants.[76] He stated that China has a huge network of secret agents and is working hard to influence governments, including Canada. It infiltrates the Chinese community and puts pressure on groups that it considers the enemy, like Falun Gong, democracy activists and others.[77] He also explained that Chinese embassies engage with overseas Chinese communities and attempt to influence them; bodies like the OCAO exist for this very purpose.[78]
• A Uyghur Community leader in Ottawa confirmed the details of the CBSA Report and spoke to espionage and foreign interference threats in Canada. He alleged he was among those targeted. Hours before he was to testify before a Parliamentary committee on China in July 2020, he said he received a message saying his mother was “dead”. He suspects the OCAO organized counter protests to attend the Uyghur rallies in Toronto.[79]
[45] A 2019 CSIS Public Report released on May 20, 2020, detailed that espionage and foreign-influenced activities that are directed at Canadian entities both inside and outside Canada directly threaten Canada’s national security and strategic interests. It cited the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) as having outlined foreign interference activities conducted by China being particularly active in Canada.[80]
[46] The evidence shows that the OCAO was the primary organization that established and implemented qiaowu policy both inside and outside China vis-à-vis Overseas Chinese. The aim was to manipulate and manage Overseas Chinese behaviour and perceptions through a variety of tactics, including covert surveillance and clandestine information gathering. Targets included diaspora dissidents and Chinese ethnic minorities.
[47] Given the longevity of the OCAO, its use of covert surveillance, the interconnected web of all PRC agencies devoted to the implementation of qiaowu, and continuity of leadership,[81] there are reasonable grounds to believe the OCAO was and remains involved in espionage against the PRC’s targeted individuals and groups in Canada.
[48] Acts of covert surveillance and clandestine information gathering on Canadian territory violate the integrity of Canada, its political independence, national security, and public safety. Such acts may negatively impact financial, economic, social, and cultural factors. Acts of covert surveillance and clandestine information gathering in Canada is against Canada. The OCAO conducting espionage, surveillance or covert monitoring of Chinese and ethnic Chinese dissidents or minorities in Canada is against Canada, and contrary to its security interests.
[49] With reasonable grounds to believe the OCAO conducted espionage against Canada and against Canada’s interests, the OCAO is an organization described in s. 34 of the IRPA.
Issue 2: Ms. Zhang’s employment at the OCAO makes her a member of that organization for the purpose of inadmissibility.
Legislative Framework - Membership
[50] While “membership” is not defined in the IRPA, it is widely addressed in jurisprudence. Several factors are to be considered when assessing “membership” in a particular organization:
• It is to be given an unrestricted and broad interpretation;[82]
• It can extend to persons who simply “belonged” to the organization in question.[83]
• Proof of actual complicity is not required;[84]
• Membership can be inferred from certain activities that materially support a group’s objectives…even though the activities do not directly relate to the activity of concern;[85]
• There must be evidence of an “institutional link” or “knowing participation” in the group’s activities, such as actions demonstrating substantive participation in the organization’s activities that allow for inferential connections analogous to a formal member.[86]
• Non-exhaustive criteria to consider when deciding membership includes the participant’s knowledge of the organization’s methods and goals, voluntariness of the participation, the degree to which the participation furthers the organization’s objectives and/or is combative/military, the participant’s intentions, the duration of the participation, the participant’s membership in related supportive groups, and the environment or context in which participation occurred.[87]
• Where there are different factions or organizations within an organization, consideration must be given to the specific faction or organization of alleged membership and its activities.[88]
[51] Since Ms. Zhang says she is not a member of the OCAO, a formal analysis is necessary.
Positions of the parties - Membership
[52] The Minister did not argue that Ms. Zhang committed espionage. Rather, the Minister’s position is that as an employee of the OCAO from 2008 to 2019, El Werefalli establishes Ms. Zhang’s membership based on her employment.[89] Further, Kanagendren established that complicity is not applicable to s. 34(1)(f), nor does membership require that someone be a “true” member who contributed significantly to the wrongful actions of the group.[90]
[53] The Minister also challenged Ms. Zhang’s credibility, citing contradictions between her testimony and CBSA interviews related to employment titles, duties, and level of knowledge about OCAO interference in other countries. The Minister submits that Ms. Zhang attempted to distance herself during her admissibility testimony from previously disclosed information, downplaying her position and involvement with the OCAO and her knowledge of its activities.[91]
[54] Notwithstanding, the Minister argues that Ms. Zhang was employed directly by the organization believed to have engaged in espionage against Canada, or contrary to Canada’s interests, that she actively worked for the OCAO, travelled on behalf of the OCAO and represented them internationally. The Minister asserts it is reasonable to believe that Ms. Zhang’s work supported and furthered the goals of the OCAO. [92]
[55] Ms. Zhang submits that being an employee of the OCACO does not constitute membership in the OCAO for the purpose of inadmissibility.
[56] First, Ms. Zhang argues that she has had multiple visas to Canada, the applications for which she truthfully detailed her employment in government positions and travel history. Neither IRCC nor any other Canadian government authorities determined her to be inadmissible on security grounds. As a result, the visa officer at the Vancouver airport did not have reasonable grounds to question her or issue the 44(1) Report, which she refused to sign. The proceeding should be dismissed.[93]
[57] Next, Ms. Zhang relies on the Immigration Division (ID) Reasons and Decision for File 0001-C1-00334-02, of which I am the original author and determined that the Minister did not establish the inadmissibility on similar grounds.[94] She asserts the Minister has not proved that she engaged in acts of espionage against Canada or contrary to Canada’s interests. Rather, she fulfilled her job description for an organization that is a big institution in China with branches in every city of China. She worked in a small city with only one employee and could not reach any central information of the OCAO.
[58] She also argues that the Minister has not provided evidence of an “institutional link” or her “knowing participation” in the group’s activities to demonstrate substantive participation in the organization’s activities that would allow for inferential connections analogous to being a formal member.[95]
Findings
[59] Ms. Zhang did not object to entering the CBSA interview into evidence and she did not provide any authority for her position that she should not have been questioned by the CBSA officers on her latest entry into Canada. I am considering Ms. Zhang’s admissibility based on the information before me, which is different from information that was before the visa officers.
[60] Next, Ms. Zhang argues that the ID’s decision in File 0001-C1-00334-02 applies to her, without substantiating why.[96] I find the ID decision in File 0001-C1-00334-02 deals with a different organization entirely where none of the evidence in that case is present in Ms. Zhang’s case. That said, it is applicable insofar as informing of the need for analysis of facts and linkages in Ms. Zhang’s case.
[61] Overall, I find that Ms. Zhang tried to downplay her association with the OCAO and her government positions during her inadmissibility hearing testimony, as well as her knowledge of the interference work being conducted by the OCAO. Nevertheless, I still find she meets the criteria for membership in the OCAO, an organization that engaged in, engages in, and will engage in espionage against Canada and against Canada’s interests.
Ms. Zhang’s job titles within the OCAO
[62] There are discrepancies in what Ms. Zhang identified as her job titles and duties between her 2017 and 2022 TRVs applications, between the positions and duties listed within the 2022 TRV application and the CBSA interviews, as well as her admissibility proceeding.
[63] Ms. Zhang’s 2022 TRV application identifies her job titles as Director of Public Relations for the Yangzhou Municipal OCAO from 2009 to 2019 and Director of Overseas Liaison for the for the Yangzhou Municipal Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese.[97] However, in interview with CBSA on September 1, 2022, she stated that her roles were with the Liaison Division for the OCAO.[98] She also testified to the latter.[99]
[64] Ms. Zhang attributed the discrepancies to translation errors; her husband filled out the application.[100] She also explained that she had handwritten on the form “Liaison Officer”, and it was probably a mistake in translation as there was no such department.[101]
[65] I do not find credible that there was a translation error; the two titles appear in the same TRV application, on the same page, one under the other in the employment section. Regardless of the discrepancies, I find that either title indicates the focus of Ms. Zhang’s employment with the OCAO was relationship building.
Ms. Zhang’s roles with the OCAO
[66] Ms. Zhang provided some conflicting information about her roles, such as whether she specifically engaged with people who were the subject of the OCAO’s services. I find she engaged directly with her target populations, particularly Overseas Chinese, or those returning from overseas.
[67] In her first CBSA interview, Ms. Zhang said her duties at the OCAO included meeting with people and taking them back home to have a meal with them [my emphasis],[102] and engaging in event planning with food and events, to allow people abroad to remember their home and to inspire them to come back [my emphasis].[103]
[68] During her second interview with CBSA, Ms. Zhang said she organized activities and held promotions targeting overseas Chinese people [my emphasis]. There were two main themes: Chinese cuisine and Chinese medicine. She described her role as being one of association and liaison. She did basic work such as running a seminar and making announcements regarding the seminar. Events were held at Yangzhou University. Outside of China there were some activities to attract business and investments, such as promoting the university as the capital of cuisine.[104] Prominent individuals would attend the events, though she did not decide who attended as the municipal Foreign Affairs Office made that decision. Municipal leaders would contact her boss if they wanted a prominent individual to attend, and the upper-level people would go with them. [105]
[69] Ms. Zhang added that she travelled for work on business trips to southeast Asia, up to four times per year. She was not responsible for contacting people, but she arranged hotels, transportation, and the itineraries. The overseas destination events received government funding and the Municipal Foreign Affairs office took charge of the overseas visits, via the local Chinese embassies.[106]
[70] At her admissibility hearing, Ms. Zhang testified that her role at the OCAO was to help overseas Chinese students who return to China to look for their family members. She also planned itineraries for government personnel and groups, including municipal chiefs and leaders of local governments. She coordinated for both people from overseas and domestically due to her tourism background, helping them with transportation, tourism, sightseeing, and provided food for them. Her overseas trips could last from a few days to more than a month, accompanied by her leader/supervisor. Her arrangements followed the direction of her supervisor. Domestically, she planned for overseas Chinese visiting the city of Yangzhou, though she did not speak to them.[107]
[71] Overall, I find Ms. Zhang’s information on her roles evolved in her testimony to distance herself from direct contact with the people for whom she provided services. I place greater weight on her earlier statements that show she engaged directly with the subjects of her services whereby she would provide them with food and make other arrangements for them, to cultivate their affinity for China. I prefer this evidence over the later evidence because at that time, she had not yet been referred to the Division for inadmissibility.
[72] There are reasonable grounds to believe that Ms. Zhang’s employment services targeted Overseas Chinese and included engagement with her target groups both inside China and the diaspora. Her target populations included students, prominent individuals, government personnel and groups, and businesspersons. She engaged with them personally, either by inviting them to her home for meals, presenting to them, and engaging in activities with them. She also worked indirectly by organizing itineraries and arranging the logistics of visits such as food and accommodation. As an event and itinerary organizer overseas, there are reasonable grounds to believe that she also liaised with the Foreign Affairs Office and the local Chinese embassies who took charge of the overseas visits. Her activities and target populations demonstrate that she was fulfilling the objectives of the OCAO and its implementation of qiaowu.
Ms. Zhang’s knowledge of the OCAO and its espionage related activities
[73] Ms. Zhang was consistent across interviews and during her admissibility testimony that she was not aware if the OCAO conducted espionage in Canada or other countries.[108] However, the information she did provide, some of which is contradictory, shows a level of awareness that Chinese agencies conducted espionage related activities.
[74] At her first CBSA interview, Ms. Zhang identified four departments in the OCAO: the General Office, Overseas Chinese Policy, Workers Union, and her department, Liaison. She said never worked in any other departments and she had no knowledge of what the other departments did, other than the General office being responsible for payroll and logistics. The building where she worked was a small building with public access; no confidential information was kept there. The four departments she identified all worked in that building but she had no idea how many departments there were as she only worked on one floor.[109]
[75] Ms. Zhang was aware of the Confucius Institute, which was under another department. She heard it interfered with other countries and that their operations and source of funding were sketchy.
[76] She said she personally was never in touch with jobs related to information gathering projects, though she knew this was one of the core tasks for one of the departments, but not which one. She believed information gathering would be conducted at the director level; her level would be too low.
[77] Ms. Zhang did not know if the OCAO or the UFWD asked overseas Chinese to gather information for them, nor did she know if the organizations communicated with Chinese students abroad. However, she did see reports about five years ago and seven to eight years ago of such events, though she was not involved in them. She did not hear about it from her colleagues, and she had no idea of the purpose of the communication with Chinese students abroad.[110]
• Confirmed that the Foreign Affairs Office kept contact information on influential people in the Chinese communities outside of China. She did not know who was on the lists, or if the people living outside of China reported any information back to the OCAO or the Foreign Affairs Office. She provided a diagram of the city structure of the OCAO but was unable to provide the structure outside her city. Her position fell under the Communications Department.
• Did not know the structure or goals of the UFWD, even though she was employed with them from 2018 to October 2020.
• Was not aware that the OCAO was alleged to have engaged in information gathering that could be considered espionage.
[79] At her admissibility hearing, Ms. Zhang stated she was not aware of the OCAO doing anything wrong to any country.[112]
Membership
[80] I find reasonable grounds to believe that Ms. Zhang’s role in the OCAO directly contributed to its goal of implementing qiaowu.
[81] Though not about espionage, El Werfalli is applicable to Ms. Zhang because the Federal Court made determinations on employment in an organization equating to membership in that organization:[113]
• One either is or is not a member of an organization. Submitting evidence about the nature of the [country specific] branch has little to do with advancing a claim that employment does not equate to membership. (para 47)
• Membership in an organization implies approval of the organization, its goals and activities. Where the individual’s membership is contemporaneous with the terrorist activity, an inference may be drawn in that the person knew or ought to have known of the organization’s terrorist activities. Even if the joining is innocent, there remains an implied approval of the organization. (para 68)
[82] As Ms. Zhang described in her statements to CBSA and in her testimony, her job function amounted to relationship building with Overseas Chinese at varying levels and with influential people, outside of China or visiting China. She provided the support to cultivate the overseas Chinese, backed by government resources and infrastructure. Her role aligned with the goals of the OCAO to attract overseas Chinese back into the fold of the Chinese nation state and to project them on to the nation state agenda, the underlying goal of which was to eliminate potential threats and rival discourses that challenged the CCP’s power.
[83] Ms. Zhang has a law degree that she acquired between 2002 and 2005, prior to beginning her employment with the OCAO.[114] She worked in a local municipal OCAO office starting in 2007, and she worked abroad in numerous countries for the OCAO from 2010 to 2019. In the context of her education and employment, there are reasonable grounds to believe that she was well versed in the PRC’s laws, policies, and procedures as it relates to implementing qiaowu through the OCAO, and that she knowingly participating in activities that supported the OCAO objectives.
[84] The documentary evidence describes the links between the OCAO and the CCP Central Committee Departments and various government ministries implementing qiaowu policy as extensive and filtering down to the provincial and city/town OCAO levels.[115] Therefore, even though Ms. Zhang submits that she did not have a connection to any central information of the OCAO, her length and type of employment in the OCAO constitutes substantive participation with institutional links to its policies and practices. It is reasonable to infer her employment with the OCAO constitutes formal membership in the OCAO. Based on her lengthy employment with the OCAO and considering the basic knowledge that she did have regarding the gathering of information on and by overseas Chinese, there are reasonable grounds to believe that she knew or ought to have known of the surveillance and information gathering tactics and other methods being used by the OCAO.
[85] If I am wrong and Ms. Zhang was not aware of the OCAO’s espionage related tactics, because she had a direct role for over a decade in coordinating, supporting, and achieving the OCAO’s qiaowu, I find that she made a sustained and voluntary contribution as an employee of the OCAO to inculcate overseas Chinese into the OCAO objectives through her united front work.[116]
[86] The documentary evidence shows that the OCAO engaged in covert surveillance and information gathering prior to Ms. Zhang’s employment with them, and during her tenure of employment. Given the longstanding use of such tactics, it is also reasonable to conclude that the OCAO will continue to employ such tactics in the future against Canada and its interests.
[87] Accordingly, I find that Ms. Zhang is a member of the OCAO for the purpose of inadmissibility. Therefore she is inadmissible to Canada under paragraphs 34(1)(f)x(a) of the IRPA for having been a member of an organization that engaged in acts of espionage against Canada and its interests.
CONCLUSION
[88] Ms. Zhang is a person described under paragraphs 34(1)(f)x(a) of the IRPA) for being a member of an organization, the OCAO, where there are reasonable grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage in an act of espionage that is against Canada or that is contrary to Canada’s interests. Accordingly, a Deportation Order is attached to these reasons.
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(signed) |
COLLEEN ZUK |
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Colleen Zuk |
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August 28, 2023 |
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Date |
[1] M1, pp. 2-3.
[2] Transcript March 22, 2023, pp. 8-9; M1, pp. 158-160, 196-203, 240-242, 359, 385; Transcript March 30, 2023, pp. 16-17. referring to M1, pp. 262, 282.
[3] Transcript March 22, 2023, pp. 1-6.
[4] Transcript March 30, 2023, pp. 2-4.
[5] Transcript March 30, 2023, pp. 4.
[6] Mugesera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 40, [2005] 2 SCR 100, para. 114.
[7] M1, pp. 6-9, 11-12.
[8] M1, pp. 10, 12-13; Transcript March 30, 2023, p.4.
[9] M1, p. 12.
[10] M1, p. 51.
[11] Harkat (Re) 2012 FCA 122 at para 150; Vukic v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2012 FC 370 at para 38.
[12] Sittampalam v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FCA 326 (CanLII), [2007] 3 FCR 198. See para 36, citing Medovarski v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 SCC 51 (CanLII), [2005] 2 S.C.R. 539, at para 10.
[13] Sittampalam v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FCA 326 (CanLII), [2007] 3 FCR 198. See para 38; Thanaratnam v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 349 (CanLII), [2004] 3 FCR 301. See paras 29-32.
[14] R. v. Venneri, 2012 SCC 33 (CanLII), [2012] 2 SCR 211, at paras 29, 36, and 40; R. v. Abdullahi, 2023 SCC 19 (CanLII) at paras 83 and 85.
[15] Transcript March 22, 2023, pp. 7-8; M1, pp, 60-64, 196-203. 317.
[16] M1, p. 63.
[17] M1, pp. 399-400.
[18] M1, p. 312.
[19] M1, p.
[20] M1, p. 60.
[21] Qu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Canada) 2000 CanLII 17132 (FC), [2000] 4 FC 71, at paras. 25-26’ Qu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCA 399, [2001] F.C.J. No. 1945 at paras. 12 and 33.
[22] Sumaida, Hussein Ali v. MCI, (FC no. IMM-846-17), O’Reilly, March 6, 2018, 2018 FC 256 at para 21.
[23] Oremade, Solomon v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-8656-04), Phelan, August 9, 2005; 2005 FC 1077, at para. 11.
[24] Peer v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 752, at para 34. In Peer v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FCA 9 at para 3, the FCA answered the following certified quesiton in the affirmative:
Is a person inadmissible to Canada for “engaging in an act of espionage … against a democratic government, institution or process” within the meaning of subsection section 34(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, if the person’s activities consist of intelligence gathering activities that are legal in the country where they take place, do not violate international law and where there is no evidence of hostile intent against the persons who are being observed?
[25] Weldemariam, v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2020 FC 631 (CanLII), [2020] 4 FCR 354 at para 51.
[26] Yihdego v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada), 2020 FC 833 at paras 26-27.
[27] Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Mason, 2021 FCA 156 (CanLII), [2022] 1 FCR 3 (on appeal at the Supreme Court of Canada), at paras 45, 80-81 where the FCA responded in the affirmative to the following question:
Is it reasonable to interpret para. 34(1)(e) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act in a manner that does not require proof of conduct that has a nexus with “national security” or the “security of Canada”?
[28] M1, pp. 226-228 ENF 2/Op 18.
[29] Transcript March 22, 2023, pp. 8-9; M1, pp. 158-160, 196-203, 240-242, 359, 385; Transcript March 30, 2023, pp. 16-17. referring to M1, pp. 262, 282.
[30] Transcript March 22, 2023, pp. 7-8; M1, pp, 60, 63-64, 196-203.
[31] Gao v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2022 FC 64.
[32] M2; Gao v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2022 FC 64, paras 33, 37, 39-42, 50, 53. Justice Rothstein referenced the IRCC Operational Manual 18 (Evaluating Inadmissibility), which is found at M1, pp. 226-228 for this proceeding. It details that espionage includes activity inside or outside Canada that would have a negative impact on the safety, security, or prosperity of Canada. Such prosperity includes, but it is not limited to, financial, social and cultural factors. See also M1, pp. 161-168 for the 2022 National Post article on the Federal Court decision affirming OCAO involvement in espionage in Canada, and M1, pp. 169-172 for an account of the Fedearl Court decision in the South China Morning Post.
[33] Ms. Zhang’s submissions dated April 20, 2023, pp. 1-5.
[34] Ms. Zhang’s submissions dated April 20, 2023, p. 3 cross-referencing M2.
[35] Transcript March 22, 2022, pp. 8-9, referring to the Global News article at M1, pp. 196-203; Transcript March 30, 2022, pp. 14-15; M2.
[36] M1, p. 369.
[37] M1, p. 352.
[38] M1, p. 368.
[39] M1, p. 380.
[40] M1, pp. 360.
[41] M1, pp. 361-362.
[42] M1, pp. 384-385.
[43] M1, p. 387.
[44] M1, p. 387-390.
[45] M1, p. 361.
[46] M1, pp. 361-362, 365-366.
[47] M1, pp. 399, 500-501.
[48] M1, pp. 358-359, 499-500.
[49] M1, pp. 358-359, 499-
[50] M1, pp. 358-359.
[51] M1, p. 60.
[52] M1, p. 61.
[53] M1, p. 385.
[54] M1, pp. 67-118. See also M1, pp, 119 – 157, a 2018 Staff Research Report on U.S.-China Economic Security Review reporting similarly on the history and functioning of the UFWD.
[55] M1, pp. 70-79, 122-125.
[56] M1, p. 81.
[57] M1, p. 82.
[58] M1, p. 82.
[59] M1, p. 82.
[60] M1, pp. 82-83.
[61] M1, pp. 84-85.
[62] M1, p. 93.
[63] M1, p. 102.
[64] M1, p. 103.
[65] M1, pp. 207 - 210. See also M1, pp. 216- 217 for a New York Times article from 2019 describing Chinese surreptitious attempts thorugh the UFWD to politically interfere in Austraila.
[66] M1, pp. 119-122.
[67] M1, pp. 63-64.
[68] M1, pp. 126, 189. See also M1, pp. 243-253 for a 2019 CBC article referencing the “China Cables” documents that show China’s efforts to track members of the Ugyhur communiity with foreign citizenship, including Canadians, Americans, British, Australian and New Zealanders, which the Chinese ambassador to the UK called “pure fabrication.” See also M1, pp. 263 – 306 for a 2017 report by the Uyghur Human Rights Project detailing Chinese government monitoring and harassment of Uyghurs overseas, including in Canada and other countries, with activities carried out by the OCAO. This publication also cites the research work of scholar James To.
[69] M1, p. 236.
[70] M1, p. 213.
[71] M1, p. 262-294.
[72] M1, pp. , 186-188, 519.
[73] M1, pp. 358-359, 385-387.
[74] M1, pp. 358-359,
[75] M1, pp. 188-189.
[76] M1, p. 125. See the Toronto Star Artcile dated June 6, 2007 at M1, pp. 158-160., which reports on Chen Yonglin’s defection in 2005.
[77] M1, pp. 158-160. See also M1, pp. 218 – 225 for an IRB Response to Information Request dated 2012 which describes specific events from 2010 to 2012 of how the Chinese embassy and Consulates in Canada keep black lists of known Falun Gong practitioners, sent people to observe, take photos of, and attempt to intimidate practioners in Canada and other countries. See also M1, pp. 229-23 for articles from 2005 detailing allegagtions of 1000’s of Chinese spies in Canada, the US and Australia where students play a fundamental role, which the Chinse embassy denounced. See also M1, pp. 254- 261 for Mr. Chen’s Submission to the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee on Australia’s Foreign Relations Bill 2020 detailing directives made by the PRC which included the use of Consualte staff in major Australian cities working in espionage and propaganda for the OCAO under the UFWD, and other agencies. The statement details that the CCP uses the Chinese communities as a base to radiate its influence on mainstreatm Australia and that in 2014, the OCAO of the State Council launched a comprehensive progam to target overseas Chinese communities with eight initiatives.
[78] M1, p. 282.
[79] M1, pp. 199-200.
[80] M1, p. 241.
[81] M1, p. 106.
[82] Poshteh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FCA 85, [2005] F.C.J. No. 381 at paras. 27-29.
[83] Chiau v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2000 CanLII 16793 (FCA), [2001] 2 FC 297, at para. 25.
[84] Ibid., citing Mahjoub v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) 2017 FCA 157 at paras. 96-97; and Tjiueza v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 1260 (CanLII), at para. 36.
[85] Sumaida v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 256at para. 17, citing Mahjoub v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) 2017 FCA 157 at para. 92.
[86] Sinnaiah v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2004] F.C.J. No. 1908., paras. 5-6; Miguel v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration) 2012 FC 802, para 32.
[87] Perez Villegas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 105; Krishnamoorthy Canada v. (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 1342; T.K. v, Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 FC 327; P.S. v. Canada v. (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 168.
[88] Cardenas v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] F.C.J. No. 139, paras. 22 to 25.
[89] The Minister’s Reply submissions dated April 26, 2023, p. 1, citing El Werfalli v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) 2013 FC 612. See paras 65-69.
[90] The Minister’s Reply submissions dated April 26, 2023, para 6 citing Kanagendren v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FCA 86. See paras 13-27.
[91] The Minister’s Reply submissions dated April 26, 2023, paras 5, 7-11.
[92] The Minister’s Reply submissions dated April 26, 2023, para 12.
[93] Ms. Zhang’s submissions dated April 20, 2023, pp. 1-3.
[94] Ms. Zhang’s submissions dated April 20, 2023, pp. 3-4; P1.
[95] Ms. Zhang’s submissions dated April 20, 2023, pp. 4-5.
[96] Ms. Zhang’s submissions dated April 20, 2023, p. 3, para 7.
[97] M1, p. 55.
[98] M1, pp. 10-13.
[99] Transcript March 30, 2023, pp. 9-11.
[100] Transcript March 30, 2023, p. 12-13; M1, pp. 58.
[101] Transcript March 30, 2023, p. 12-13; M1, p. 55.
[102] M1, p. 12.
[103] M1, p. 13.
[104] M1, pp. 18-19.
[105] M1, p. 20.
[106] M1, pp. 20-21.
[107] Transcript March 30, 2023, pp. 8-11.
[108] M1, pp. 15, 23, 34-37.
[109] M1, p. 15.
[110] M1, p. 23.
[111] M1, pp. 26-33.
[112] Transcript March 30, 2023, p. 10.
[113] El Werfalli v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 FC 612 (CanLII), [2014] 4 FCR 673.
[114] M1, p. 55.
[115] M1, pp. 384-387.
[116] M1, p. 82-85