Har-Megiddo Watch: This from Chris Jones—a young historian of ancient Assyria teaching at Union College—seems to me to be quite insightful:
Christopher W. Jones: ‘From Anwar Sadat up to the present <twitter.com/cwjones89/s…… normalization has always been a triangular calculation recognizing the unlikelihood of military victory over Israel versus the economic benefits of peace with Israel and improved relations with the USA. Against the slow tide… Hamas and Hezbollah have always argued "no, armed struggle can still work, just give us a chance." But winning is the only thing that makes this argument convincing. Tension arises because projecting victimhood—the most successful Palestinian diplomatic strategy—requires not winning.
Hamas had to choose one route or the other, and chose to go full ISIS. But how is slaughtering hundreds of civilians winning?… They've hurt Israel. That's what matters. This is the "resistance" that many are euphemistically posting about today. Will it provoke a massive Israeli response? Certainly. Will it undermine Palestinian diplomatic standing in the West. Yes. Does this matter? Not as long as Hamas' government in Gaza survives….
I see many comments calling this a suicide mission by Hamas. This is based on the assumption that Hamas will inevitably lose if the IDF embarks on a full invasion of Gaza. That is not an assumption that should be made. Hezbollah fought the IDF to a draw in 2006.. Hamas has been steadily increasing its military capabilities, gaining experience from every war. They have had over a decade and a half to prepare the ground. New tech such as drones and ATGMs heavily favor the defender. A conventional battlefield victory by Hamas inside Gaza is entirely possible. I don't think the Hamas leadership would have launched yesterday's attack if they thought otherwise…
Gaza City is 4 miles by 4 miles, with 600,000 people living in it: 40,000 people per square mile. (The whole strip is 140 square miles with 17,000 people per square miles. Figure 4 times the size and half the population density of Fallujah. In the U.S.-Iraq War, the principal lesson of the First Battle of Fallujah was that “senior political leaders should not react emotionally in war and direct immediate action against a densely populated urban area when conditions for success are not present”. In the Second Battle of Fallujah the U.S. lost 100 killed and 600 wounded, with perhaps 1500 Iraqi Resistance members killed, perhaps the same number captured, and perhaps the same number of civilians killed.
How does IDF compare to U.S. Army and Marine doctrine and training these days? How have changes in technology over the past 20 years made the battlefield—the urban battlefield especially—even more an arena of eggshells-armed-with-hammers? And is overwhelming firepower worth much? (Was it ever?)
What level of Israeli casualties will the IDF and the Israeli cabinet be willing to accept? What ratio of civilian-to-militant casualties will they be willing to impose? And what is the right model for Hamas—does it have leaders and a network that can be disrupted and dissolved, or is there an ample supply of young men eager to take up as many arms as Iran can ship through Egypt past bribed customs inspectors?
It is going to be bloody awful, and bloody deadly. There is no point in asking Khameini, bin Salman, and Netanyahu to act like adults here. But we do.