Minds are emergent features of certain complex physical systems, such as mammalian brains, but there’s no reason to assume these are the only substrates capable of giving rise to a mind. So long as a system supports the right kinds of dynamic, recursive, and integrative processes—whatever those may be—minds should be multiply realizable across different physical architectures. What matters is not the specific material, but the organizational structure that enables the emergence of mental states.
Counter Claim:
Emergence may explain how some complex patterns form from simpler ones, but it can't explain why some patterns give rise to subjective experience while others don’t. Until we can bridge the conceptual and explanatory gap between physical structure and mentality, the emergence story will be incomplete and open to challenge. For example, panpsychism suggests that subjective experience may be a fundamental, built-in feature of the world itself, not something that emerges from it.
Aug 6
at
3:32 PM
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