My letter to the Economist, about the idea of a Chinese “quarantine” on Taiwan, got published (it’s below the linked letter here). As is normal, it was cut, so here’s the full version
The idea of a “quarantine” (scare quotes in original) has been put forward as a strategy the People's Republic of China might deploy against Taiwan economist.com/briefing/…. This new emphasis reflects widespread recognition, following the failure of Russian naval power in the Ukraine war, that neither a seaborne invasion nor a traditional blockade is likely to succeed in reincorporating Taiwan. lowyinstitute.org/the-i…
But a quarantine lacks any definition in international law. It is, to use an Australianism, the blockade you have when you are not having a blockade.
The term, in this usage, was first used by President John F Kennedy in the Cuban missile crisis, as a tool of de-escalation. Kennedy wished to prevent the transfer of missiles to Cuba without provoking a nuclear war. Hence, he wanted to avoid declaring a blockade which is a well-defined act of war. The Soviets, also wishing to avoid nuclear war, did not break the quarantine, and did not challenge Kennedy's characterisation
This history makes it clear that the term "quarantine" is a legal fiction, dependent on the assent of both parties. There is no reason for Taiwan to take such a fiction seriously. Rather, any purported quarantine is, in reality, a blockade, and therefore an act of war. The only effect of using this terminology, rather than openly declaring a blockade, is to hand the initiative to Taiwan, which can choose whether and how to respond militarily.
The actual role of this fiction is to allow the perpetuation of a discussion in which a PRC takeover of Taiwan is a real and present danger rather than a possibility for the remote future. This fiction serves the interests of many parties: the PRC which must maintain the claim that it can reincorporate Taiwan if it chooses, the Taiwanese government which hopes for US aid, and the dominant faction in the US military and foreign policy establishment, for which the threat supposedly posed by China is a central part of the raison d'être. Recognition that a forcible reincorporation of Taiwan into the PRC is not actually possible would imply a fundamental rethinking which no-one who matters really wants.