Philosophical use of the term “intuition” has been widely accepted both among philosophers and among people in online communities arguing about philosophy. This has been achieved in large part by the fact that “intuition” is a familiar term that has colloquial uses, and because it is often used in an innocuous way by philosophers. However, some philosophers have employed the term to mean something far more specific and far more questionable. These latter, more objectionable uses have managed to fly under the radar of people’s scrutiny because philosophers enjoy a kind of natural motte-and-bailey: the innocuous uses of intuition are so unobjectionable to people that it seems silly and perhaps a little insane to question whether we have intuitions.

But we don’t. “Intuitions” as Huemer and others use the term are not an established phenomenon. There is to my knowledge no empirical evidence that they exist, nor is it clear they think there could be, or what such evidence would look like. Philosophers are relying on speculative armchair psychology to make extremely presumptuous and strong claims about how human reasoning works with little or no corroborating evidence from the sciences. There is a name for this:

Pseudopsychology.

We should call it what it is, and we should start being more skeptical of these accounts. It is time to overturn the epidemic of uncritical talk of “intuitions” in philosophy. Even if there are legitimate, salvageable conceptions of intuition, these notions must be extricated from their dubious brethren. Until a coordinated effort to do so succeeds, highly questionable philosophical methodology will persist.