>>On Bush’s account, normative reasons are reducible to facts about desire or what courses of action will result in the most pleasure

This is not my position. I don’t think there are normative reasons, nor did I argue that reasons are reducible to facts about courses of action that result in the most pleasure. The word “pleasure” doesn’t even appear in the essay you are responding to, and I am not sure where you got that from.

My position is *not* that that normative reasons can be reduced to or explained in terms of desires, but that the English language's use of the term "reason" has been coopted by philosophers, deployed outside ordinary contexts of usage, prompted philosophers to mistakenly reify the term "reason", and led them to mistakenly believe one can "have" reasons because reasons are "given" by something, whether it be desires or non-desire facts. I deny that reasons can be "given" by anything at all, including desires. Since I don't believe that there are any such things as normative reasons, I don't think they can be "reduced to" desires. I don't think there's anything to reduce.