I question the notion that transparency is essential to question begging. Suppose I present the following argument:

People sometimes feel pain.

If illusionism is true, no one feels pain.

Therefore, illusionism is false

This argument does not seem to me to meet the transparency condition. However, once we disambiguate the terms used in this argument, it becomes apparent that the only way this argument could possibly work requires understanding the terms in a way that simply restates the conclusion. This is because “feels pain” is ambiguous. Illusionism is roughly the view that people mistakenly believe they have phenomenal states. That people mistakenly believe this is irrelevant to the objection, so the only thing that’s relevant is that it denies that there are phenomenal states. And we can distinguish between the only relevant senses of “feels pain”: one that involves pain phenomenal states and one that doesn’t. Illusionism denies all phenomenal states, not just pain phenomenal states, so pain itself is irrelevant. All that matters is that it denies there are phenomenal states. And the denial of the view that there are no phenomenal states, is, in this case, functionally equivalent to asserting that there are phenomenal states. Once we fully unpack this argument, then, we get something like:

There are phenomenal states.

If there are no phenomenal states, then there are no phenomenal states.

Therefore, there are phenomenal states. (Or, alternatively, it is false that there are no phenomenal states)

If this is used as an argument against the view that there are no phenomenal states, the first premise is clearly question begging. The issue with the transparency condition is that it conceals the vacuity of objections like the pain argument above behind a superficial veil of substance. When disambiguated, the relevant terms either trivially entail the conclusion in a superficial and trivial way that presupposes the conclusion or something that entails the conclusion, or at least one premise is going to be false and the conclusion doesn’t go through.

It is also question begging in the sense you specify in the article: You say that charging an argument as question-begging is “to deny that it raises any interesting problem.” I think this is true in the above case. The objection to illusionism on offer here does not raise any interesting objections to illusionism. It simply consists of asserting the contrary and vacuously repeating the implications of illusionism.

My point here is that even when an argument isn’t transparently question begging, it can be just as useless, vacuous, and presumptuous, and this is merely concealed behind terminological camouflage. There are no hidden implications or untapped considerations here. The argument’s entire force comes from rhetorically hoodwinking readers into thinking something substantive has been presented. I think this is true of many arguments: they are presumptuous and presume their conclusion in questionable ways, but conceal this. There’s no serious intellectual work to do in engaging with these objections. Given this, I question whether the transparency condition should really be maintained.