One of the weirdest things people in philosophy have done is to presume that the existence of a disagreement is a strong indication that the people involved believe there is an objective fact of the matter. This seems to turn on the assumption that the only time people argue with one another or have a disagreement is when they are mutually attempting to convince one another of the truth, independent of any practical considerations about what to do.

This is almost never the case. In many (perhaps most) cases in which people disagree or are arguing about something, their is some type of goal coordination going on: they’re trying to figure out what to do, to align their values and interests, and agree on some course of action. Absolutely nothing about that presupposes that there’s an objective normative truth about what they should do. And insofar as there are disputes about what’s true, these disputes are typically about nonnormative descriptive considerations relevant to…figuring out the best course of action. Here’s an example:

Alex and Sam want to order pizza. Alex suggests Lorenzo’s Pizzeria. Sam says “No way, we shouldn’t order from there. Lorenzo’s changed ownership and the pizza is mid now.” “Oh,” Alex might say, “Then what about Anthony’s?” Sam may agree, “Yea, Anthony’s is still great. Let’s order there.”

Note that a stance-independent fact is relevant here: a change in ownership that resulted in a change in how the pizza is made. But the disagreement is still ultimately about what they should do.

Philosophers love to talk about what’s obvious.

Well, this is obvious.