I’m interested in the variety of responses I received to my previous post about people claiming that they mean what ordinary people mean. I’ve constructed a dialog with a bit more context to see what you make of Alex and Sam in this exchange. I’ve tried not to caricature either perspective (though if you think I have, let me know where specifically). What I want to know is what you make of Alex and Sam in this exchange, and in particular whether you think Sam’s replies are satisfactory.

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Alex and Sam are at a philosophy conference. Sam is giving a lecture where they are arguing that their theory, Samism, is the best account of our ordinary, commonsense ways of thinking.

During this lecture, Sam appears to be using the term “truth” in a way that fits with correspondence theory but not other theories of truth (e.g., deflationary or pragmatic). Critically, many of Sam’s arguments rely on this assumption. If truth isn’t intended in the correspondence theoretic sense, Sam’s arguments would collapse.

Alex isn’t entirely sure if Sam really does presuppose correspondence, but decides to ask. Alex approaches Sam after the lecture and the following conversation takes place:

Alex: What did you mean by “truth” in your lecture?

Sam: I mean what ordinary people mean.

Alex: It sounded like you were using “truth” in a way consistent with correspondence theory. Is that right?

Sam: Well, yes. That’s what ordinary people mean by truth.

Alex: How do you know that?

Sam: That’s a challenging question to answer in a short conversation. But I believe that, on philosophical reflection, correspondence theory best accounts for how ordinary people use the term truth.

Alex: Alright, did this philosophical inquiry involve any empirical investigation into how ordinary people use the term “truth” in everyday life?

Sam: No. This isn’t an empirical question. One considers cases of the application of the term “truth,” builds a theory, considers counterexamples to that theory, and refines or rejects the theory until one settles on the account that best accommodates the data.

Alex: What exactly is the data?

Sam: The data is how ordinary people use the term “truth.”

Alex: But to know how they use it, don’t we need to conduct studies to find out how they use it?

Sam: No. I am already an expert in the English language and am familiar with how I use the term “truth.” By examining how I and others use the term truth, and considering our own responses to various cases, we can figure out how the term is used.

Alex: Suppose we went out and conducted studies on how people use the term “truth,” and this didn’t match the conclusions you arrived at via introspection and philosophical reflection?

Sam: As I said, this isn’t an empirical question, so those results would be irrelevant.

Alex: …How people use the term “truth” is irrelevant to what they themselves ordinarily mean when they use the term?

Sam: No, not quite. How they use the term is relevant. It’s just that empirical studies aren’t the proper method for answering these questions. But, just to engage your hypothetical, if ordinary people meant something different than I supposed, then, of course, I’d be mistaken about the ordinary conception of “truth.” That isn’t a problem though, because I am stipulating that by “truth” I mean whatever it is that ordinary people meanby “truth.”

Alex: Alright, so if you mean whatever they mean by truth, but it turns out they don’t use the term “truth” in a way consistent with correspondence theory, and it turns out that the ways you were using the term “truth” in your lecture only make sense, and if your arguments only work, if “truth” is meant in the correspondence theoretic way, then wouldn’t that mean that just about everything you said in your lecture was mistaken? After all, you used the term in a way specifically requiring correspondence theory. But if it turns out that ordinary people use the term in a deflationary or pragmatic way, several key points in your arguments wouldn’t follow.

Sam: Yes, that’s right. If it turned out that people used “truth” in a deflationary or pragmatic way, then none of my arguments would follow. Fortunately for me, that’s not what the ordinary sense of truth means. I think the ordinary concept of truth is correspondence theory. Of course I could be wrong about that, in which case I’d have to revise my theory.