Running on Empty? The Recycled Missile Narrative

There is an interesting recycled pattern emerging in the coverage of the US-Iran war. I don't claim to know exactly what is happening behind closed doors at the Pentagon, but the sequence of this narrative is worth observing.

Whenever we seem to approach a diplomatic pause, an MoU, a deal, an agreement, a ceasefire, a new negotiating track, or a sudden shift in tactics, a leak hits the mainstream press (or think tanks) regarding "catastrophic" U.S. missile depletion.

If we look at the timeline, the first major leaks and reports came months before the agreement, the MoU. Back in March, reports were already warning that THAAD interceptors were running dangerously low. By late April, the New York Times, citing internal Pentagon estimates, reported that the campaign had "significantly drained" global supplies of Tomahawks, Patriots, and ATACMS, forcing the U.S. to move weaponry from Asia and Europe. Then, in June, the U.S.–Iran MoU was announced.

After the MoU unraveled and the strikes resumed, the story came back in a more acute form. The stockpiles were not said to have recovered and then mysteriously collapsed again; the reporting painted a continuous drawdown from the original pre‑war levels, first warnings, then figures suggesting half‑used inventories, later claims of two‑thirds or four‑fifths depletion in certain categories. These leaks were then also accompanied by stories of Trump being "surprised" and furious at Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth for misleading him. (Similar to the pre-MoU narrative when Trump also blamed his Defense Secretary.)

These material shortages are likely real, at least for specific, high-end munitions relative to the requirements of a hypothetical future war with China (that these depletion stories are even paired with such ideas….). But there is a massive difference between the U.S. being constrained in high-end interceptors, and the U.S. being unable to continue its current campaign against Iran. The empire still retains capacity for naval blockades, cyber warfare, proxy activation, and financial sieges.

Because the U.S. (as the imperial core’s base) still holds coercive power, we have to ask what function the circulation of this specific depletion narrative serves right now. In effect, this looks like institutional planning generating a narrative that serves two potential outcomes simultaneously (it might have other functions, but these two come to my mind):

First, it can help prepare the ground for an agreement (whether it directly or indirectly involves the US). If a ceasefire, a pause, or a new or resurrected old MoU follows, it can be presented in Washington as the unavoidable result of overstretched logistics. That gives the administration an off‑ramp. At the same time, it gives Iranian political elites a story of resilience and sovereignty. That makes any arrangement easier to sell domestically and regionally.

Second, the very stories that announce depletion also generate the rationale for a massive expansion of military production through “panic”: more missiles, more air defence, more integrated procurement, more “burden‑shifting,” more NATO industrial coordination. NATO’s own initiatives are already oriented toward expanding production capacity, pooling demand, and making allied systems interoperable. In that sense, “depletion” can become the bridge to a new industrial order, one in which the U.S. retains command of strategy, finance, technology, and standards, while production is spread across a wider trans‑Atlantic and allied network. The U.S. may no longer be able, or even willing, to restore its old military‑industrial predominance through a purely domestic effort. But it can reorganise the imperial industrial base so that European and other allied nodes carry more of the manufacturing load, while Washington keeps the steering wheel.

So I am not saying the shortages are fake. They are likely real for specific weapons systems, and the replenishment bottleneck is severe. The question I keep returning to is what the recurring circulation of this information makes possible. It can make a deal look like the outcome of Iranian pressure (with Oman or the US or any other country in the region). It can let Washington step back without openly conceding a tactical loss. And it can provide the justification for a permanent, transnational rearmament cycle.

The sequence is by now familiar: escalation, leaks about vanishing stockpiles, presidential “surprise,” a turn toward negotiation or pause, then a push for rearmament and industrial integration, and eventually, renewed capacity for another round. However, I hope that this does not happen again and again. In any case, I am not asserting that this is a centrally scripted operation. Bureaucratic infighting, alarm among commanders, procurement lobbying, and the real difficulty of replacing high‑end weapons can all generate this kind of reporting. But a narrative that keeps reappearing like this does not need a single author to perform a systemic function.

So I’m watching these patterns in the information environment.