So, qualitative composites aren’t qualities? There can be a felt property of a sensation, the throbbing painfulness of a pain sensation, that decomposes into the throbbing aspect and the painful aspect, and makes it NOT fundamentally dissimilar to another sensation ,like a throbbing pleasant orgasmic sensation, which is similar with respect to throbbingness. And for you that felt property of a sensation, is NOT a quality, since it is decomposable? If you answer yes, then that’s perfectly coherent, but makes the theory of qualities beholden to the empirical claim that sensations are composable like that (as opposed to our CONCEPTS and words, which obviously are composable like that). If, instead, your answer is “no”, then the whole view threatens to tumble into incoherence; since qualities would be defined as non-decomposable, but also have composable instances, which is like allowing that there are four-sided triangles while insisting that triangles are three-sided by definition.