The Two Different Paths: We are about to find out which path we are on.  As I said in my last note, from my conversations with a number of world leaders in a number of countries, and as seems obvious to me, there will either be a) a U.S. win over Iran, which will require taking control over the Strait of Hormuz and assuring that Iran's nuclear program is dead—i.e., defanging Iran, or b) a U.S. loss, which is the result if these things don't happen.   

Most senior policy makers I speak with believe that we are likely headed down the b) path and that will be made clear soon. It needs to be made clear soon because continuing on the current path or being more forceful will cause sharp increases in oil and gasoline prices and great difficulties during the high travel season, bad political consequences for President Trump, and difficulties in his upcoming meeting with President Xi in China. So, we should have that verdict soon.  

The perception that the b) path is most likely is already leading to a view that the United States will not be a reliable protector against possible opponents like Russia in Europe and/or China in Asia, and that is already leading to actions being taken that are sensible in light of that belief, like leaders paying "tribute" visits to China. As explained before, this set of circumstances is likely to have some analogous consequences to Great Britain losing the Suez Canal in 1956. By the way, this is also happening at a time when China is earning huge amounts of money through its very strong exports—so much money that it is difficult for those Chinese earning the money to know what to do with it. This is making China a very important player in world capital markets as well as world trade. In other words, these events are making China geopolitically and financially stronger.