Why the switch to "obligation"-talk? I take the pronatalist claim to just be that you have some *reason* to create each happy person (presumably in proportion to their welfare value). There's nothing paradoxical about that. Working through the putative asymmetry in outcome-relative weak actualism, let's take world B as a base and compare both world A, which adds Joy, and world C, which adds Misery. From B's perspective, the worlds are all value-equivalent. A says A is better. C says C is worse. Suppose B is actual. Asymmetrists want to say (i) we had good reason not to realize C, but (ii) no extra reason to realize A. How do they secure this? Appeal to self-conditional value gives us reasons against C, in that if we'd chosen C, it would've then been worse. But it's equally true that, if we'd chosen A, it would've then been better, suggesting that we should have self-conditional reasons for A. (B doesn't regard itself as any better or worse than either A or C, and so doesn't generate any competing self-conditional reasons when making these comparisons.) Where's the asymmetry between A and C? I think an asymmetry may have been smuggled in to the account of permissibility as "exactly those [options] that aren't [self-conditionally] worse than any other". If we instead start from the more foundational normative question of what *reasons* there are in the situation (and insofar as we go for deontic concepts like 'permissibility' at all, take it to be determined in suitable fashion by the balance of those normative reasons), there doesn't appear to be any grounds for an asymmetry here after all. (Though again, I do think the deeper issue here is that we should reject "the spirit of actualism". Even if B is actual, we should regard the extra suffering life in alternative C as a bad-making feature, resulting in world C being properly evaluated as *worse*. There's nothing "spooky" about this; it's entirely commonsensical that we should evaluate miserable lives as intrinsically bad.)