Russian and Chinese air defence systems have failed in two wars this year. Russian and Chinese offensive missile technology may be succeeding in a third. The same countries whose shields collapsed are sharpening the spears piercing someone else’s shield. That paradox is the most important military-industrial signal of 2026.
In January, the United States captured Nicolás Maduro. Maduro’s Russian S-300VM, Buk-M2, and S-125 batteries did not stop it. His Chinese JY-27A radars, marketed as anti-stealth, did not detect it. American forces achieved air superiority, suppressed every system, and executed the raid without losing an aircraft.
In February, Operation Epic Fury opened against Iran. Iranian integrated air defences included Russian S-300, reported S-400 components, and Chinese HQ-9B systems. Israeli F-35s and American F-22s operated freely over Iranian airspace. The defences were overwhelmed by stealth, electronic warfare, and saturation. Hegseth said Iran’s air defences were degraded by 90 percent. Two countries. Two Russian-Chinese defence architectures. Two failures.
Now reverse the lens. On March 20th and 21st, Iran launched waves of Khorramshahr-4 ballistic missiles with cluster warheads at Israel. Missiles struck Tel Aviv, Jerusalem near the prime minister’s residence, Petah Tikva, and the Dimona area. Israel declared a mass casualty incident in Arad. Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow intercepted many. But several penetrated. These were the most significant Israeli air defence failures since the war began.
The cluster warheads are the variable. Standard re-entry vehicles present a single target to interceptors. Cluster munitions fragment into dozens of submunitions before terminal phase, overwhelming the tracking algorithms that guide each interceptor. The question defence analysts are asking is where Iran acquired the capability to miniaturise cluster warheads and achieve reliable dispersal at hypersonic re-entry velocities on a missile that travels 2,000 kilometres. Iran’s indigenous programme is advanced. But that specific engineering challenge is one Russia and China have both solved and Iran had not demonstrated before this war.
No confirmed evidence ties Russian or Chinese engineers directly to the Khorramshahr-4 cluster variant. Speculation is growing among Israeli analysts and in defence journals. What is confirmed is the pattern: Russian and Chinese defensive exports failed in Venezuela and Iran. Russian and Chinese offensive technology may have enabled the weapon now succeeding against Israeli defences built with American technology. The shield they sold did not work. The spear they may have helped forge does.
China and Russia are monitoring both sides of Epic Fury in real time. Every F-35 overflight generates sensor data on detection gaps in their exported defences. Every Khorramshahr impact generates data on interception failures in American-designed Israeli systems. Both datasets flow to Beijing and Moscow. The wars they are not fighting are the laboratories they are using to calibrate the wars they might.
Iran’s air defences were Russian and Chinese. They failed. Iran’s offensive missiles may carry Russian and Chinese cluster technology. They succeeded. The countries that built the shield that broke may be building the spear that works. That is not a contradiction. It is a strategy: sell the defence to generate revenue, invest in the offence to generate the capability that matters when the shield is someone else’s problem.
The shield costs billions. The spear costs millions. And 22 days into this war, the spear is winning.
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