AMCA – On a wing and a prayer

ADA’s project to develop the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) as an indigenous Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) has its roots in its Medium Combat Aircraft (MCA) studies in the 2000’s. The MCA was originally supposed to be a bigger, twin-engined version of the Light Combat Aircraft. After India and Russia signed an Inter-Government Agreement in 2007 for joint development and production of the Prospective Multi-role Fighter (PMF) (which is now known as the Su-57), most probably fearing the MCA’s loss of relevance in the changed scenario, ADA transmogrified MCA into AMCA by adding “Advanced” to the previous moniker.

The contract for the Preliminary Design of the PMF was signed in December 2010. Once the PD stage was completed, the Indian and Russian sides began negotiations for signing the next contract for full-scale development. At the time, it was generally assumed that the PMF project will be done jointly by HAL and Sukhoi and the learnings from that project will flow down to the AMCA project thus enhancing its probability of success. However, in the intervening years when the PMF negotiations were progressing, ‘PMF followed by AMCA’ somehow became ‘PMF or AMCA’. Eventually, after intense jousting and lobbying in favour of self-reliance, the PMF was put in the backburner and AMCA became India’s choice for the FGFA.  Interestingly, if a contract was signed in 2016 with Russia, the PMF would have been inducted into the IAF from 2024 onwards. On the other hand, AMCA the PMF-slayer is still on the drawing board.

As per public information, the development of the AMCA is planned to be completed in 8 years. The Russian FGFA project began in 2000 and Induction commenced by end 2020 (20 years). The development of the F-22 Raptor began in 1986 and Induction into USAF commenced in 2005 (19 years). The JSF development began in 1993 and Initial Capability was achieved commencing from 2015 for F-35 B version (22 years). Given these exemplars, around 18 years is the bare minimum to achieve Initial Operational Capability for the AMCA if an established OEM is the designer. However, the AMCA is going to be developed by ADA and a private company with no prior expertise or experience in aircraft design or development. Therefore, the learning period will have to be added to the typical cycle time to arrive at a realistic timeline for the AMCA. In my opinion, any promise for induction of the AMCA before 2045 should be categorically ruled out. The difference of around 10+ years between plan and likely reality is extremely crucial because the private vendor is to be selected based on L-1 pricing.  Such pricing would be based on an exact definition of the scope of work and the schedule. In the case of Fighter Aircraft development, both these variables are notoriously difficult to predict and manage.

The biggest folly is to keep HAL out of the development process. (This would be akin to the US government keeping Lockheed Martin aside and granting the 6-Gen Fighter development project to a previously untested private entity). In the extreme, this decision (craftily engineered by tweaking eligibility criteria in the EOI) alone is enough to jeopardize the AMCA project. HAL, despite its inefficiencies, is the only agency in India possessing end-to-end capabilities in design and development of Fighter aircraft. The knowledge and experience required to complete the countless complicated and complex tasks successfully can only be accumulated over decades of exposure to multiple projects. HAL has seen it all. It would be illogical to expect that any of the three vendors/consortia shortlisted now will be able to supplant HAL and achieve a miracle of realizing an AMCA in 8 years.

It is vital to note that ADA has design knowledge in only a few domains of aircraft design. The rest of the skill sets are in HAL’s possession. Therefore, ADA cannot assist or supervise the vendor to fulfill the whole gamut of design and development tasks the vendor has to undertake. In view of this, a better option (probably the only one) is to entrust Design, Systems Integration and critical ground/ flight testing tasks to HAL (as in the LCA project) and to include a Tier-I private vendor solely for manufacturing and assembly of the airframes. Manufacturing of the prototypes during the development stage would give valuable exposure and experience to the vendor enabling a fluent transition to the subsequent Series Production stage. Equipping, system integration and final checks can optionally be entrusted to the vendor after the vendor’s personnel have jointly worked alongside HAL engineers and technicians during the making of at least 3 prototypes.

The current strategy for AMCA also calls for massive investments in capital facilities which are readily available within HAL. The proposed investments include new manufacturing and assembly facilities, ground testing facilities, flight test facilities including runway, ATC, etc. and residential quarters. As per reports, the Andhra Pradesh government has already allotted about 600 acres for the AMCA project. HAL has one airport in Bangalore and another in Nashik where the flight testing of AMCA can easily be done. However, in order to keep HAL out of the project, completely new flight testing facilities are being set up at enormous cost to the national exchequer. The DRDO has its own Aeronautical Test Range in Chitradurga which could have been modified for the purpose. However, it does not appear that this option has been considered. In any case, it is very easy to justify anything if one has command over the English language and access to aeronautical jargon which is designed to confound bureaucrats. However, whether such decisions are in the national interest has to be seen objectively.

An aspect that should worry the IAF is the choice of the engine for AMCA. Super-cruise capability is one of the defining characteristics of any FGFA.  The F-22 Raptor has a stealth mode combat take-off weight of around 30 Tons (against MTOW of 38 Tons) and it is powered by two P&W F-119 engines with 156 kN AB Thrust and 116 kN Dry Thrust (Dry Thrust is critical for Supercruise). With AMCA’s MTOW of 27 Tons and assumed stealth mode combat take-off weight of around 21 Tons, it is clear that an engine with about 110 kN AB Thrust and about 83 kN Dry Thrust is required for comparable performance (Not precisely, but reasonably close enough). ADA plans that the initial variant of the AMCA will use two GE F-414 INS6 engines with 98 kN AB Thrust and 58 kN Dry Thrust each. Given the comparison with the Raptor, the initial version of AMCA will have no Supercruise at all and in addition will have other debilitating shortfalls in Mission and Point performance parameters.

As per news reports, the new engine for AMCA is to be jointly developed by GTRE and Safran, a contract for which is yet to be negotiated and agreed. Given that Safran has never developed an engine of 120 kN power class, and given the usual timelines for new engine design and development, the new engine can be assumed to be available about 12 years after a contract with Safran is signed. Considering at least a 2-year cycle time for contract signing by 2028, the new engine may become available by 2040. Considering that the new engine will have a different sizing and interfaces, the AMCA airframe and related systems should be modified to accommodate the new engine. After that, new prototypes will have to be built and an extended flight test campaign will be required to assess and certify the Mission and Point performance parameters. In other words, an AMCA meeting its minimum Air Staff Requirements will be available only by 2050 or so. Meanwhile, the IAF will have no option other than to induct the under-powered initial version of the AMCA. It is the LCA Mk-1 and LCA Mk-2 story all over again.

AMCA is not ADA’s only project. ADA is still grappling with the pending tasks related to the LCA Mk-1 variants. It is also developing the full-capability LCA Trainer and the LCA Navy Mk-I variants. New developments include the LCA Mk-2, LCA Navy Mk-2 and the TEDBF. With an engineering team of probably less than 1000 engineers, it is not clear how ADA will manage this overwhelming array of major projects and still hope to meet any of the promised timelines.

The question is, can the IAF afford to wait till 2050 to get FGFA capability given our perilous neighborhood realities? By 2050, will 5-Gen aircraft still be even relevant? The timelines being discussed here assume that HAL is the main design agency. If it is going to be a private sector affair with grossly inadequate support from ADA to the exclusion of HAL, we can safely add about 5 years to these timelines. Given this grievous situation, if FGFA capability is still pursued, the government should consider acquiring one of the FGFAs available globally. The options include the Su-57, the F-22 Raptor and the F-35 Lightning. Two or three Squadrons can be directly procured instead of complicating matters by trying to localize production. We already have the Rafale precedent.