Very helpful. Would only add a few observations / reminders to friends on top here:

1) There is a difference between regime cash flow and national prosperity. Regimes can survive indefinitely without the latter, but not the former. Oil was providing cash flow to fund operations, not prosperity (except for the corrupt leadership).

2) The other primary foreign currency lifeline for Iran were its networks of shadow bankers and financial intermediaries in UAE. Billions more in Iranian financial interests already shut down there. Roughly a third of all Iran’s international trade was with UAE. “Don’t bomb the hand that feeds you”

3) Two weeks ago, the government announced a new 10,000,000 rial bank note worth roughly $7. That’s what soldiers were getting paid with going into the war. Inflation at 40% and rising.

4) The cost to the Iranian economy to date is estimated between 20-50% of GDP. All else equal, it would take a full year of toll booth revenue at normal Hormuz traffic levels just to fill the hole they’re already in. Take away oil, all else ain’t equal.

5) No money for imports and at some stage, no cash flow to fund operations like, for instance, soldiers’ wages.

6) Tens of millions of their own people already wanted them dead before the war.

5 & 6 go together, imo.