What people get wrong about Hungary and the EU
And why the Commission was right to release the money
Last Thursday and Friday a momentous summit of EU leaders took place. After much deliberation and anticipation, Ukraine was granted approval to begin full negotiations for entry into the EU. It was another political victory for Ukraine and deeply symbolic of the country’s European path, the choice that has determined their future as a nation.
It was also only achieved thanks to an unprecedented bit of political ingenuity.
Hungary, led by the far-right, pro-Russian Viktor Orbán, had made no secret of his opposition to Ukrainian membership of the EU. However, the other leaders around the table wouldn’t let the issue go and the pressure on Orbán grew. In the end, to allow countries to take a decision by ‘consensus’, Orbán was simply asked to leave the room before they asked if anyone had any objections to opening accession talks.
It was a clever solution and not one many people knew was even possible prior to this meeting. Nonetheless, it didn’t really tackle the heart of the issue: that Hungary’s government repeatedly tries to work against the functioning and interests of the EU while pursuing an authoritarian and anti-democratic agenda at home. A separate proposal on financial aid to Ukraine did not make any progress during the summit.
It’s an issue that has prompted many in more liberal circles to agitate for the EU to ‘get tough’ on Orbán. They variously propose that Hungary should be suspended from the EU, kicked out entirely or have all its EU funding indefinitely frozen.
Much of this is unrealistic on practical grounds. There is, for example, no mechanism for a member of the EU to be kicked out, no matter how much the others may want it. A suspension of voting rights does exist (Article 7) but attempts to use this on Hungary have always been doomed by the need for unanimity among all other members, a condition that has not existed at any point during this discussion. The EU has, to its credit, held back substantial funds from Hungary over rule of law violations (although people will note that this has not actually solved the situation).
Perhaps more importantly, there is also a political problem here. In the lead up to the European Council, the European Commission approved the unfreezing of €10bn to Hungary. Many decried this as surrendering to ‘Orbán’s blackmail’. Yet the link between the funds and any decisions taken in the summit is unclear, particularly as what Orbán actually conceded to the other leaders is not what most people expected.
Notably, the Commission didn’t simply issue the funds at random. The Commission has a list of demands for Hungary to comply with in order to restore the rule of law and Hungary’s government had complied with a number of these conditions. The independent National Judicial Council was given more powers, the Constitutional Court’s powers over other judges was more limited and the Supreme Court could no longer take on cases that should go to the European Court of Justice.
Within the structure of the EU, the Commission is intended to be the ‘guardian of the treaties’. It is meant to act as a neutral party that upholds the law and treaties of the EU. It can therefore legitimately ‘police’ the rule of law within the EU’s members. But to maintain that legitimacy, it must act in a way that appears unbiased. To negotiate conditions with a country’s government, for those conditions to be met and then for the money to still be withheld would undermine that legitimacy. Unfreezing at least some of the money was a necessary step.
Moreover, we stray onto particularly risky territory when we argue that Hungary should suffer an institutional penalty for opposing the accession of Ukraine to the EU. Unlike with rule of law concerns, which can be assessed in a more objective manner, the question of Ukrainian membership, and even support for Ukraine more generally, is firmly political.
We can disagree very strongly with the view of the Orbán government – and I would count myself as a dedicated supporter of Ukraine in every regard – but that does not change the fact that we are dealing with political questions. And so long as we are faced with these kinds of questions, then institutional tools (like the suspension of voting rights or freezing funds) should be out of the question. Hungary cannot be punished by the European Commission for the political act of opposing Ukrainian accession anymore than France can be punished for opposing Albanian accession. To do otherwise would be to set up the Commission with a deeply politicised and arbitrary power that could only harm the EU in the long run.
In discussing Hungary we must therefore maintain a clear distinction between actions around the rule of law in Hungary, which are designed to preserve democracy, and suggestions that we should forcibly by-pass Hungary’s views on political topics, which would circumvent democracy.
For many this is a frustrating answer, at risk of creating feelings of impotence. They will understandably declare that more must be done about the very real split between Hungary’s government and much of the rest of the EU.
It would be wrong to suggest that there is no way forwards. One option is to reform the way decisions in EU foreign policy are made, moving away from unanimity. This would maybe create some more flexibility but it still fails in practice because it doesn’t address the real political issues. Hungary’s use of its foreign policy veto may be frustrating but only a minority of countries are currently advocating switching to majority vote in these cases. Many governments are unwilling to give up their own veto, which they would use to defend their own national interests, simply to deal with Orbán. Indeed, it’s precisely this lack of appetite for deep reform that leads so many to look for ways to ‘hack’ the existing order.
So while institutional reform could be a solution for the future, more likely the short-term will require working from the bottom-up rather than the top-down. This means reaching out directly to the Hungarian population, promoting liberal democratic parties, running counter-propaganda campaigns. These must be political actions to tackle a political problem. Indeed, they need not be limited to Hungary. As the far-right is on the up in a number of European countries, more and more places need exactly this kind of operation in order to win Europe’s war of ideas. Coincidentally, the upcoming European Parliament elections, in June 2024, would be just the time to launch this kind of operation.
None of this would be for the European Commission to take on but is instead the job of Europe’s governments, of its politicians. The Commission still has an important role to play in maintaining the rule of law but both those within and without the organisation are wrong to push for politicisation and mission creep. In supporting Ukraine, in preserving democracy or in holding back the far-right, there is no stronger defence than a victory in public opinion and no greater vulnerability than defeat at the ballot box. Hungarians, and Europeans more broadly, must be mobilised in defence of democracy, liberty and rules-based stability. It’s time for politicians to do their job.
But hungary is not a democracy anymore. You cannot reach out to its people.. putin style propagada machine, constantly changing election rules, complete state capture