Recently we have seen a slew of articles about the poor state of European defence. They correctly explain that European governments have underinvested in their militaries for many years, with forces and available equipment shrinking drastically since the end of the Cold War. The idea that Europe wouldn’t face any direct threat has been dramatically exposed as false in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Now concerns abound that Russia could go further and news outlets explain what a Russian invasion of NATO territory could look like.
Many such pieces move on to focus on the upcoming US elections. With the Republican primary in fully swing, all signs point to Donald Trump once again being the party’s candidate for US president.
Two facts are then presented as essential. First, that Trump is a committed isolationist who regularly questions aid to Ukraine, is happy to cut deals with dictators and shows no concern for America’s notional allies in Europe. He openly believes that NATO offers nothing to the US, that the alliance is a free ride for Europeans and has reportedly said in private that he would not come to the aid of a NATO ally. Second, for all his obvious faults and in spite of the role he played in trying to overturn the legitimate result of the 2020 elections, there is a very real possibility that Trump could win a second term. Indeed, for some, he is the favourite in the race against Biden.
From this we are supposed to understand that a Trump victory would severely undermine European defence and that this is why Europe must invest more in its own capabilities; to compensate for the potential absence, formal or otherwise, of American protection.
However, this line of analysis is much too focused on a single person. At a certain level, it appears that many pundits believe that America is falling to isolationism because Trump is popular. Yet it is much more likely that Trump is popular because Americans are indulging in isolationism regardless. The issue is not so much Trump as an individual politician but rather the 40-50% of US voters ready to endorse his views.
Trump is not president, he’s not even the Republican candidate for now, yet already we’ve seen a collapse in support for Ukraine from Republican politicians. At best, these politicians view it as a useful bargaining chip, something they are willing to trade and bet on as they try to extract concessions from the Democrats on other, unrelated matters. At worst, some of them have no care for Ukraine at all, actively opposing US efforts to support Ukrainian defence, spreading false information about corruption or Russian peace offers and generally aligning with the isolationist tendency of American politics. Together they have conspired to (so far successfully) sabotage the extension of US aid to Ukraine.
Why are they doing this? It is not because Trump might become president again a year from now. It is because they all believe that, to a greater of lesser extent, this is what their voters expect of them.
Based on the current evidence, is there any reason to say that they are wrong?
The logical conclusion then is this: the 2024 US presidential election does not matter.
Maybe Europe will get lucky. Maybe Biden will win and Trump will finally disappear from the political stage (he’d be 82 by the time of the following election). But it would be a major mistake to assume that such a scenario would be any kind of ‘get out of jail free’ card. Biden would likely still have to work with Republicans in Congress, who are certain to make life difficult for him and impede attempts at properly fighting back against Russian aggression.
While a Trump victory may make the conditions starker, it would do relatively little to change the fundamentals of the situation in which Europe now finds itself. As much as the American alliance is an essential pillar of European defence, it has also become deeply irresponsible to be reliant on America coming to our rescue.
Indeed, it is past time for us to be talking in hypotheticals. We need America to do more to help defeat Russia right now. Ukraine’s progress has stalled during the latter part of 2023 as different strikes against Russian defensive positions failed to generate a breakthrough (at least as far the land war is concerned). While Russia is firing massive numbers of shells and missiles right across Ukraine’s territory, Ukrainian forces are being forced to ration, with their rate of fire falling day by day.
There is no lack of Ukrainian requests for more ammunition and more equipment to revitalise their military. As a test of America’s willingness to confront Russia, it should be easy enough to pass. Ukrainians are not even asking American soldiers to put themselves at risk, simply to be given the means to risk their own lives in fighting Putin’s forces. Yet this is a test that America today is failing.
In a world where Europe had an effective defence capacity of its own, this would not be such a problem. Unlike in the US, Europe does not lack the will to help Ukraine. For all the protests of Viktor Orbán in Hungary or Robert Fico in Slovakia, most European governments are committed to ensuring Ukraine’s victory. If there had been sufficient military supplies here, and industrial capacity to keep producing more, then Ukraine’s armed forces today would be well-equipped and taking the fight to Russia. That they are forced to hold back and count every shot is thanks to Europe’s excess dependence on America to do all the military heavy lifting.
While Trump winning the next election would have many dire implications for America and the world, it changes very little for Europe’s defence. We are beyond theorising about the impact of an America no longer truly committed to deterring Russian aggression; beyond a potential future, this is our present. Europe must develop independent military capacity as a matter of urgency, no matter what November’s election might bring.