During last week’s European Council, EU leaders delivered a critical decision. After many months of wrangling, they agreed to support Ukraine with €50bn over the next four years. This will provide Ukraine with an important lifeline as the EU begins to underwrite a large part of Kyiv’s annual budget.
While the agreement itself was not totally unexpected, the meeting did go surprisingly smoothly. In the previous days, reports had suggested that diplomats were becoming more pessimistic about a deal as fears grew that Hungary’s illiberal leader, Viktor Orbán, would try to block the funding, as he did in December. Talk of needing to find alternatives grew, whether by providing the funding outside of EU structures or by applying massive pressure on Budapest and pulling the plug on all EU money to Hungary (an unprecedented and likely illegal move).
Yet on the day itself, there was no apocalypse, no sturm und drang. After pre-summit breakfast negotiations, the formal talks on Ukraine funding were swiftly dealt with and a deal announced before lunchtime.
So what changed? Why did something so difficult become so straightforward?
Part of the answer may lie in the relationship between the three strongest players in the European far-right today: Hungary’s Fidesz, of which Orbán is leader, Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) and Italy’s Brothers of Italy (FdI).
Ever since Fidesz was kicked out of the European centre-right group, the European People’s Party, there has been talk of them joining forces with PiS and FdI. Already, the latter two sit together in the European Parliament as the two leading forces of the European Conservatives and Reformists (which the UK Conservatives were part of until Brexit). Bringing Fidesz into the club would establish the ECR as the third major force of European politics, behind the centre-right and the social democrats but ahead of the liberals and the other far-right group.
However, there has always been a big stumbling block: foreign policy. Where Orbán is friendly with Putin and has constantly agitated to suspend aid for Ukraine, his Polish and Italian counterparts are the very opposite. PiS and FdI are both Atlanticists, who support NATO, believe in the defence of Ukraine and have no interest in cutting deals with Moscow. For this reason, it has always been assumed that the great consolidation of the European right would be impossible, the views on this key issue simply too divergent to make the marriage work.
But now there is evidence the situation may be moving. Initially, just after the European Council summit, a key leader from PiS indicated they could accept Fidesz joining the ECR. Then, in an interview with Italian media, Orbán himself appeared to confirm the idea. This suddenly puts a new light on Orbán’s apparent change of mind regarding Ukraine. Rather than being an isolated move, a final and necessary decision to surrender to pressure from almost every other leader, it could be the first indication of a new strategy.
Under this strategy, Orbán would tone down his public praise of Putin and, while never being pro-Ukraine as such, would not actively intervene to stop the EU helping Kyiv. In exchange, he would be admitted into the ECR and the larger group could focus on cooperating in those areas where they do agree: opposition to EU integration, xenophobia, hostility to LGBT people, climate scepticism and a desire to cut back abortion rights.
It’s a fairly uncomplicated trade-off and it makes you wonder why it hasn’t happened already.
Part of the reason may be that Orbán was waiting, hoping to see if other far-right and pro-Russia parties and leaders could make advances. Yet potential players like Salvini in Italy or Le Pen in France have not managed to pull off the kind of success that would be enticing for Orbán.
Even where a similar-minded politician has succeeded – Geert Wilders in the Netherlands – the pressures of coalition-building have forced a much more moderate stance on Ukraine there too. Given this reality, Orbán may have decided that he had waited long enough and that it was best to cut a deal, get on the inside of a bigger alliance and build up his power from there.
Now, none of this is confirmed yet. For the moment we are still relying on assumptions and reading between the lines. It’s possible that there is no such deal being cooked up behind the scenes. Alternatively, the potential deal may be very real but might fall through for unknown reasons.
What we do know is that if it does come to pass, then it would be a mixed blessing indeed.
In the short term there would be clear benefits for Ukraine as Putin’s most useful pawn is taken off the board. Support for Ukraine should become easier to agree and could be more frequent as a result. It could ease the way for further military assistance and, in the end, the ultimate prize of EU membership.
But the consolidation of the far-right as the third-strongest group in European politics would come at a cost. It would mean a loss for the fight against climate change, a loss for women’s rights, a loss for the humane treatment of migrants and a loss for LGBT equality. Moreover, an indirect boost for the far-right internationally, especially in Washington, could limit the overall gains for Ukraine.
If this really is the opening of a new pragmatism from Orbán, then the relief may be short-lived.