Attacks on shipping hurt the Global South, so why is China so passive?
Beijing lacks leverage and the will to stop Iran and the Houthis.
The Houthis attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea continue, despite military strikes by the US and UK, as well as pleas from the Biden Administration that China use its influence over Iran to rein in their proxies in Yemen.
The Houthis and Iran are undeterred by both the allied use of military force and notably, qualified requests made by their top customer China.
On Monday, the indiscriminate nature of their attacks – always claimed to have been targetted at ships travelling to Israel – were exposed when they launched two missiles at a Greek-owned, Marshall Islands-flagged cargo vessel carrying corn from Brazil.
‘Of note, the MV Star Iris’s destination is Bandar Iman Khomeini, Iran,’ the US Central Command’s X account said, somewhat dryly.
In short, the Houthis attacked a vital foodstuff bound for their patrons – Iran.
Houthi spokesman Yahya Saree had said earlier that they had attacked Star Iris believing she was American.
‘The naval forces of the Yemeni Armed Forces targeted the American ship “Star Iris” in the Red Sea with a number of suitable naval missiles, and the hit was accurate and direct, thanks to God,’ he said in a statement on Monday.
The own goal is unlikely to deter the Houthis or Iran from further attacks, despite the soaring costs of shipping, and delays to the delivery of vital goods to customers in the Global South – countries China purports to speak for, claiming they are shortchanged by a US-dominated rules-based order.
This is why China’s actions – and inaction – in trying to alleviate the price pressures on shipping, are worth examining.
Last month, US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, made it publicly known that he’d asked his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi to lean on Iran.
‘China … as a UN Security Council member has an obligation to use the influence it has in Tehran to get those in Tehran to use the influence they have with the Houthis to push back against this kind of behaviour,’ Sullivan told the Council of Foreign Relations after his marathon 12-hours of meetings with Wang.
“I won’t characterise the response because I’ll leave that to Wang Yi to do for himself, but I will just say that was a detailed and substantive conversation because it is a matter where we believe that countries, particularly permanent members of the UN Security Council, have unique responsibilities and should step up to those responsibilities.’
Five days ago, China’s Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu hosted his Iranian counterpart Ali Baqeri Kani in Beijing.
‘China calls on all parties concerned to work together to keep the shipping lanes safe in the Red Sea in accordance with the law and to effectively respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the coastal countries along the Red Sea,’ China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a readout of the meeting.
But the readout contained an important qualifier, describing the tensions in the Red Sea as a ‘prominent manifestation of the spillover from the Gaza conflict.’
Not surprisingly, the Iranians were unmoved.
‘The Iranian side … believes that only when the conflict in Gaza is put to an end firstly can good conditions be created for the restoration of the stable situation in the Red Sea,’ Bagheri said, according to the Chinese readout.
This shows China has both limited interests and capabilities to restrain Iran.
Ahmed Aboudouh, associate fellow with Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa programme and head of the Emirates Policy Centre’s China Studies Research Unit, said expectations of China’s influence over Tehran were always overly optimistic.
‘China doesn’t have enough leverage over the Iranians,’ Aboudouh told Latika Takes.
‘Yes, it may enjoy a sizeable influence over the Iranian economy, but not over its security apparatus and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.’
But Aboudouh and other experts said China also had no interest in stopping the Iranians and the Houthis, even if it could.
‘Bejing would not mount the required pressure on the Iranians and risk jeopardising its relations with Iran to grant the US a free diplomatic win,’ Aboudouh said.
‘This, however, might change if the conflict expands into a region-wide war. But until this is the case, Beijing will unlikely do what is required by the US.’
Beijing also stands to benefit from a US that is stretched militarily, diplomatically and domestically, by the wars in Ukraine and Israel’s retaliatory assault on Gaza. As long as the US is preoccupied with responding to these conflicts, it has less capacity and resources to focus on the Indo-Pacific.
This is despite the rising costs for shipping that the danger in the Red Sea is causing, including for China.
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the average container shipping spot rates from Shanghai have more than doubled, (+122 per cent) since early December.
The rates from Shanghai to Europe more than tripled (+256 per cent.)
‘Despite the vulnerability of its exports to the attacks on commercial shipping, China will prefer to let others do the heavy lifting in terms of the security response,’ said Robert Ward, Japan Chair at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).
‘With its geopolitical sights set on winning favour in the “Global South” and, relatedly, on criticising what it sees as the broader failure of the US-led international order, Beijing will prefer to maintain its distance from the US-led response.’
But China’s stance could involve some costs. As Jan Hoffman from UNCTAD said: ‘Developing countries are particularly vulnerable to these disruptions.’
‘President Xi Jinping in his speech at the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference said that China must “embody the responsibility of a major country … and persist in promoting world stability and prosperity,”’ said Meia Nouwens, Senior Fellow for Chinese Security and Defence Policy also at the IISS.
‘Those words ring hollow when Beijing fails to cooperate with other major powers to resolve crises like what we’re seeing the in Red Sea.
‘Countries in the Middle East may question the US’s military commitment to the region, but when crises emerge, the Chinese haven’t shown up,” she said.
Aboudouh said the region would take note.
‘Arab governments can not be blamed if they now think that when push comes to shove, it is the US that will be there to protect their interests and security, not China,’ he said.
In a sign of how long the allies expect Houthis to continue their attacks, the UK is considering sending HMS Queen Elizabeth if and when the US Navy withdraws the USS Dwight D Eisenhower, likely in May.
‘She will be a major contributor to the coalition there and the sooner she sails the better,’ Tom Sharpe, retired Royal Navy commander, said.
While China confines its presence in the Red Sea to conducting naval escorts, it's worth examining the contrasting response by India, from where I write this piece.
While India is not a part of the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian, it has been visible and active in the region, responding to at least seven distress signals sounded by commercial vessels since the Houthi attacks began, including assisting the MV Marlin Luanda tanker, carrying a Russian crude oil product, that caught fire after being hit by a Houthi missile.
As India’s Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar put it: ‘We will not be considered a responsible country when bad things are happening in the surrounding country and we say “I have got nothing to do with this.”’
A stark reminder to those who prefer to sit on the sidelines that it is always actions that speak louder than words.