The Russo-Ukraine War offers a panoply of lessons which might inform strategy, defence industrial priorities, military force structures and battlefield tactics. Learning from the experiences of other nations is what a clever country does. And for Australia, that begins with learning the lessons for which the Ukrainians have paid such a high price.
Two years ago this week, Russian ground forces crossed into Ukraine in the south, east and north. The Russians planned for a lightning ten-day campaign to seize the capital and install a puppet regime. But in war, nothing is certain. Even the simplest of plans can come undone through enemy action. So it was on the first day of this war. The Ukrainians, initially disorganised, were able to defeat the air assault into Hostomel, forcing the Russians into an arduous land campaign in northern Ukraine which ultimately failed.
The Russo-Ukraine War is the largest conflagration in Europe since the Second World War and the most consequential; it has driven a wholesale transformation of warfare. Both the Ukrainians and the Russians have adopted an array of new technologies which have changed tactics, military organisational structures and the degree of lethality in war. The war has been fought at a scale not seen in eight decades, resulting in massive human and material losses, driving the mobilisation of people and defence manufacturing.
Australia can learn much from the war. And while the topic of Ukraine (unbelievably) did not rate a mention in the 2023 Defence Strategic Review, Australia has a once-in-a-generation opportunity to transform how it commands, how it learns and makes decisions, how it fights, and how it supports military operations. Five crucial lessons stand out.
You can read the entire article on the lessons for Australia from the past two years of war in Ukraine, here (for free) at the Lowy Interpreter.
Gonzalo, Spot on! And I’d add more points.
“Long range” in European (Ukrainian) terms is up to, say, 1500kms. It is 1100km from Warsaw to Moscow; 760km Kyiv to Moscow. By contrast, Darwin to China is 6000km and to Jakarta is 2700km. There is simply no comparison between the theatres and therefore, between the strategic choices for the protagonists. This was why the Allies had to slowly and painfully island-hop to get within bomber range of Japan in WW2.
The Army will be irrelevant in any war with China. As Gonzalo said, it will not try to invade. It WILL seek to isolate and subjugate Australia into subservience. Australia’s best (indeed, only) strategy (apart from its alliances - a dangerous policy perhaps in the age of Trump) is to make itself a “prickly hedgehog”, deny sea access to its coastal littoral using submarines, missiles and maybe aircraft, and keep its sea lanes open for essential re-supply. It is self-sufficient in food and energy but needs imports for vital electronics and chips. All this calls into question the need for nuclear subs: why would Australia need to patrol the Chinese coast when it could deny safe access to its own coast by an enemy, using sea drones, diesel-electric subs, mines, and missiles, all for a fraction of the cost in dollars; manpower (a very scarce resource for a country with a population of only 27 million); and time compared to the AUKUS subs folly.
As Mick said, strategy starts with hard thinking. There’s not enough of it in this case, or by Israel against Hamas…
As an island continent, Australia is not in danger of being invaded by anyone. I doubt that the PLA is planning to invade Australia in the foreseeable future or in any future. I do think that Australia needs to focus on air defense systems in particular as well as naval power to protect is freedom of the seas and its lines of communication. But I do not see a great need for offensive ground forces