Something rotten in the Israeli Defense Forces?
The recent strike on an aid convoy comes in the wake of a damning probe into the deaths of three hostages at the hands of the IDF.
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Below: Soldiers of the IDF’s Golani brigade in the Shejaiya area of Gaza city
On April 1st a group of aid workers left a warehouse in Deir al-Balah, in central Gaza. The vehicles in their three-car convoy were clearly marked with the frying-pan logo of World Central Kitchen (WCK), a charity that has worked closely with Israel. Their route along the coastal road had been cleared with the Israeli army. But these precautions didn’t save them. An Israeli drone loitering overhead fired three missiles in succession at the cars, killing all seven people inside.
As someone who has delivered food for the World Central Kitchen in another very bad place, I felt a natural affinity with the aid workers killed. And as a former infantry commander and fire support coordinator, who has planned and fought in urban operations, I was curious to find out how as sophisticated a force as the Israeli military might have become careless or negligent about protecting non combatant lives.
The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) admit making a ‘serious mistake’ — but the initial probe suggests that it was not just one such mistake, but a series of inexplicable errors. Hopefully the investigation will uncover enough to hold those responsible accountable, and prevent this from happening again. But the odds don’t look good.
This latest incident was a reminder of another tragedy caused by ‘friendly fire’ earlier in the campaign. On 10 December, reconnaissance troops of the IDF’s Golani Brigade entered a half rubbled building in the Shejaiya area of Gaza city and were engaged by insurgents. What followed was another inexplicable chain of missteps leading to the death of three Israeli hostages at the hands of the IDF.
Resistance to that point had been far less than expected: mostly small groups of Hamas fighters firing at them from buildings or tossing grenades out of top story windows. The occasional RPG – usually fired from beyond range – would slam into a building or fizzle overhead, but such activity was rare enough to provide a welcome interlude to the boredom. The slow pace was due to a result of the IDF’s modus operandi in Gaza – a painstaking advance preceded by massive amounts of fire power. Before conventional troops moved into an area, a special operations unit would first establish a lodgment for conventional troops to conduct clearing operations.
As the Golani Brigade advanced, drone footage showed what appeared to be Hamas fighters in a building near the next planned lodgment site and a reconnaissance troop was dispatched to deal with them. Their plan was to enter an adjacent house and then breach their way into the target building. As was their usual procedure, the soldiers sent into the building first a dog, equipped with Go-Pro camera. The dog searched the ground floor and was on its way up the stairs to the second floor when it was shot by Hamas fighters, but not before the camera had picked up clear recordings of Israeli hostages announcing their presence in Hebrew. The camera was not connected to a live feed — and no one checked it until days later.
A helicopter gunship fired rockets into the building along with a massive amount of fire power from the troops on the ground. A drone was sent in to confirm that the Hamas gunmen were dead and then the reconnaissance troops entered and searched the building — finding only the bodies of the gunmen and their own dog. The building was reported as being clear and left unattended - despite the fact that only one of its two levels had been searched, and despite several of the reconnaissance soldiers reporting that they had heard voices in Hebrew from the upstairs. The three hostages were on the second floor — which was never cleared because of the ‘threat from booby traps’. The shouts in Hebrew were assumed to be attempts to draw the soldiers into an ambush — but no attempt was made to verify this assumption.
Realizing that the gunmen were dead, the three hostages fled, and spent the next 5 days searching for help. They wrote in Hebrew on the outside walls of the buildings where they stayed — graffiti that was spotted but disregarded as being another invitation to a trap. The IDF found a hand written note saying ‘Save us’ in Hebrew by a tunnel entrance in an adjacent building. It is now thought that this note was written by one of the hostages as they were moved from the tunnel to a building above ground. At the time, however, the note was assumed to be a ploy. No one checked the tunnel or surrounding area for hostages. The subsequent IDF investigation found that there were no reported incidents of Israeli troops being lured into an ambush by any of the methods described.
On 14 December, Day 4, an IDF drone filmed two signs near the building where the firefight had taken place, both in Hebrew - one reading “Save us, hostages’ and one reading ‘SOS.
By the next day, their fifth on the run, the hostages approach an IDF position. They have taken their shirts off and are carrying a large white flag on a pole. They call to the soldiers in Hebrew from 40 meters away. One of the soldiers then shoots and kills two of the hostages. The third hostage flees into a building, wounded but alive. At this point the IDF battalion commander calls for a cease fire and personally goes forward to talk the last hostage, Yotam Haim, into coming out of the building. Haim, was a drummer for one of the bands playing at the Nova Festival when he was taken hostage. Now, terrified and upset he is shouting ‘Help me’ loud enough for the soldiers outside to hear. It takes 15 minutes of talking by the battalion commander for Haim to agree to come out. The word goes out on all nets to hold fire — that the man is a hostage. ‘Come out towards me,’ the battalion commander calls to Haim. He does and two of his soldiers shoot him dead.
Only eight days after that battle, and three days after the hostages were killed, did anyone review the footage from the dog's camera. In the audio from it, the hostages can be heard shouting, "Save us, we're hostages," "Alon, Yotam, Samer," "We're on the stairs" and "We're near the stairs."
Below, Israeli hostages: Samal Talalka, Yotam Haim and Alon Shamriz
Incidents of friendly fire are common to all armies engaged in ground combat. But what is baffling about this incident is that a series of very basic but tragically serious mistakes were made not by reservists rushed to active duty, but by elite soldiers of the Golani and Paratrooper Brigades.
Both these killings — of aid workers and hostages — were covered by the media because they involved Israeli citizens or foreigners. Aside from that the one thing they have in common is a series of events that can only be explained in terms of a wider problem.
The IDF investigation into the killing of the three hostages found that the soldiers involved had violated procedures, but no disciplinary action was taken. The soldiers in turn argued that they were following procedures — albeit unofficial - established at the battalion level, and observed by all. Procedures such as ‘free fire zones’, and shoot on sight orders for military age males whether armed or not. Other procedures — such as firing into all buildings as the IDF approaches, a practice known in US doctrine as reconnaissance by fire, are openly endorsed though likely to lead to civilian casualties.
In this week’s podcast we discuss whether recent incidents are indicators of a fundamental shift in IDF culture - a shift that is shaping the war in Gaza and perhaps the future of Israel.
We also discuss the recent strike in Damascus that killed three of the four most senior officers in Quds force, one of whom, General Mohammed Reiz Zahedi, was rumored to be next in line for the top position: chief commander.
Some Israeli intelligence experts argue that the killing of even these senior officers does not break the rules of the game — the unwritten understanding of limitations by which both sides seek to avoid escalation - because it occurred in Syria, not on Iranian soil. Unfortunately, it is clear that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei thinks otherwise and has told the world — an action which may end up forcing his hand. Meanwhile, despite public appeals for calm, the Israeli defense establishment is on high alert.
Below, General Mohammed Reiz Zahedi (red rectangle) inspecting damage from an Israeli airstrike. In the foreground is General Esmail Quani, Chief Commander, IGRC Quds Force, the man he was slated to succeed.
If an attack does takes place, it will most likely include one or more of the following scenarios: a direct drone and cruise missile attack launched from Iran itself and aimed at Israeli infrastructure sites; an intense barrage of rockets and missiles fired by Hezbollah against critical infrastructure and densely populated urban areas; or an attempt to strike an Israeli embassy overseas. Long shots might include a ground launched missile attack against an El Al airliner or an attack on Israeli community centers and synagogues overseas. The IDF has already bolstered its Air Defense Command to deal with possible missile or drone attack from the Islamic Republic.
But how likely is such an attack — how far is Iran prepared to go to further its interests, and what can be done to prevent escalation? All topics discussed — but unfortunately not solved — in this week’s podcast. I hope that you enjoy it.
Hi Isiah,
I think that the best way to answer your questions is from the article itself.
1. 'The subsequent IDF investigation found that there were no reported incidents of Israeli troops being lured into an ambush by any of the methods described.'
To answer your second question I will leave out my reference to the markings on the vehicle (although as someone familiar with conducting strikes at night, I'm not sure I buy the argument that these were not visible):
On April 1st a group of aid workers left a warehouse in Deir al-Balah, in central Gaza. The vehicles in their three-car convoy were with the World Food Kitchen, a charity that has worked closely with Israel. Their route along the coastal road had been cleared with the Israeli army. But these precautions didn’t save them. An Israeli drone loitering overhead fired three missiles in succession at the cars, killing all seven people inside.
And some more context from the article -- because I wouldn't have written it if I believed this to be an isolated incident in the 'fog of war' (an expression that I dislike intensely for being trotted out to justify all kinds of behavior).
'This latest incident was a reminder of another tragedy caused by ‘friendly fire’ earlier in the campaign. On 10 December, reconnaissance troops of the IDF’s Golani Brigade entered a half rubbled building in the Shejaiya area of Gaza city and were engaged by insurgents. What followed was another inexplicable chain of missteps leading to the death of three Israeli hostages at the hands of the IDF.'
Incidents of friendly fire are common to all armies engaged in ground combat. But what is baffling about this incident is that a series of very basic but tragically serious mistakes were made not by reservists rushed to active duty, but by elite soldiers of the Golani and Paratrooper Brigades.
Both these killings — of aid workers and hostages — were covered by the media because they involved Israeli citizens or foreigners. Aside from that the one thing they have in common is a series of events that can only be explained in terms of a wider problem.
The IDF investigation into the killing of the three hostages found that the soldiers involved had violated procedures, but no disciplinary action was taken. The soldiers in turn argued that they were following procedures — albeit unofficial - established at the battalion level, and observed by all. Procedures such as ‘free fire zones’, and shoot on sight orders for military age males whether armed or not. Other procedures — such as firing into all buildings as the IDF approaches, a practice known in US doctrine as reconnaissance by fire, are openly endorsed though likely to lead to civilian casualties.'
Many thanks for taking the time to send in your thoughts. I write because I enjoy writing but I much prefer discussion !
My best,
Andy
You could tell something was dysfunctional in the IDF from the 7th October footage of the assault on that military base near the border. The quality of a lot of the conscripts and those in charge of them is clearly questionable.