Political party finances have been revealed – here’s what they show.
Our elections are not fought on a level playing field. That’s the inescapable conclusion from the first-ever look behind the veil of secrecy that has traditionally shrouded the finances of our main political parties.
Until now, parties’ accounts have largely remained confidential, on the basis that civil-society bodies are entitled to a fair degree of privacy about their activities and levels of funding. But under a law change brought in by former justice minister Kiri Allan, they now have to publish their annual accounts.
This brings New Zealand in line with countries like the UK, who have long mandated such publication on the grounds that, given parties’ crucial role in political contests, there is a public interest in knowing how well-resourced they are and where they spend their money. Such transparency is, in any case, business as usual for parties like the Greens that have been publishing its accounts for years.
So what do the accounts show us? Most obviously, a massive resource imbalance between our two biggest parties, National and Labour. On pretty much every financial measure, the right is smashing the left.
Take, for instance, the relative financial states of health of the two parties as they entered an election year. At the end of 2022, Labour had assets of $3.5m – not bad, one might think, but less than a quarter of National’s $15.8m tally.
The disparities continued into 2023, when National’s revenue of $11.2m was exactly twice Labour’s total. That was in large part thanks to a record haul of donations from wealthy individuals. National spent even more than it earned – around $15.6m – but the resulting $4m deficit (after accounting adjustments) was easily absorbed by its enormous balance sheet. Labour, by contrast, couldn’t afford to run that kind of loss, and spent less than half its rival’s total, around $7m.
Elsewhere, National outspent Labour on staff salaries by two-to-one ($2.2m versus $910,000). And when it came to the most crucial figure of all, 2023 election campaign spending, the same old disparity cropped up: National’s $7.6m budget was nearly double that of Labour’s $4.3m.
This figure is crucial because it is sometimes believed that the parties spend roughly equivalent amounts contesting an election. The confusion arises because, until now, the only figures officially reported have been the amounts lavished on advertising in the three months prior to the election, the one part of campaign spending that is rigorously limited (and indeed subsidised) by the state.
Election expenses, though, go far beyond the adverts that run on billboards, in newspapers and on social media. Successful campaigns require paid staff and strategists, near-constant polling and focus groups, travel and venue hire budgets, volunteer coordinators, and the creation of ever-larger and more sophisticated voter databases. Then there is the advertising that parties run before the three-month election campaign – the “regulated period” – officially begins.
Although vast pots of money cannot turn around a fundamentally flawed campaign, even National strategists like David Farrar admit that parties “always want more money than less, because it gives you options”. The latest international research also suggests parties with bigger war chests generally win more votes: one large study of French and British elections found that “an increase in spending per voter consistently improves candidates’ vote share”. National’s ability to vastly out-spend Labour, on a nearly two-to-one basis, implies that our elections are not a fair and even contest.
This imbalance looks set to continue. Revenue-generating assets are one foundation of future prosperity, and National’s accounts record $2.3m in “investments” and $2m in “investment property”– the latter underscoring its reputation as the party of landlords – while Labour’s equivalents appear to be $660,000 and $0, respectively.
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The parties’ reliance on big-money donors also appears to be a permanent fixture. National, once reputed to have hundreds of thousands of members, now declares just 23,000, who between them generated a measly $160,000 in revenue. Labour does not state its membership, but its revenue line for “levies, membership and affiliation”, some of which is union-derived, totals $750,000. While evidently more substantial than its rival’s sum, this still comprised just one-tenth of Labour’s 2023 revenue. All of which points to a future in which parties’ ability to compete for votes hinges substantially on their success in attracting wealthy patrons.
There is an alternative, as my Victoria University colleague Lisa Marriott and I recommended in our 2022 report Money for Something: capping donations from individuals at around $15,000 a year, and using tax credits to incentivise donations up to $1,500. This would shift the funding of political parties away from large donations from a small number of people, and towards small donations from a large number of people.
This would reduce opportunities for undue influence and help level the playing field between parties. Elections would become, to a greater extent, contests of ideas, not money. Last year’s Independent Electoral Review made largely the same recommendations, as did a report this month from the Helen Clark Foundation. The intellectual consensus for reform is growing; whether anything changes, though, is another matter.
The government says that in a changing world where order is increasingly determined by power rather than rules, we need to move away from independence. Here’s what that means in practice, and why there are concerns.
There are a few phrases that have popped up in recent interviews and speeches given by our prime minister and minister of foreign affairs in relation to New Zealand’s foreign policy: the likes of “reset”, “force multiplier” and “traditional partners”. The government is signalling that New Zealand will be moving away from the independent foreign policy approach we’ve had for decades. Instead there have been moves to further align with the US and Australia, particularly in the consideration of joining Aukus.
For a small trading nation like New Zealand, foreign policy is an area where security and trade are delicately balanced. Economic interests are entangled in relationships of power. It’s not nice to think of these things as going hand in hand, but that’s the way it goes. At the moment, New Zealand is walking a tightrope between the US and China, which are jostling for influence and power over the Pacific. On Wednesday, minister of defence Judith Collins described possible implications of this tussle in picture book terms: “When two elephants fight, little ants can get squashed.” We are the ant, and both the US and China have power over us not just through their potential military force, but also through their spending power. Our economy relies on trading with them.
China’s premier Li Qiang at the Fonterra head office with Christopher Luxon on June 15, 2024. (Photo: Fiona Goodall/Getty Images)
A double-handed slap-back against the government’s proposal to reset foreign policy came in a strongly worded letter co-signed by unlikely co-conspirators Helen Clark and Don Brash. They worried that a reset in favour of the US, such as signing on to Aukus, could risk this balance and our relationship with China, our biggest trading partner. Still, Peters and Luxon are charging on with promising a pivot. On August 16, Luxon described independent foreign policy as “nonsense” and made clear that in his eyes, its days were numbered. So what exactly would we be resetting?
Breaking free
For many, our independent foreign policy began when we declared New Zealand’s land, sea and airspace nuclear-free zones in 1987. The New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act banned nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed ships from entering into New Zealand waters and prohibited the acquisition, stationing and testing of nuclear bombs. Though its final form is parliamentary and legalistic, the act sprang from a hugely popular protest movement, stoked along by Greenpeace (who could forget the Rainbow Warrior?).
Public interest in foreign policy had grown through the 1960s and 1970s, inflamed by concern over New Zealand’s involvement in the Vietnam War, the country continuing diplomatic and sporting ties with apartheid South Africa, and opposition to French nuclear testing in the Pacific. People protested publicly and lobbied politicians. It was a moment in time that still swells the patriotic hearts of many New Zealanders, who are proud to be on the right side of history, and to have stood up to big world powers to protect not only ourselves, but our Pacific neighbours too. We’re proud to be plucky.
An image that stirs patriotism even in the coldest New Zealand hearts – a protest in 1988. (Photo: Greenpeace)
This bravery came with repercussions. The US suspended us from Anzus, a trilateral security agreement between the US, Australia and New Zealand over the Pacific region. We had entered that agreement in 1951, essentially obliging ourselves to support the US in its wars (Korean War, Vietnam War) in return for its guarantee of protection. Now, we were out, and so we positioned ourselves as a small but independent and principled nation. We like to see ourselves as having disproportionate influence internationally through our staunch independent and principled voice. This has been woven into our national identity.
OK, but what about the Pākehā motherland, Britain?
New Zealand was granted dominion status in 1907, signed the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and became a founding member of the League of Nations in 1920, securing its effective independence. We became increasingly independent in the following years but didn’t fully take control over our foreign policy from the Dominions Office in London until the second world war, when the New Zealand government passed the External Affairs Act in 1943. This established a separate government department to communicate with other governments, negotiate treaties and agreements, direct our overseas ports and deal with diplomats from other countries. Then in 1947 we became fully independent of Britain with the Statute of Westminster Adoption Act. which gave New Zealand full sovereign status and Commonwealth membership.
When the UN charter was being negotiated in 1945, New Zealand keenly turned up. Peter Fraser, our prime minister at the time, advocated for the rights of smaller powers to participate as equals, and sponsored the concept of trusteeship (international oversight of the administration of colonies), which has played an important part in decolonisation. He opposed (unsuccessfully) provisions that allowed permanent members of the Security Council to veto resolutions (the US has recently used these provisions to veto resolutions for ceasefire in Gaza). New Zealand’s delegation also influenced charter articles on economic, social and human rights. Throughout the 40s and 50s, multilateral diplomacy (relationships with groups of countries) through the UN and related organisations was central to New Zealand foreign policy because we didn’t have many direct relationships with other countries.
The UN is a part of the rules-based order that New Zealand’s international relations rely on. This order is the framework of rules, norms and institutions that has governed relations between states since the end of World War II. It’s underpinned by principles like the peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the promotion of sustainable development and respect for fundamental human rights. The UN is a powerful body in creating and maintaining these principles.
We also signed the Manila Treaty in 1954, along with the US, the UK, Australia, France, Thailand, the Philippines and Pakistan, as a commitment to collective security in southeast Asia. The Pacific Islands Forum (originally the South Pacific Forum), of which New Zealand is a part, was established in 1971.
In the past 80 or so years, we’ve expanded our diplomacy and relationships. Today the New Zealand government has a network of 60 diplomatic posts throughout the world. Our favourite is probably Australia, with whom we’ve had the Closer Economic Relations (CER) agreement since 1983. CER removed most barriers to trans-Tasman trade and substantially integrated New Zealand’s economy with our larger neighbour.
From the late 1990s negotiating free-trade agreements became a priority. A landmark agreement with China was concluded in 2008, and the country has since grown into our largest trading partner. In 2023 our exports to China totalled $20.76 billion (in the same year our exports to the US totalled $14.5 billion).
While we focus on trade with China, we’re part of Five Eyes, an anglosphere intelligence alliance with Australia, Canada, the UK, and the US. The alliance has grown into a robust global surveillance mechanism that monitors the internet. Its activities are shrouded in secrecy and there are plenty of questions about whether it operates legally.
With all these acronyms, alliances and treaties, one might wonder if perhaps we’re not as independent as we like to think. Some commentators say New Zealand has never existed independently of the anglosphere security architecture, although there have been moments when we’ve taken independent stances. At best, they say, that independence has been aspirational.
Who supported our independent foreign policy?
Everyone! Well, at least Labour and National. Our approach to foreign policy has been largely bipartisan.
Has it come to an end? Why?
The current government is sending messages that the era of independence foreign policy is over. It’s giving warming indications that we’re likely to become a Pillar 2 member of Aukus. This would lock us further in with our “traditional partners” in the anglosphere, and would be a big middle finger to China. They’re certainly trying to get people on board, with Luxon appealing to facets of our national identity by claiming the change will be a “return to the fine tradition of Kiwi activism on the world stage” (some would say the opposite is true).
Academic experts in geopolitics and international relations, as well as our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, say that the current global situation, with war and fractured international security, is undermining the rules-based order that New Zealand’s foreign policy relies on. For example, both Russia and Israel are flouting the rules, ignoring the UN and instead exercising hard military power. On Tuesday, the Ministry of Defence released a four-year statement of intent saying that the international system is changing, becoming more challenging and risky. “The use, and threat of use, of military power is increasingly shaping states’ interactions,” it reads. Small countries with tiny military and economic might can only be independent if the system is governed by fair rules rather than power.
MFAT has identified eight ‘megatrends’ it believes will have the greatest impact on international affairs from now to 2035 (Source: MFAT’s ‘Navigating a shifting world‘)
This changing landscape is something that Peters cites too. “Over the past 25 years, we have witnessed a rolling back of democracy, increasingly restrictive market barriers, and an increase in conflict,” he said in May. Echoing an MFAT report from June 2023, he said the international order was shifting in three ways. Firstly, what was once determined by rules is increasingly contested and relative power between states is assuming a greater role. Secondly, economic relationships are being reassessed in light of increased military competition as the world loses stability. Thirdly, there’s a shift in economic behaviour, where building for resilience and sustainability is becoming more prominent than efficiency.
During his speech in May, where he laid out the destabilised geopolitical landscape, Peters said, “The world has changed, and so must we.”
What are critics’ concerns?
Critique of the foreign policy reset has been aimed mostly at the proposal to join Aukus. It isn’t so much the nuclear aspect of Aukus, but the alignment with the US that has some people worried.
They said the orientation of New Zealand as a fully fledged military ally of the US implied that we would be dragged into the US-China competition for power. Rhetoric about China spying on New Zealand was “obsessive” and countless countries, including us, spy on others. Maintaining a good relationship with China was their foremost concern. “China not only poses no military threat to New Zealand, but it is also by a very substantial margin our biggest export market – more than twice as important as an export market for New Zealand as the US is.”
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The Labour Party has been at pains to prove that despite what the current government says, Labour did not consider joining Aukus during its term. Labour’s foreign affairs spokesperson David Parker said, “Labour continues to be unconvinced joining Aukus offers New Zealand significant benefits, and that the government has yet to explain the rationale for joining a security pact designed to militarily contain China, our biggest trading partner.”
Green Party foreign affairs spokesperson Teanau Tuiono penned an editorial for the Manawatu Guardian in May in which he opposed joining Aukus. Like other critics, he said he didn’t want our relationship with China impacted. He proposed an alternative – “we should embrace a Pacific-centric approach, strengthen ties with our neighbours and contribute to regional stability and prosperity.”
Instead of investing in military hardware and alliances, Tuiono suggested New Zealand advocate dialogue, diplomacy and mediation. “We can position ourselves as a beacon of peace in a world marred by tension and strife.”
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