By Walt Hickey
Welcome to the Numlock Sunday edition.
This week, I spoke to Alex Ward, who wrote the brand new book, The Internationalists. I’m a huge fan of Alex, he covers the fascinating beat of foreign policy, and I’ve been excited for this book since it was first announced.
We talked about how U.S. policy abroad has undergone a massive but largely misunderstood revolution over the past several years, how the transition from Trump to Biden led to somewhat surprising changes, and what that means for us.
Ward can be found at Politico or on Twitter @AlexBWard. The book is available wherever books are sold.
This interview has been condensed and edited.
All right, Alex, thanks for coming on.
Yeah, thanks for having me.
You are the author of a brand new book that essentially dives into how the foreign relations of the United States completely changed and turned over between the Trump and Biden administrations. Do you want to talk a little bit about what got you interested in writing a book about this?
Yeah, I mean, any administration, they always talk about how a president has so much more flexibility in his first year, and now he can do whatever he likes on domestic policy. And I'm always thinking, well, that matters in foreign policy, too.
And it's kind of remarkable; the Trump years were such an aberration of traditional American foreign policy. He questioned the legitimacy of NATO, got closer to dictators — not to say that American foreign policy has been anti-dictator forever, but he was openly supportive of them — upended global trade relations, made everyone sort of turn on China.
So it was interesting to see, here comes Biden next, this avatar of traditional foreign policy, who was 3 years old before World War II ended, who has seen the world America made, in effect. And I was curious how he was going to try to change things, or if he would. Maybe there was something he felt from the Trump years that needed to be kept. So I thought I'd chronicle it; I thought I'd get a sense of what this administration, full of Democratic A-listers in foreign policy, what they would try to accomplish, and if they would look at the Trump years and think, we should keep this, or we should remove that.
And it led to some pretty exciting findings. For example, I think the Biden team kept the confrontation against China pretty central. They kept a lot of the trade tariffs on China and others. With export controls, they pretty much move away from globalization. When they talk about foreign policy for the middle class, what they're talking about is changing trade in a way that makes it easier on people in America. And so, sort of one of the overall conclusions was basically that the Biden team adopted a lot more of Trumpism or populism than I think they expected to. And I found that sort of fascinating.
Of course, all of that influences, as we talk about Afghanistan, as we talk about Ukraine, all of that thinking really went into all those kinds of responses.
That's really cool. You know, I guess this is perhaps a very basic question, but I'd love your thoughts on it: What are the actual direct ways that presidents can have a meaningful effect on changing foreign policy? Like, what does that even look like on the ground?
Well, look, I always find it fascinating when we watch presidential debates and they go, I'm going to do this with Medicare, I'm going to do this with Social Security, I'm going to do this with immigration, or whatever. And all of those require Congress.
Yeah.
Right? All presidents talk about it like they're all powerful on domestic policy. The truth is, they need Congress, and they need other things.
On foreign policy, it’s almost entirely the prerogative of the president. The White House, the National Security Council, the president, they run foreign policy. No one can really stop them. Yes, there are legal checks; there should be war powers and they should be coming to Congress to authorize war and other things. But no one does it, and at the end of the day, no one can really stop the president or the White House from taking the military actions or doing the other foreign policy things that they want to do.
So by and large, it is the prerogative of the president. And so here comes Biden and his team. And I should note that his national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, is extremely instrumental in Biden's thinking here. He was right next to Hillary Clinton as she was conceding to Trump in 2016. And he is, like, he grew up in the traditional D.C. Democratic foreign policy world.
Yeah.
You know, liberal international order, global economics, free trade, America is strong, help democracy and democracies. And then he saw Trump win and he was like, look, I know foreign policy isn't the be all end all, but it is. It didn't disqualify Trump from winning. It didn't turn that many people off. So he traveled the nation with others for about four years trying to get a sense of, what is it about Trump's foreign policy that appealed to people? And he tried to inculcate that.
He and Biden talked at length about this idea of a foreign policy for the middle class. You know, how is it that you can better connect all these high-minded things you do abroad back home? And so with Biden, they basically tried to reframe how the U.S. conducts stuff. And of course, they basically had a carte blanche, because the president can come do what he wants here.
Has it worked?
Well, it's always too early to tell, right? I think in a sense it has. Look at the Inflation Reduction Act. That thing, a lot of it's domestic. Its real purpose was investing in clean tech and future technologies, so the U.S. is more competitive on the world economic market in that sense.
And remember that we did so knowing full well we would piss off the Europeans. The Europeans were furious at the Americans for doing this. Ironically, because they were like, oh, you guys are being too protective of your industries, and Americans are like, you guys have been doing this for decades. But still, you would think a traditional foreign policy thinker like Biden would go, well, let's not do anything ever to piss off the Europeans. Well, they pissed off the Europeans, and like, by a lot. So in theory, that's supposed to be helping out the U.S. economy in the long run, leading to more manufacturing jobs.
Also, with the tariffs on China, based on the latest data I've seen, there are more manufacturing jobs in America today than there were at any point in the Trump administration. And when they talk even about Ukraine and defending Ukraine, what do they say? They say, well, we're actually not sending that much money to Ukraine. We're sending old weapons. And that means that the U.S. needs to make new weapons, which, yes, that goes to defense contractors, but that means there will be manufacturing jobs in places like Mississippi and Arkansas and other places like that. How great, right? All of this is stuck with the middle class person in mind.
It’s hard to know if that will work. And look, there have been failures here. I'm not trying to paint a rosy picture. There have been failures all around. But I think in terms of that narrow concept, it's too early to tell, but you are seeing some positive signs.
Yeah. That is interesting because, you know, I hadn't necessarily heard that as the foreign policy for the middle class. But that is, I don't know, it seems like an interesting way to tie it together. I guess what's interesting about Biden is that, like, he was on foreign relations during his run in the Senate. He definitely has a lot of orthodox views, right, when it comes to this stuff. We've seen that particularly lately in some of the conflicts. But what are some moments that surprised you specifically where he changed his view?
Well, I would say on Afghanistan and the decision to withdraw. During the Obama years, he and his aide at the time, a guy named Antony Blinken, who happens to be the secretary of state now, they came up with this idea of counterterrorism plus, which is effectively to leave some troops behind to fight terrorists, and that's kind of it. Biden comes into office knowing that Trump has signed a deal with the Taliban to leave, having lost a son who had fought in Iraq, and he kind of came to the conclusion that this war is fruitless. There's no reason to be there.
And while they did a policy review and the military leaders were saying, we've got to stay, withdrawal's going to be chaotic, we've got to sort of plan this out over time, Biden's like, no, we're out. I was a bit surprised because, yeah, Biden believes what he believes, but he had a pretty strong apparatus behind him of people who were saying, you know, let's not really do this. In fact, Blinken went to Europe at one point, talked to Europeans about what they were planning to do, and they were kind of like, wait, you're doing this without us? What the hell? What are we doing now? So, it was kind of interesting. Biden stuck to his views here, despite mounting pressure at home and abroad.
That said, I think he has been… Even with Israel and Hamas, there's no question that Biden has been staunchly on Israel's side here. Even though he will say, and has said, that his response has been over the top, he stood by it. But even he, who has been, again, staunchly pro-Israel his entire career, to be saying as much as he is about Palestinians, to be saying as much as he is about the need for humanitarian assistance, to talk about, you know, how many people have been killed — that is far more than any American president has said or has done. I'm not saying it's good or enough or anything like that, for those who might disagree with the view, but let's look at the history of the last 30, 40 years of American administrations. None have been this critical, even if it's minimally, but this critical of Israel in a fight like this.
So it's degrees, right? I was sort of surprised, yes; I expected Biden to be even more pro-Israel than he has been during this fight. I think he's actually moved slightly away from that position, but certainly not enough for his critics.
You get a sense that whatever the assessment of his term’s going to be, it will kind of ultimately come down to the resolution or, you know, lack thereof of the Ukraine conflict right now. How did that kind of punch his teeth out in the first year, so to speak, when it came to setting a foreign policy?
I mean, you have to remember that Ukraine happened months after the Afghanistan withdrawal.
Yeah.
So, the U.S. military leaves in late August. Intelligence comes in in late September, early October, that Putin's about to invade Ukraine.
And you have to remember that the Biden team was very embarrassed by the withdrawal — not the decision to leave, but in how we left. Thirteen dead Americans, troops in a bombing attack outside of the airport; the belief that the Taliban would take maybe up to two years to take over Afghanistan, and they did it in a matter of days, really; the belief that the U.S. could leave, and there would be chaos, you know, but not enough chaos that it'd be easier to take out Afghan allies of the United States and Western powers who fought in the war for 20 years. So it was pretty embarrassing, internally, and they were embarrassed by it. As much as the Biden team said that we agree with this decision on a strategic level, and we are fully supportive of it, they were embarrassed by how it all panned out. The optics of it were just, of course, horrible, and deadly.
So Ukraine comes along, and it's a moment of redemption in a way, oddly. They go, okay, what did we learn? What did we do wrong during the past 10 years? How do we apply it to this Ukraine context? And so they basically were like, all right, tell allies what we know. Get that information out there. Start planning responses. Start getting a sense of what Russia wants to do. And it was like this massive effort to redeem themselves after Afghanistan.
And I think we have to say, Biden was basically telling people, let Russia know what we know, tell our allies, get coordinated, set stuff up, but do not start World War III. And those were the corners that his aides had to start making a response, which I think has been, overall, pretty successful, right? Kiev still stands. Ukraine is still, even though they've lost more territory since the war reignited in 2022, in a decent position, of course.
I sort of stopped writing this book around February and March of last year, when I was at Biden's rally in Warsaw. He was like, Kiev stands strong, it stands proud, it stands free. And it felt like a campaign rally for NATO. They were playing Twisted Sister, doing the whole thing. And there was this moment of real optimism.
Of course, the counteroffensive did not pan out. Now you've got this spot where the Ukrainians are low on infantry and ammunition, and the Russians may have the advantage at this point. So if I were finishing the book now, I would not be anywhere as optimistic.
But all this is to say that for a solid year and a half or so, the U.S. was kind of crushing it. Now it's not so clear.
Yeah, and they really nailed the start of that war. They really did, they called their shot, and then I think that there was this belief, and I was very surprised that it really did seem like it was a redemptive moment. I’d never thought about that.
Yeah, and look, the whole theory of the case, really, behind Team Biden was like, Trump is what happens if you don't have responsible, effective people in charge. Now they did. Of course, Trump was the president, but there were people trying to do the best by American foreign policy and by America. I don't want to deny them that.
But the sense from Team Biden was like, we're here to save the world. We're here to do what's best. And we've basically collected this A-team, these A-listers of Democratic foreign policy, many of whom are coming back, many of whom are kind of making lateral moves in order to save the world, in order to put things back on track. That is how they felt. And so for their big test in Afghanistan, their first big test in Afghanistan to fail pretty miserably, overall, there was this moment of like, okay, well, they've got to get back on their feet here.
And Ukraine presented that, for better or for worse. You're right, they called their shot. I mean, they told Europeans. And one of the sort of newsier aspects of the book is that we all generally knew that Biden and Zelenskyy had a fraught relationship heading up to the war, but it was like a screaming match back.
Really?
Like, really, really bad.
Why?
Well, because Biden is telling Zelenskyy, like, hey man, this is what the intel says: You're about to get invaded. Also, there are like, 100,000-plus troops on your border. There are blood bags. There are field hospitals. Like, you don't do this unless you're planning something, for real.
And Zelenskyy's like, stop saying that. It's not true. We know the Russians better than you do. You're hurting our economy. You're scaring our people. Like, you guys are absolutely wrong. Plus, America's history of intelligence when it comes to war has not been particularly great. Maybe have some humility and stop telling us what's about to happen. We know what's about to happen.
And the U.S. would also tell European allies, like, hey, here's what our intel says. And you had some Europeans, like Germans and French, go, well, we're not really sure, you know? Maybe you guys are wrong about this. It was kind of the Brits that were the ones who were in agreement.
So, all of this is to say that, yeah, I have these scenes of Biden and Zelenskyy kind of going at it. And Biden at one point is like, mobilize your people. Protect your city. What the hell are you doing? Why are you waiting? Now, of course, nothing sharpens the mind more than being invaded, right?
Right.
So, the moment the Russians rolled in, Zelenskyy was like, great. America, you're on our side. What can we do? Also, can you send us weapons? Can you send us money? So, you know, now, of course, they're all on board, but for a long time, Ukraine really felt the U.S. was worrying the world unnecessarily and was having some sort of traumatic stress episode after Afghanistan. Like they were willing something.
It was a pretty rancorous moment — and I would say that the relationship between the U.S. and Ukraine has never been super friendly, right? But I think during that period, it was genuinely rancorous. Now, it's just kind of tense.
Interesting. That's interesting, because you don't always get that vibe. But, it is truly tense?
Yeah. I mean, look, the Ukrainians wished the U.S. had sent weapons forever ago. You know, send us fighter jets, send us defense missiles, send us long-range missiles, more ammunition, more everything. And of course, any country that's being invaded, any government would want all that support and more.
Sure.
The U.S. is more cautious about sending things, takes its time, is worried about escalation with Russia, worried about being seen moving with allies. Lest we forget, when the Germans were asked to send their Leopard tanks, they were like, okay, but America has to send tanks as well. And that led to a whole back and forth about that. Meanwhile, the Ukrainians are like, our people are dying, our country's being invaded, let's move here. So there's always a tension when the Ukrainians are like, send us this stuff, and the U.S. is like, yeah, maybe, and in due time. There's always that natural tension.
And even though they have a good working relationship at this point, it could clearly be better. And for the Ukrainians, it's a little bit of an unreasonable position in a way, because they're like, just do what we want. And the Americans are like, well, we have other considerations, including making sure we have enough stuff to fight China in case they invade Taiwan.
So, you know, there's always a mismatch of interests, but it's a little less friendly than, of course, they portray in public.
How do you think his reaction stacks up against what previous administrations were capable of? In some of the descriptions of the book, you describe it as one of the most ambitious realignments of American policy since Nixon. Like, how's he doing?
Again, it's sort of a too early to tell thing, but I think what's sort of interesting is that basically since 1945, this notion of a liberal or national order, which is something the Biden team still believes in and wants to defend, it’s needed reforming. It needs a software update. And one of the ways they've been talking about that is via global economics. They're basically saying, like, globalization has its place, and free trade has its place, but why are we allowing all of this? Why would we do certain moves if it hurts American security?
So, they've, in a sense, been clawing back from globalization. They've been, again, doing export controls, putting on tariffs, trying to improve the American foreign policy, the American middle class experience, and on top of that, protecting national security. So that is kind of a big change. And you had Jake Sullivan, the National Security Advisor, give a major speech in which he was kind of like, yeah, this is the new Washington consensus. Everyone believes this to be true.
Now, just because you say it's a consensus doesn't mean it is. But, like, that's how they feel. They feel that this is now a whole new era of global economics. And then, of course, a time where you need sort of refreshed relations with allies and clear expectations about, hey, we've got to work together. Things are only possible when we all work in unison.
Another example would be the U.S. spending a lot of time trying to get Japan and South Korea to be friends.
Right. That's been so much time.
So much time. And then they get a meeting at Camp David and are like, look, we're good now and we're all going to work together on countering China and checking in on North Korea and, you know, working together to ensure a prosperous and free Indo-Pacific.
But that's kind of a theory of the case. Like, they now feel, for example, that on North Korea, U.S. policy is in a much better place because U.S., Japan and South Korea are so aligned. So even though North Korea, you know, they've not sat down with North Koreans for meetings, and even though it's very likely North Korea's missile program and nuclear program has improved under Biden, they would still see the North Korea policy as a success because of the closeness with South Korea and Japan.
Personally, I think if the metric of success is that North Korea is less of a nuclear threat than it was when we took office, well, I think they fail by that metric. But they see it in a different way.
Fascinating. Yeah. It's also, again, it's always too early to say with this stuff because it's not like there's a scoreboard. It's not like there's a chart that says, here's how good the foreign policy of the United States is right now, like you can arguably come up with for the economy. It's a very cool subject area.
Yeah, and like, look, I'm not going to deny that the world is on fire right now, right? So, if you are Biden and you're trying and you're thinking about 2024 and you're thinking about how you're going to define your foreign policy legacy, now is kind of the wrong time to do it.
Yeah.
Because you've got Israel-Hamas, you've got what's going on with the Houthis in the Red Sea, you've got tensions with Iran, you've got Venezuela looking like it's going to invade Guyana, you've got Ukraine in a bad position against Russia. Like, in many ways, it's not a particularly... For the immediate things, it doesn't feel like the Biden administration has great answers. But I think they would say that if you step back, is America in a stronger economic and allied and Democratic position than it was when Trump took office? They would say, absolutely, yes.
And so that matters, because these crises here, the goal now is to make sure they don't get completely, insanely out of control. That they are kept even in the horrible boxes that they are in now. And if that's the case, that would show the strength of American foreign policy by managing these crises deftly without, you know, an overinvestment by the U.S., etc. You don't have to agree with that view, but I think that's how they see it.
But I will say that heading into 2024, Biden had been planning to basically be like, look at this world America remade, that I remade. We're on a stronger footing. We're not in wars; I ended a war. Here we are. And now I think they have a tougher argument to make on that, which is why I think you're starting to see more voters like, well, Trump's foreign policy would be worse. Right? That's their argument now, as opposed to, ours is good.
Got it. Well, the book is called The Internationalists: The fight to restore American foreign policy after Trump. Alex, where can folks find it?
You can find it anywhere books are sold. So wherever your favorite bookstores are, go get it there.
Amazing. All right, and where can folks find you?
You can find me on Instagram or Twitter. I think @AlexBWard is what it is on Twitter, where I'm mostly on.
All right. Exceptional.
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