How the United States Uses the Trans-Pacific Partnership to Contain China in International Trade
The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was signed on February 5, 2016 by its twelve members and is now open for ratification. If ratified, the TPP will be the largest mega free trade area in history and will encompass forty percent of world trade. The U.S. led the TPP negotiations and deliberately excluded China from the negotiations. This ploy by the U.S. was a calculated effort to contain China and to shift power in trade in the Asia-Pacific from China to the U.S. China now appears to face a difficult choice. China can join the already concluded TPP, with its text largely drafted by the U.S., and submit to terms it had no part in negotiating and to a humiliating process of seeking approval from the U.S. Joining the TPP means accepting a treaty in which every major provision is directed at China in an attempt to contain China’s ascendancy in international trade. The other alternative is to ignore the TPP, but this could mean significant losses in trade opportunities right in China’s own neighborhood. The battle over the TPP is a major contest between the two countries to determine which will write the rules of international trade for the twenty-first century. On the one hand, the U.S. is determined to write the rules, which will have as their chief aim to contain China. On the other hand, China seeks to write the rules in a way that will benefit China at the expense of the U.S. This Article examines how the TPP is designed specifically to contain China and how China might respond to this challenge over who will write the rules of international trade and gain supremacy in trade in the twenty-first century.
The U.S. achieved an important strategic objective in its efforts to contain the People’s Republic of China (China) in global trade when the historic Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was signed on February 5, 2016.1
See Catherine Putz, TPP: The Ratification Race is On, The Diplomat (Feb. 5, 2016), http://perma.cc/VRU5-ZC7U;see also Michal Meidan, The TPP and China: The Elephant That Wasn’t in the Room, The Diplomat (Oct. 15, 2015), http://perma.cc/P5TE-4G6N.For the full text of the TPP, see TPP Full Text, Office of the United States Trade Representative, https://perma.cc/77GY-EY5E(last visited Oct. 4, 2016).
See TPP Full Text, supra note 1.
See id. at art. 30(5); see also Rebecca Howard, Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal signed, but years of negotiations still to come, Reuters (Feb. 4, 2016), (http://perma.cc/5DDA-2Z5B).
See Howard, supra note 3.
See infra Section II.
See supra note 1.
The TPP comes into force once it is ratified. See TPP, supra note 1, at art. 30(5).
See infra Section IV.
See id. By the time China could have joined in the negotiations, the major provisions of the text affecting China had been completed. New members must accept the text as is and cannot revisit any text that has been completed. Any new member can only participate in negotiations on new text.
China’s exclusion from the TPP negotiations was no accident, but instead was a deliberate ploy by the U.S. to limit China’s growing global trade influence starting right in China’s own backyard.10
See infra Section IV.
See id.
Since the text of the U.S.-led TPP is final and agreed to by the signature of the TPP parties on Feb. 5, 2016, the only way to change the text is to amend it. Amendments require the consent of all members, including the U.S. See TPP, supra note 1, at art. 30(2) (describing amendments as requiring the consent of all members).
See TPP, supra note 1, at art. 30(2).
See TPP, supra note 1, at art. 30(4) (describing the accession process as requiring the approval of each TPP member including the U.S. in accordance with applicable legal procedures of each member). If Congress approves the TPP, Congress will also issue a regulation on the approval procedures for new members of the TPP; Congress issued a similar regulation for new WTO members when it approved and implemented the WTO agreements in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 1-3-465, 108 Stat. 4829 (1994) codified as 19 U.S.C. § 3532 [hereinafter URAA]. Article I, § 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power to “regulate commerce with foreign nations,” giving Congress the final say on U.S. trade law and policy. Congress could enact legislation requiring congressional approval of all new TPP members, but it is more likely that Congress will follow the model of the URAA. With respect to new members of the WTO, the URAA requires that “the [United States] Trade Representative . . . consult with the appropriate congressional committees before any vote is taken by the Ministerial Conference [of the WTO] . . . relating to . . . the accession of a state.” Implementation of Uruguay Round Agreements, 19 U.S.C.A. § 3532 (1994). If Congress enacts a similar provision related to new members of the TPP, which seems likely, Congress could hold public hearings on China’s accession to the TPP.
Congress might criticize China for “cheating” in international trade as there is a commonly held view that China ignores the rules of the WTO. See David Pilling, It won’t be easy to build an ‘anyone but China’ club, The Financial Times (May 22, 2013), http://perma.cc/MP89-AFMB.Prior to China’s ascension to the WTO, the U.S. Congress held hearings every year to determine whether to extend trade benefits to China under the Most-Favored Nation Principle, which would allow China to enjoy lower tariffs on its imports into the U.S. The U.S. used the annual review process as an opportunity to make threats and lecture China on its deficiencies in its human rights record. See Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Opposes Human Rights in the World Trade Organization, 35 U. Penn. J. Int’l L. 61, 77–80 (2013). China found this process to be humiliating and the common perception at the time was that these annual reviews were an opportunity for China “bashing.” See id. at 79–80 & n.91.
Creating an “anyone but China club”16
See Pilling, supra note 15.
See Jane Kelsey, U.S. China Relations and the Geopolitics of the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement, Global Research (Nov. 11, 2013), (http://perma.cc/D4EJ-PU4W); see also Nathan Vanderklippe, TPP deal a way for U.S. to reassert primacy over China, The Globe and Mail (Oct. 5, 2015), (https://perma.cc/L6LM-WXJJ).
China joined the WTO in 2001. See Member Information: China and the WTO, World Trade Organization, http://perma.cc/R34K-6RUU(last visited Oct. 9, 2016).
See Pilling, supra note 15.
See Daniel C.K. Chow & Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade Law: Problems, Cases, and Materials 26 (2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter Chow & Schoenbaum, International Trade Law].
See Pilling, supra note 15.
See id.
See id.
See infra Section II.A.
See TPP, supra note 1, at art. 1(2) (noting that the TPP is to “coexist with their existing international agreements . . . including the WTO agreement.”).
The TPP is authorized by Article XXIV:5 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which permits WTO members to form free trade agreements such as the TPP. For a more detailed explanation of this point, see infra Section II.A.
Reining in or constraining China in international trade is achieved by the TPP through a number of specific trade provisions; the major provisions are the subjects of study in this Article. For the U.S. government, these various provisions of the TPP serve three important objectives, set forth below, which both threaten and constrain China. These three features of the TPP seem to put China in a difficult conundrum—China can suffer losses in international trade by refusing to join the TPP, or it can join the TPP and be subject to the humiliation of having to abide by rules written by the U.S. with the express intent of containing China.
First, the threat to China if they refuse to join the TPP is a loss of trade with the U.S. and other TPP members.27
See infra Section II.B.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Kimberly Amadeo, Why Is The U.S./China Trade Deficit So High?, The Balance (Sept. 8, 2016), (http://perma.cc/3RN8-7HMH).
See infra Section II.C.
See, for example, Daniel Mills, China Cheats While the U.S. Suffers, Economy in Crisis (May 25, 2014), (http://perma.cc/RKQ3-U7AU).
Second, if China does join the TPP, China will be constrained because the TPP will erode many of the trade advantages that China now enjoys and is able to exploit under the WTO.38
See infra Section III.
See infra Section III.A.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See infra Section III.A.
Similarly, China does not enforce environmental standards in producing its goods, leading to not only the degradation of the environment, but more importantly in the context of trade, to lower-priced goods.44
See infra Section III.B.
See id.
See id.
Other measures that China currently maintains are financial and regulatory support of China’s massive state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that benefit from myriad forms of state assistance and from discrimination against foreign companies located in China.47
See infra Section III.C.
See id.
See id.
Third, the TPP is a shot aimed squarely—by the U.S.—at China that lets China know in no uncertain terms that the U.S., not China, intends to write the rules of international trade for Asia and the rest of the world in the twenty-first century.50
See infra Section IV.
See Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Established the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, 49 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. (forthcoming 2016).
See infra Section IV.
See id.
See supra note 51.
See id.
See id.
This Article will develop the themes set forth above by proceeding in three sections. Section II will discuss the nature of preferential trade agreements and their relationship to the WTO, and detail how PTAs both create and divert trade and the threat this poses to China if China refuses to join the TPP. Section III of this Article will examine how joining the TPP will neutralize key advantages China currently enjoys in international trade, including concerns related to workers’ rights, the environment, and state-owned enterprises. Section IV will discuss how the U.S. and China are locked in a fierce battle on who will write the rules for international trade in the twenty-first century and how the TPP appears to be a major victory for the U.S., assuming that the TPP is ratified by the U.S. Congress,57
Factors influencing whether the U.S. Congress will approve the TPP are whether (1) President-Elect Donald Trump will reverse his campaign position opposing the TPP; (2) Trump will renegotiate the TPP and seek Congressional approval of a modified TPP; and (3) the next election cycle in 2020 will result in a new President who supports the TPP. In the author’s view, it is possible that President-Elect Trump will reverse candidate Trump’s opposition to the current or modified version of the TPP because the TPP is designed to increase U.S. export trade opportunities, increase employment, and reign in China’s aggressive trade tactics, a favorite subject of criticism during President-Elect Trump’s campaign.
The TPP is a comprehensive PTA that not only liberalizes the trade in goods,58
See TPP, supra note 1, at ch. 2 (National Treatment and Market Access).
See id. at ch. 10 (Trade in Services).
See id. at ch. 11 (Financial Services).
See id. at ch. 13 (Telecommunications).
See id. at ch. 9 (Investment).
See id. at ch. 26 (Transparency and Anti-Corruption)
See id. at ch. 25 (Regulatory Coherence).
See id. at ch. 18 (Intellectual Property).
See Chow & Schoenbaum, International Trade Law, supra note 20, at 63.
See TPP, supra note 1, at art. 3–4, 6. The technical term used by the TPP for trade sanctions is the “suspension of benefits.” For example, suppose that Country A, a TPP member, has agreed to zero tariffs for goods from Country B. If Country B fails to comply with the TPP, the TPP can authorize Country A to suspend its zero tariffs for goods from Country B, which would then likely be subject to higher tariffs under Country A’s GATT rate. Country B would suffer a loss in trade due to the higher tariffs. This is what constitutes a trade sanction under the TPP and the WTO.
In order to facilitate an understanding of how the TPP—or any preferential trade agreement—works, the following discussion will focus on the trade in goods because it is still the most fundamental and important channel of trade, far exceeding all other channels of trade (services, investment, and intellectual property) in monetary terms.68
See Chow & Schoenbaum, International Trade Law, supra note 20, at 9, 14–15 (comparing recent figures for trade in goods, services, investment and technology).
The twelve countries that are members of the TPP are also members of the WTO and are subject to the obligations of both organizations.69
See TPP, supra note 1, at art. 1(2) (recognizing that the TPP agreement “co-exists” with the WTO agreements).
See What is the WTO?, World Trade Organization, http://perma.cc/E3SA-W3LN,(last visited Oct. 5, 2016).
The WTO website indicates that the WTO currently has 164 members, including all of the most powerful economies in the world. See Members and Observers, World Trade Organization, http://perma.cc/T848-KV64,(last visited Oct. 5, 2016).
See GATT and the Goods Council, World Trade Organization, http://perma.cc/5ZNW-FHYY,(last visited Oct. 5, 2016).
See General Agreement on Trade in Services, World Trade Organization, http://perma.cc/NX48-LTJP,(last visited Oct. 5, 2016).
See TRIPS [trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights] material on the WTO website, World Trade Organization, http://perma.cc/AK4M-CGFL,(last visited Oct. 5, 2016).
Of these agreements, the GATT has the longest and most venerable history, beginning in 1947, immediately following the Second World War.75
See Chow & Schoenbaum, International Trade Law, supra note 20, at 26.
See id. (describing how the GATT limits the use of tariffs as a trade barrier). Prior to the GATT no such mechanism existed to limit the use of tariffs. This meant that if a nation raised its tariffs other nations could raise theirs in a tit-for-tat response.
See id.
See id. at 18.
Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202–1683 (1930).
See Chow & Schoenbaum, International Trade Law, supra note 20, at 18.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
The GATT (1947) was intended to impose much-needed discipline on the use of tariffs in order to avoid the disastrous use of tariffs to create barriers to trade that engendered suspicion and hostility.86
See id. at 26.
See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. II(b), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
See id.
See id.
See id. at art II:1(a).If a tariff is “unbound” then a WTO member can impose any tariff at any level it sees fit.
Imposing a tariff duty that is above the bound rate is a violation of Article II:1(a)–(b).See Appellate Body Report, Argentina–Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, ¶ 46–55, WTO Doc. WT/DS56/AB/R (adopted on Apr. 22, 1998). There, the Appellate Body held:
A tariff binding in a Member’s Schedule provides an upper limit on the amount of duty that may be imposed . . . The principal obligation in the first sentence of Article II:1(b) . . .requires a Member to refrain from imposing ordinary customs duties in excess of those provided for in the Member’s Schedule. . . . We conclude that the application of a type of duty different from the type provided for in a Member’s Schedule is inconsistent with Article II:1(b) . . .In this case, we find that Argentina has acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article II:1(b),first sentence, of the GATT 1994.
Id.
WTO disputes are resolved by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which consists of panels that operate as trial courts, and an appellate body that functions as a high court of international trade. Decisions by the panels and the appellate body create institutional pressure on WTO members to correct any WTO violations; the WTO DSB can also authorize the imposition of trade sanctions against a recalcitrant offending member that creates additional pressures to comply. See Chow & Schoenbaum, International Trade Law, supra note 20, at 63–68. Overall, the WTO dispute settlement system is viewed as a great success. See id. at 63.
See id. at 49–51, 180.
See id. at 180.
See id.
Due to common political and economic interests, some nations have sought to reduce tariffs even further than their GATT commitments.96
See id. at 51.
For example, under the North American Free Trade Agreement, the three member countries (the U.S., Canada, and Mexico) have agreed to zero tariffs for virtually all goods traded among them. See id. at 51, 56.
See GATT, supra note 87, at art. I.
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation . . . any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product . . . shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in . . . the territories of all other contracting parties.99
The entire text of GATT Article I:1 reads:
1. With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.
Id. at art. I:1.
The goal of the MFN principle is to ensure that members do not offer special preferences to some countries while denying the same benefits to other WTO members.100
See Chow & Schoenbaum, International Trade Law, supra note 20, at 129.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 130.
See id.
The answer lies in GATT Article XXIV:
4. The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by the development, through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the economies of the countries parties to such agreements. They also recognize that the purpose of a customs union or of a free-trade area should be to facilitate trade between the constituent territories . . . .
5. Accordingly, the provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent, as between the territories of contracting parties, the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade area . . .105
See GATT, supra note 87, at art. XXIV:4-5.
The key language of Article XXIV is the first sentence of Article XXIV(5): “[T]he provisions of this Agreement shall not prevent . . . the formation of a customs union or a free trade area.”106
A free trade area, such as NAFTA, allows for the free movement of goods within the members of the free trade area, but subject goods from non-members of the free trade area to the individual tariffs of each of the members. In the case of NAFTA, goods from the U.S. travel to Mexico and Canada duty free, but goods from a non-NAFTA member are subject to the individual tariff rates of each NAFTA member. For instance, goods from China that enter Canada would be subject to Canadian tariffs, that enter the U.S. would be subject to U.S. tariffs, that enter Mexico would be subject to Mexican tariffs. These tariffs might vary from nation to nation so that the importer might pay a higher tariff in the U.S. than an importer might pay in Mexico. Free trade areas thus encourage forum shopping for the cheapest tariff rate among the members of the free trade area from which the goods can then move around the free trade area duty free. This is why NAFTA has complex rules of origin that are designed to eliminate this type of forum shopping. So under the NAFTA rules of origin if a good from China enters Mexico and then enters the U.S., the U.S. might treat the good as originating from China and impose ordinary tariffs. A customs union, like the E.U., also has free movement of goods among all of its members (that is, duty free treatment) but imposes a single external tariff on non-members of the E.U. Thus, it makes no difference whether goods from China enter the E.U. through Italy, France, Germany, or Belgium; the goods are subject to the same tariff, thus eliminating the incentive to forum shop. Of course, a single external tariff requires greater economic integration than a free trade area. See Chow & Schoenbaum, International Trade Law, supra note 20, at 55–56.
See GATT, supra note 87, at art. XXIV:4.
The effect of excluding China from the TPP is that China, unless it joins, will be unable to enjoy the benefits the TPP provides to all of its twelve member states. The short-term goal of the TPP is to reduce tariffs among its members below their current GATT rates and, in the long term, to eliminate all tariffs in order to have a true free trade area.108
TPP, art. 2.4 entitled “Elimination of Customs Duties” states in relevant part: “Unless otherwise provided in this Agreement, each Part shall progressively eliminate its customs duties on originating goods in accordance with its Schedule to Annex 2-D (Tariff Commitments).” TPP, supra note 1, at art. 2.4(2).
All of the TPP members are also WTO members, which means that they currently maintain WTO tariffs. The concept is to reduce the rates to zero under the TPP. Thus, TPP members receive “WTO plus” treatment.
See Chow & Schoenbaum, International Trade Law, supra note 20, at 52.
Various governmental and non-governmental sources indicate that the U.S. should see an increase in all other areas of trade in addition to the trade in goods. For example, the United States Trade Representative believes that the TPP will increase U.S. exports of services. Trans-Pacific Partnership: Summary of U.S. Objectives, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., https://perma.cc/X6YC-CBQ7(last visited Oct. 25, 2016) The Trade Representative has stated:
Services industries account for four out of five U.S. jobs and also represent a significant and growing share of jobs in other TPP countries. Securing liberalized and fair access to foreign services markets will help U.S. service suppliers, both small and large, seeking to do business in TPP markets, thereby, supporting jobs at home.
Id. The USTR also believes that the TPP will boost U.S. exports of technology (that is, intellectual property) intensive goods. Id. (“In TPP, we are working to advance strong, state-of-the-art, and balanced rules that will protect and promote U.S. exports of IP-intensive products and services throughout the Asia-Pacific region.”). Another institutional study indicates that the TPP will boost outward U.S. technology transfer. See Nam D. Pham et al., NDP Analytics, The Economic Benefits of Intellectual Property Rights in the Trans-Pacific Partnership 4 (2014). https://perma.cc/T422-8GSQ.Both inward foreign investment from other countries and outward U.S. foreign direct investment in other countries are expected to rise as a result of the TPP. Theodore H. Moran & Lindsay Oldenski, TPP Will Promote Investment as Well as Trade, Peterson Inst. For Int’l Econ. (Mar. 10, 2015, 11:15 AM), https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/tpp-will-promote-investment-well-trade.These benefits are reciprocal, that is, U.S. trading partners should be a similar increase in their modes of trade in additional to the trade in goods.
What might be less apparent is that preferential trade agreements also divert trade (and perhaps political cooperation) from non-members.112
See Chow & Schoenbaum, International Trade Law, supra note 20, at 52.
Under the hypothetical five percent GATT rate tariff, an imported product from China with a price of $1 will cost the importer $1.05 with the tariff included and the importer will then pass the cost onto the consumer in the form of a 5-cent increase in price.113
The importer, usually a distributor, pays the increased tariff in order to clear the goods at customs so that they will be allowed to enter the internal market. What prevents the importer from absorbing the price increase and not passing on the price increase onto the consumer in the form of higher retail prices? The answer is nothing. If the importer does not pass on the increased tariff to the consumer, then the importer simply earns fewer profits. Most importers, however, wish to maximize profits and so for this reason higher tariffs usually mean higher prices for consumers.
Over time, what will occur? As rational economic actors, importers and consumers will prefer to buy the imports from Vietnam, and the imports from China will go unsold. As a result, the importer will stop importing goods from China and import them from Vietnam instead. If we generalize this example to goods across many sectors, including high technology goods, the U.S. might be able to source goods across many industries from TPP countries instead of from China. Recall that Japan and Australia are also members of the TPP and other countries, such as South Korea, have indicated that they wish to join. This could give the U.S. many sources of goods comparable to Chinese goods in all areas, including high technology areas (for example, auto parts) but at a lower price because of the preferential tariff for TPP members. If China does not join the TPP, China’s trade with the U.S. and other TPP members will be diverted to other TPP countries and China could suffer a loss in trade opportunities.114
From a macroeconomic perspective, the balance between trade increases and trade diversion due to free trade areas is the most important question for the multilateral trading system. To the extent that trade increases outweigh trade diversion, the entire multilateral trading system is better off even if some countries lose trade opportunities. To the extent that losses from trade diversion outweigh trade increases, the preferential trade agreement then becomes a net loss for the multilateral trading system.
Diverting trade away from China serves important U.S. interests at the present because of the heated political criticism and vehement populist anger over the ever-mushrooming trade deficit with China, which reached a record $365.7 billion in 2015. 115
See Terence P. Jeffrey, $365,694,500,000: U.S. Merchandise Trade Deficit With China Hit Record in 2015, CNS News, (Feb. 9, 2016), (https://perma.cc/2LDT-ADRY).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
The negative consequences of the U.S. trade deficit with China can be understood through reviewing some basic international economic principles. When a nation experiences a trade deficit, it is buying more goods from its trading partner than it is selling.120
See Chow & Schoenbaum, International Trade Law, supra note 20, at 30.
See id.
See id.
On the other hand, the nation enjoying the trade surplus will become flush with cash from revenues earned from trade, its economy will grow quickly and, in the case of China, become a global trading power.123
See id.
See id. at 45.
This is a term used by critics of China. See id. at 46.
See id. at 45.
See id. at 45–46.
See id. at 47.
See id. at 46–48.
See id. at 47.
See id.
See id.
A related hot-button issue that stems from the trade deficit in goods with China is that some U.S. companies are moving their operations overseas.133
See Katherine Peralta, Outsourcing to China Cost 3.2 Million Jobs Since 2001, U.S. News & World Report, (Dec. 11, 2014), (https://perma.cc/4BTD-KHL9).
See Mark Huffman, Why Cheap Chinese Products Are About to Get Cheaper, Consumer Affairs (Aug. 11, 2015), (https://perma.cc/K7W5-LDXE).
See Kimberly Amadeo, How Outsourcing Jobs Affects the U.S. Economy, The Balance, (June 25, 2016), (https://perma.cc/W7UQ-9ZGH).
See id.
See Huffman, supra note 134.
Michael Snyder, Why Are the American People Mad? Maybe It is Because Millions of Their Jobs Have Been Lost to Outsourcing and They Aren’t Coming Back, End of the American Dream (July 29, 2010), https://perma.cc/5YCL-2NHG.
See Daniel Mills, China Cheats While the U.S. Suffers, Economy in Crisis (May 25, 2014), (https://perma.cc/2PEQ-AHPV).
The virtue of the TPP is that trade will be diverted from China to other TPP countries, reducing the trade deficit with China and the outsourcing of jobs to China that so enrages some U.S. politicians and workers. The TPP countries will need to abide by the high standards set forth in the TPP so they cannot “cheat” in their trade with the U.S. as China currently does, according to China’s critics.140
See id.
While the TPP could result in the diversion of trade from China to the U.S., the same holds true for all members of the TPP. The same arguments made earlier in this section apply to other TPP countries as well. All TPP members, such as Australia and Japan, now have an economic incentive in the form of lower tariffs to buy goods from other TPP members instead of from China. Exclusion from the TPP means losses of trade opportunities for China, not only with the U.S., but also with the entire membership of the TPP, which currently accounts for forty percent of world trade.141
See Howard, supra note 3.
One alternative for China is to join the TPP and enjoy the advantages of lower tariffs and increased trade with the members of the TPP. This might seem to be an obvious step but here is where the U.S. strategy has created the other prong in the dilemma for China. In order to join the TPP, China must agree to the terms of the TPP, as well as any other terms that the U.S. Congress might demand as a price of admission to the TPP. China would also have to undergo a humiliating process of approval of its TPP entry by the U.S. Congress, which might relish an opportunity to criticize and humiliate China.142
See supra note 15.
There are a number of hot button issues on which Congress might seek concessions from China. For example, Congress might demand that China show greater respect for intellectual property rights by cracking down on trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy, a major source of contention between the U.S. and China and that China put a stop to its currency manipulation that increases the U.S. trade deficit. For a discussion of counterfeiting, see Daniel C.K. Chow & Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Business Transactions: Problems, Cases, and Materials 537–53 (3d ed. 2015). For a discussion of China’s currency manipulation, see Daniel C.K. Chow, Can the United States Impose Trade Sanctions on China for Currency Manipulation?, 16 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript on file with the author).
One of China’s major advantages in trade that the U.S. sought to neutralize is China’s comparatively low cost of labor.144
See M. Dana Baldwin, Addressing the Challenge of China’s Labor Cost Advantages, Center for Simplified Strategic Planning, Inc. (2016), (https://perma.cc/K4M3-B5VK).
See id.
See David Barboza, In Chinese Factories, Lost Fingers and Low Pay, N.Y. Times (Jan. 5, 2008), (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/05/business/worldbusiness/05sweatshop.html).
The following provisions of the TPP related to workers’ rights were likely also drafted by the U.S. with China in mind as the main target.147
See Kelsey, supra note 17 (noting that every major proposal in the TPP is targeted at China). The U.S. considers labor rights and trade to be an important trade issue as evidence by the inclusion of provisions connecting labor and trade in every recent U.S. free trade agreement. See infra Section IV.
1. Each Party shall adopt and maintain in its statues and regulations, and practices thereunder the following rights as stated in the ILO [International Labor Organization] Declaration: (a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; (b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; (c) the effective abolition of child labour and . . . a prohibition on the worst forms of child labour; and (d) the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.148
TPP, supra note 1, at art. 19.3(1).
The reference to the standards of the International Labor Organization (ILO), contained in TPP Article 19.3, can be best understood in the context of the long debate about including labor rights in the WTO culminating in the declaration issued by the first WTO Ministerial Conference held in Singapore in December 1996.149
See Chow & Schoenbaum, International Trade Law, supra note 20, at 369.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 370.
The most important consequence of the Singapore Declaration with relation to workers’ rights is that the breach of workers’ rights cannot be used to justify a trade restriction under the WTO.154
See id.
See id.
See Kimberly Ann Elliot, The ILO and Enforcement of Core Labor Standards, Institute for International Economics Policy Brief 00-6 (July 2000), https://piie.com/publications/pb/pb00-6.pdf(noting that the ILO relies primarily on “sunshine,” that is, exposing illegal labor to public scrutiny and “carrots,” that is, technical assistance in helping countries comply). By contrast, the WTO can authorize trade sanctions to enforce its obligations.
See TPP, supra note 1, at art. 25.
The TPP also adds two other significant provisions regarding workers’ rights. Article 19.3(2) states: “[e]ach Party shall adopt and maintain statutes and regulations, and practices thereunder, governing acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health.”158
Id. at art. 19.3(2).
Id. at art. 19.5(1).
See Daniel C.K. Chow & Anna M. Han, Doing Business in China: Problems, Cases, and Materials 266-73 (2012).
See id. at 269.
Yin Lily Zheng, It’s Not What’s on Paper, But What is in Practice: China’s New Labor Contract Law and the Enforcement Problem, 8 Wash. U. Global Studies L. Rev. 595, 601–12 (2009) (describing the many obstacles to effective enforcement of China’s Labor Contract Law).
The consequence of the TPP’s labor provisions is that once China joins the TPP, China will no longer be able to maintain factories that are dangerous and unsanitary.163
See Barboza, supra note 146.
See id.
See Daniel C.K. Chow, The Legal System of the People’s Republic of China 224–28 (3d ed. 2015).
From a competitive standpoint, meeting the TPP’s high labor standards should result in an increase in labor costs and a corresponding increase in the price of imports from China. The labor provisions of the TPP were designed by the U.S. to neutralize one of China’s major advantages in trade—highly skilled and conscientious but inexpensive manual labor created by substandard working conditions.
The TPP incorporates a number of environmental provisions that are not available under the WTO. In the WTO, environmental concerns are linked to trade but only in an indirect and peripheral way by decisions of the WTO Appellate Body, which functions as a high court of international trade.166
See Chow & Schoenbaum, International Trade Law, supra note 20, at 301–18.
The extensive environmental obligations under the TPP are the subject of Article 20, with no parallel in the texts of the WTO. Most salient to the main themes of this work is Article 20.5, Protection of the Ozone Layer, which provides:
1. The Parties recognise that emissions of certain substances can significantly deplete and otherwise modify the ozone layer in a manner that is likely to result in adverse effects on human health and the environment. Accordingly, each Party shall take measures to control the production and consumption of, and trade in, such substances.167
TPP, supra note 1, at art. 20.5.
This TPP provision was likely drafted by the U.S. with the specific purpose of reining in China. Why? China is the leading producer of greenhouse gases that directly damage the atmosphere’s ozone layer.168
See Edward Wong, Glut of Coal-Fired Plants Casts Doubt on China’s Energy Priorities, N.Y. Times (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/12/world/asia/china-coal-power-energy-policy.html?_r=0(calling into question China’s commitment to renewable energy given the continuing building of dirty fuel coal powered plants).
See The consequences of climate change, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (2016), (https://perma.cc/D2V8-RRJ5).
See Wong, supra note 168.
See Christopher Helman, Solar Power is Booming, But Will Never Replace Coal. Here’s Why, Forbes (Apr. 24, 2014), (https://perma.cc/6B2W-T55N); see also Matthew Wald, Cost Works Against Alternative and Renewable Energy Sources in Time of Recession, N.Y. Times (Mar. 28, 2009), (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/29/business/energy-environment/29renew.html).
Article 20.5 is only one example of many provisions in Chapter 20 that create greater obligations concerning environmental obligations. Other TPP provisions require protection of the marine environment from ship pollution,172
TPP, supra note 1, at art. 20.6.
TPP, supra note 1, at art. 20.10.
TPP, supra note 1, at art. 20.16.
TPP, supra note 1, at art. 20.17.
Aside from the environmental benefits created by the TPP, and more germane to the thesis in this Article,176
This is not to minimize the beneficial social effects of responsible environmental behavior. The focus on this article is on the economic effects of China’s behavior. An examination of the social and ethical issues was the topic of an independent study by the author. See Daniel C.K. Chow, How China Uses International Trade to Promote its View of Human Rights, 45 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 681 (2013).
A third set of provisions in the TPP takes direct aim at China’s SOEs that receive many forms of financial and non-financial assistance from the State. In its 2015 annual report to Congress, the U.S. Trade Representative stated:
Many of the problems that arise in the U.S.-China trade and investment relationship can be traced to . . . the large role of state-owned enterprises and other national champions in China’s economy, which continue to generate significant trade distortions that inevitably give rise to trade frictions.177
See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2015 USTR Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance (2015), (https://perma.cc/7TJE-M28R).
An SOE is a business enterprise that is an administrative unit of the State.178
See Chow, supra note 165 at 22.
See id.
Bob Davis & Brian Spegele, State Companies Emerge as Winners Following Top China Meeting, Wall St. J. (Nov. 13, 2013), (http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303559504579195551704526972).
See Anti-Monopoly Law, art. 7 (promulgated by the 29th Session of the Standing Comm. Tenth Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), (https://perma.cc/Q8G4-6C65).
See The State Advances, The Economist (Oct. 6, 2012), (https://perma.cc/SM3E-SDHM).
See Chow, supra note 51, at 27.
See Wayne Morrison, Cong. Research Serv., RL33536, China-U.S. Trade Issues 8 (2014).
See PetroChina Becomes World’s Largest Listed Company, China View (Nov. 6, 2007), (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-11/06/content_7018280.htm).
See Carolyn Davis, ExxonMobil, Chevron, Phillips 66 in Top 10 of Fortune 500, NGI’s Daily Gas Price Index (Oct. 15, 2015) https://perma.cc/M3GR-VNT9(Exxon Mobil ranked No. 2 in 2015 Fortune 500).
See Global 500 2014, Fortune (2014), (https://perma.cc/2WUD-ZTQM).
For a general discussion of how China discriminates against MNCs and in favor of its SOEs, see Daniel C.K. Chow, How China Promotes its State-Owned Enterprises at the Expense of Multinational Companies Doing Business in China and in Other Countries, 41 N.C. J. Int’l L. 455 (2016).
MNCs doing business in China often claim that the Chinese government discriminates against them in favor of SOEs through three common practices. First, SOEs often prefer purchasing goods and service from other SOEs rather than MNCs.189
See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, TPP Chapter Summary: State-Owned Enterprises 2, (https://perma.cc/H2YY-3N7B).
This observation is based on the author’s own working experience in China.
See Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China’s Crackdown on Commercial Bribery Threatens U.S. Multinational Companies Doing Business in China, 31 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 512, 528 (2014) (“Most people in China are resigned to accept petty corruption by SOEs, that is, the giving of kicks and bribes, as a way of doing business.”).
Second, MNCs claim that the Chinese government discriminates against MNCs under important regulatory regimes, such as the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) and under various anti-bribery laws.192
See id. at 517–23.
See id. at 518–19.
See id. at 519–21.
See id. at 521–22.
See id. at 522.
See Chow, supra note 188, at 483.
A third common complaint is that China provides subsidies (financial contributions) to SOEs, a form of financial assistance.198
See USTR 2015 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, supra note 177, at 86 (discussing U.S. government’s efforts to press China to remove subsidies to SOEs).
The WTO has provisions that prohibit discrimination in the purchase of goods,199
See GATT supra note 87, at art. III.1.
See id. at art. III.4.
See id. at art. XVI. Article XVI is elaborated upon in World Trade Organization, Agreement Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (1994), (https://perma.cc/FDJ5-4XNC).
The TPP addresses all three of these concerns raised by U.S.-based MNCs. Article 17.4 of the TPP requires SOEs to avoid discrimination in the purchase of goods and services by giving treatment to goods and services from other TPP parties treatment no less favorable than that accorded to SOEs.202
TPP, supra note 1, at art. 17.4.
TPP, supra note 1, at art. 17.5
i. direct transfers of funds or potential direct transfer of funds or liabilities, such as: A. grants or debt forgiveness; B. loans, loan guarantees or other types of financing on terms more favourable than commercially available to that enterprise; or C. equity capital inconsistent with the usual investment practice, including for the provision of risk capital, of private investors[ ] (ii) goods or services other than general infrastructure on terms more favourable than those commercially available to that enterprise.204
TPP, supra note 1, at art. 17.1 (“Definitions”).
A comparison of this provision with the provisions in the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) indicates that the quoted text of the TPP set forth above closely tracks SCM Article 1, which defines a “subsidy” for the purpose of imposing a countervailing duty as an extra tariff imposed by the importing country on a subsidized import to offset the effect of the subsidy.205
SCM Article 1 entitled “Definition of a Subsidy” provides in relevant part:
For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if:
(a)(1) There is a financial contribution by a government or any public body within the territory of a Member . . . where: (i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees); (ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax credits); (iii) a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure or purchases goods; [or] (iv) a government body makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs a private body to carry out one or more of the type of functions illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which would normally be vested in the government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices normally followed by governments.
See USTR 2015 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, supra note 177.
Due to the outsized role that SOEs enjoy in China and in global trade, these provisions of the TPP were also likely drafted with China as the target. No other current TPP country has SOEs that approach the size and power of China’s SOEs or their dominance in international trade. Joining the TPP will make China’s most frequently complained of practices that benefit SOEs illegal and will allow the U.S. to directly challenge these practices in the TPP dispute settlement system.
[The TPP] would give us a leg up on our economic competitors, including . . . China. Of course, China’s greatest economic opportunities also lie in its own neighborhood, which is why China is not wasting any time. As we speak, China is negotiating a trade deal that would carve up some of the fastest-growing markets in the world at our expense, putting American jobs, business and goods at risk. . . . America should write the rules. America should call the shots. Other countries should play by the rules that America and our partners set, not the other way around. . . . The United States, not . . . China, should write them.”207
Barack Obama, The TPP Would Let America, not China, Lead the Way on Global Trade, Washington Post (May 2, 2016), (https://perma.cc/YW32-TQUT).
Attempts by the U.S. to control China have not, of course, escaped China’s notice, and they underscore how the relationship between the two countries has increasingly become a fierce rivalry. The U.S. and China take starkly different approaches to international trade treaties, which benefit the interests of each country.
The recent approach of the U.S. in all of its international trade treaties is to link social issues such as workers’ rights and the environment to trade. This practice began with the North American Free Trade Agreement, which came into effect in 1994.208
See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, North American Free Trade Agreement, (https://perma.cc/23HW-3K8E).
See U.S. Department of Labor, North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (1993), (https://perma.cc/RP26-LDB5).
See Commission for Environmental Cooperation, North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, https://perma.cc/W49S-T5SA.
See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (2007), (https://perma.cc/YA5A-724S).
See id. at art. 19.1.
U.S. Department of State, 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2012), (https://perma.cc/S8YW-83V6).
By contrast, China’s trade agreements reveal a different approach. China has entered into recent bilateral free trade agreements with its partners, including Costa Rica (2011), Pakistan (2009), Peru (2009), Singapore (2009), New Zealand (2008), and Chile (2006).214
See Chinese Ministry of Foreign Commerce, China FTA Network, (https://perma.cc/7D46-3RKD).
See World Bank, Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation Between the Association of South East Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China (Nov. 2, 2002), (https://perma.cc/3X5D-XKAT).
Francis Cheung and Alexious Lee, A Brilliant Plan: One Belt One Road, Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (2015), (https://perma.cc/FZM8-CRBT).
These two contrasting approaches concerning the linkage of social issues to trade reflect a fundamental difference in philosophy in the use of trade to create sticks and carrots on social issues and is a topic that is beyond the scope of this Article.217
For a discussion of the philosophical differences, see Daniel C.K. Chow, How China Uses International Trade to Promote its View of Human Rights, 45 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 681 (2013).
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, The Trans-Pacific Partnership, (https://perma.cc/HS9T-MXWF).
The U.S.’s attempt to contain China in international trade through the TPP has left China with a dilemma: it can ignore the TPP and risk losses in trade opportunities, or submit to the TPP and the humiliating process of applying to the U.S. Congress to join the TPP. 219
Whether the TPP will be approved by the U.S. Congress now or eventually depends on a number of political factors. See supra note 57.
See Howard, supra note 3.
China may choose a third alternative—negotiate its own multilateral preferential trade agreements on its own terms with its trading partners in Asia and outside of Asia that will exclude the U.S. Indeed, China is now negotiating a rival preferential trade agreement in Asia called the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (Regional Partnership).221
Richard Macauley, Thought the TPP was a Big Deal? China’s Rival Free Trade Pact Covers Half the World’s Population, Quartz (Oct. 8, 2015), (https://perma.cc/S4QQ-KCLF).
See id.
See id.
See id.
America’s Big Bet, The Economist (Nov. 14, 2015), (https://perma.cc/BDP2-23FJ).
These recent developments in the negotiation of trade agreements underscore more clearly than ever that the U.S. and China see themselves as rivals, not allies, in world trade. Given their contrasting approaches to international trade, who writes the rules of international trade becomes paramount in the rivalry. The U.S. will seek to neutralize China’s cost advantages in international trade in all of its trade treaties and China will seek to preserve them in its trade treaties. No one should be surprised at this result. It is a political reality that nations enter into trade agreements that are in their best interests at the expense of rivals. The U.S. has entered into trade agreements that promote its best interests at the expense of China, and China has done the same at the expense of the U.S. This Article is a study of how the TPP promotes U.S. interests at the expense of China.
At this moment in history, whether the U.S. or China will write the rules of international trade is an open question. What is not open to question is that the stakes are high: the nation that writes the rules will likely gain supremacy in international trade and will become the leading power in global trade in the twenty-first century.
- 1See Catherine Putz, TPP: The Ratification Race is On, The Diplomat (Feb. 5, 2016), http://perma.cc/VRU5-ZC7U;see also Michal Meidan, The TPP and China: The Elephant That Wasn’t in the Room, The Diplomat (Oct. 15, 2015), http://perma.cc/P5TE-4G6N.For the full text of the TPP, see TPP Full Text, Office of the United States Trade Representative, https://perma.cc/77GY-EY5E(last visited Oct. 4, 2016).
- 2See TPP Full Text, supra note 1.
- 3See id. at art. 30(5); see also Rebecca Howard, Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal signed, but years of negotiations still to come, Reuters (Feb. 4, 2016), (http://perma.cc/5DDA-2Z5B).
- 4See Howard, supra note 3.
- 5See infra Section II.
- 6See supra note 1.
- 7The TPP comes into force once it is ratified. See TPP, supra note 1, at art. 30(5).
- 8See infra Section IV.
- 9See id. By the time China could have joined in the negotiations, the major provisions of the text affecting China had been completed. New members must accept the text as is and cannot revisit any text that has been completed. Any new member can only participate in negotiations on new text.
- 10See infra Section IV.
- 11See id.
- 12Since the text of the U.S.-led TPP is final and agreed to by the signature of the TPP parties on Feb. 5, 2016, the only way to change the text is to amend it. Amendments require the consent of all members, including the U.S. See TPP, supra note 1, at art. 30(2) (describing amendments as requiring the consent of all members).
- 13See TPP, supra note 1, at art. 30(2).
- 14See TPP, supra note 1, at art. 30(4) (describing the accession process as requiring the approval of each TPP member including the U.S. in accordance with applicable legal procedures of each member). If Congress approves the TPP, Congress will also issue a regulation on the approval procedures for new members of the TPP; Congress issued a similar regulation for new WTO members when it approved and implemented the WTO agreements in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 1-3-465, 108 Stat. 4829 (1994) codified as 19 U.S.C. § 3532 [hereinafter URAA]. Article I, § 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power to “regulate commerce with foreign nations,” giving Congress the final say on U.S. trade law and policy. Congress could enact legislation requiring congressional approval of all new TPP members, but it is more likely that Congress will follow the model of the URAA. With respect to new members of the WTO, the URAA requires that “the [United States] Trade Representative . . . consult with the appropriate congressional committees before any vote is taken by the Ministerial Conference [of the WTO] . . . relating to . . . the accession of a state.” Implementation of Uruguay Round Agreements, 19 U.S.C.A. § 3532 (1994). If Congress enacts a similar provision related to new members of the TPP, which seems likely, Congress could hold public hearings on China’s accession to the TPP.
- 15Congress might criticize China for “cheating” in international trade as there is a commonly held view that China ignores the rules of the WTO. See David Pilling, It won’t be easy to build an ‘anyone but China’ club, The Financial Times (May 22, 2013), http://perma.cc/MP89-AFMB.Prior to China’s ascension to the WTO, the U.S. Congress held hearings every year to determine whether to extend trade benefits to China under the Most-Favored Nation Principle, which would allow China to enjoy lower tariffs on its imports into the U.S. The U.S. used the annual review process as an opportunity to make threats and lecture China on its deficiencies in its human rights record. See Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Opposes Human Rights in the World Trade Organization, 35 U. Penn. J. Int’l L. 61, 77–80 (2013). China found this process to be humiliating and the common perception at the time was that these annual reviews were an opportunity for China “bashing.” See id. at 79–80 & n.91.
- 16See Pilling, supra note 15.
- 17See Jane Kelsey, U.S. China Relations and the Geopolitics of the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement, Global Research (Nov. 11, 2013), (http://perma.cc/D4EJ-PU4W); see also Nathan Vanderklippe, TPP deal a way for U.S. to reassert primacy over China, The Globe and Mail (Oct. 5, 2015), (https://perma.cc/L6LM-WXJJ).
- 18China joined the WTO in 2001. See Member Information: China and the WTO, World Trade Organization, http://perma.cc/R34K-6RUU(last visited Oct. 9, 2016).
- 19See Pilling, supra note 15.
- 20See Daniel C.K. Chow & Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade Law: Problems, Cases, and Materials 26 (2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter Chow & Schoenbaum, International Trade Law].
- 21See Pilling, supra note 15.
- 22See id.
- 23See id.
- 24See infra Section II.A.
- 25See TPP, supra note 1, at art. 1(2) (noting that the TPP is to “coexist with their existing international agreements . . . including the WTO agreement.”).
- 26The TPP is authorized by Article XXIV:5 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which permits WTO members to form free trade agreements such as the TPP. For a more detailed explanation of this point, see infra Section II.A.
- 27See infra Section II.B.
- 28See id.
- 29See id.
- 30See id.
- 31See id.
- 32See id.
- 33See id.
- 34See id.
- 35See Kimberly Amadeo, Why Is The U.S./China Trade Deficit So High?, The Balance (Sept. 8, 2016), (http://perma.cc/3RN8-7HMH).
- 36See infra Section II.C.
- 37See, for example, Daniel Mills, China Cheats While the U.S. Suffers, Economy in Crisis (May 25, 2014), (http://perma.cc/RKQ3-U7AU).
- 38See infra Section III.
- 39See infra Section III.A.
- 40See id.
- 41See id.
- 42See id.
- 43See infra Section III.A.
- 44See infra Section III.B.
- 45See id.
- 46See id.
- 47See infra Section III.C.
- 48See id.
- 49See id.
- 50See infra Section IV.
- 51See Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Established the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, 49 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. (forthcoming 2016).
- 52See infra Section IV.
- 53See id.
- 54See supra note 51.
- 55See id.
- 56See id.
- 57Factors influencing whether the U.S. Congress will approve the TPP are whether (1) President-Elect Donald Trump will reverse his campaign position opposing the TPP; (2) Trump will renegotiate the TPP and seek Congressional approval of a modified TPP; and (3) the next election cycle in 2020 will result in a new President who supports the TPP. In the author’s view, it is possible that President-Elect Trump will reverse candidate Trump’s opposition to the current or modified version of the TPP because the TPP is designed to increase U.S. export trade opportunities, increase employment, and reign in China’s aggressive trade tactics, a favorite subject of criticism during President-Elect Trump’s campaign.
- 58See TPP, supra note 1, at ch. 2 (National Treatment and Market Access).
- 59See id. at ch. 10 (Trade in Services).
- 60See id. at ch. 11 (Financial Services).
- 61See id. at ch. 13 (Telecommunications).
- 62See id. at ch. 9 (Investment).
- 63See id. at ch. 26 (Transparency and Anti-Corruption)
- 64See id. at ch. 25 (Regulatory Coherence).
- 65See id. at ch. 18 (Intellectual Property).
- 66See Chow & Schoenbaum, International Trade Law, supra note 20, at 63.
- 67See TPP, supra note 1, at art. 3–4, 6. The technical term used by the TPP for trade sanctions is the “suspension of benefits.” For example, suppose that Country A, a TPP member, has agreed to zero tariffs for goods from Country B. If Country B fails to comply with the TPP, the TPP can authorize Country A to suspend its zero tariffs for goods from Country B, which would then likely be subject to higher tariffs under Country A’s GATT rate. Country B would suffer a loss in trade due to the higher tariffs. This is what constitutes a trade sanction under the TPP and the WTO.
- 68See Chow & Schoenbaum, International Trade Law, supra note 20, at 9, 14–15 (comparing recent figures for trade in goods, services, investment and technology).
- 69See TPP, supra note 1, at art. 1(2) (recognizing that the TPP agreement “co-exists” with the WTO agreements).
- 70See What is the WTO?, World Trade Organization, http://perma.cc/E3SA-W3LN,(last visited Oct. 5, 2016).
- 71The WTO website indicates that the WTO currently has 164 members, including all of the most powerful economies in the world. See Members and Observers, World Trade Organization, http://perma.cc/T848-KV64,(last visited Oct. 5, 2016).
- 72See GATT and the Goods Council, World Trade Organization, http://perma.cc/5ZNW-FHYY,(last visited Oct. 5, 2016).
- 73See General Agreement on Trade in Services, World Trade Organization, http://perma.cc/NX48-LTJP,(last visited Oct. 5, 2016).
- 74See TRIPS [trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights] material on the WTO website, World Trade Organization, http://perma.cc/AK4M-CGFL,(last visited Oct. 5, 2016).
- 75See Chow & Schoenbaum, International Trade Law, supra note 20, at 26.
- 76See id. (describing how the GATT limits the use of tariffs as a trade barrier). Prior to the GATT no such mechanism existed to limit the use of tariffs. This meant that if a nation raised its tariffs other nations could raise theirs in a tit-for-tat response.
- 77See id.
- 78See id. at 18.
- 79Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1202–1683 (1930).
- 80See Chow & Schoenbaum, International Trade Law, supra note 20, at 18.
- 81See id.
- 82See id.
- 83See id.
- 84See id.
- 85See id.
- 86See id. at 26.
- 87See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. II(b), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
- 88See id.
- 89See id.
- 90See id. at art II:1(a).If a tariff is “unbound” then a WTO member can impose any tariff at any level it sees fit.
- 91Imposing a tariff duty that is above the bound rate is a violation of Article II:1(a)–(b).See Appellate Body Report, Argentina–Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and Other Items, ¶ 46–55, WTO Doc. WT/DS56/AB/R (adopted on Apr. 22, 1998). There, the Appellate Body held:
A tariff binding in a Member’s Schedule provides an upper limit on the amount of duty that may be imposed . . . The principal obligation in the first sentence of Article II:1(b) . . .requires a Member to refrain from imposing ordinary customs duties in excess of those provided for in the Member’s Schedule. . . . We conclude that the application of a type of duty different from the type provided for in a Member’s Schedule is inconsistent with Article II:1(b) . . .In this case, we find that Argentina has acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article II:1(b),first sentence, of the GATT 1994.
Id.
- 92WTO disputes are resolved by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which consists of panels that operate as trial courts, and an appellate body that functions as a high court of international trade. Decisions by the panels and the appellate body create institutional pressure on WTO members to correct any WTO violations; the WTO DSB can also authorize the imposition of trade sanctions against a recalcitrant offending member that creates additional pressures to comply. See Chow & Schoenbaum, International Trade Law, supra note 20, at 63–68. Overall, the WTO dispute settlement system is viewed as a great success. See id. at 63.
- 93See id. at 49–51, 180.
- 94See id. at 180.
- 95See id.
- 96See id. at 51.
- 97For example, under the North American Free Trade Agreement, the three member countries (the U.S., Canada, and Mexico) have agreed to zero tariffs for virtually all goods traded among them. See id. at 51, 56.
- 98See GATT, supra note 87, at art. I.
- 99The entire text of GATT Article I:1 reads:
1. With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.
Id. at art. I:1.
- 100See Chow & Schoenbaum, International Trade Law, supra note 20, at 129.
- 101See id.
- 102See id.
- 103See id. at 130.
- 104See id.
- 105See GATT, supra note 87, at art. XXIV:4-5.
- 106A free trade area, such as NAFTA, allows for the free movement of goods within the members of the free trade area, but subject goods from non-members of the free trade area to the individual tariffs of each of the members. In the case of NAFTA, goods from the U.S. travel to Mexico and Canada duty free, but goods from a non-NAFTA member are subject to the individual tariff rates of each NAFTA member. For instance, goods from China that enter Canada would be subject to Canadian tariffs, that enter the U.S. would be subject to U.S. tariffs, that enter Mexico would be subject to Mexican tariffs. These tariffs might vary from nation to nation so that the importer might pay a higher tariff in the U.S. than an importer might pay in Mexico. Free trade areas thus encourage forum shopping for the cheapest tariff rate among the members of the free trade area from which the goods can then move around the free trade area duty free. This is why NAFTA has complex rules of origin that are designed to eliminate this type of forum shopping. So under the NAFTA rules of origin if a good from China enters Mexico and then enters the U.S., the U.S. might treat the good as originating from China and impose ordinary tariffs. A customs union, like the E.U., also has free movement of goods among all of its members (that is, duty free treatment) but imposes a single external tariff on non-members of the E.U. Thus, it makes no difference whether goods from China enter the E.U. through Italy, France, Germany, or Belgium; the goods are subject to the same tariff, thus eliminating the incentive to forum shop. Of course, a single external tariff requires greater economic integration than a free trade area. See Chow & Schoenbaum, International Trade Law, supra note 20, at 55–56.
- 107See GATT, supra note 87, at art. XXIV:4.
- 108TPP, art. 2.4 entitled “Elimination of Customs Duties” states in relevant part: “Unless otherwise provided in this Agreement, each Part shall progressively eliminate its customs duties on originating goods in accordance with its Schedule to Annex 2-D (Tariff Commitments).” TPP, supra note 1, at art. 2.4(2).
- 109All of the TPP members are also WTO members, which means that they currently maintain WTO tariffs. The concept is to reduce the rates to zero under the TPP. Thus, TPP members receive “WTO plus” treatment.
- 110See Chow & Schoenbaum, International Trade Law, supra note 20, at 52.
- 111Various governmental and non-governmental sources indicate that the U.S. should see an increase in all other areas of trade in addition to the trade in goods. For example, the United States Trade Representative believes that the TPP will increase U.S. exports of services. Trans-Pacific Partnership: Summary of U.S. Objectives, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., https://perma.cc/X6YC-CBQ7(last visited Oct. 25, 2016) The Trade Representative has stated:
Services industries account for four out of five U.S. jobs and also represent a significant and growing share of jobs in other TPP countries. Securing liberalized and fair access to foreign services markets will help U.S. service suppliers, both small and large, seeking to do business in TPP markets, thereby, supporting jobs at home.
Id. The USTR also believes that the TPP will boost U.S. exports of technology (that is, intellectual property) intensive goods. Id. (“In TPP, we are working to advance strong, state-of-the-art, and balanced rules that will protect and promote U.S. exports of IP-intensive products and services throughout the Asia-Pacific region.”). Another institutional study indicates that the TPP will boost outward U.S. technology transfer. See Nam D. Pham et al., NDP Analytics, The Economic Benefits of Intellectual Property Rights in the Trans-Pacific Partnership 4 (2014). https://perma.cc/T422-8GSQ.Both inward foreign investment from other countries and outward U.S. foreign direct investment in other countries are expected to rise as a result of the TPP. Theodore H. Moran & Lindsay Oldenski, TPP Will Promote Investment as Well as Trade, Peterson Inst. For Int’l Econ. (Mar. 10, 2015, 11:15 AM), https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/tpp-will-promote-investment-well-trade.These benefits are reciprocal, that is, U.S. trading partners should be a similar increase in their modes of trade in additional to the trade in goods.
- 112See Chow & Schoenbaum, International Trade Law, supra note 20, at 52.
- 113The importer, usually a distributor, pays the increased tariff in order to clear the goods at customs so that they will be allowed to enter the internal market. What prevents the importer from absorbing the price increase and not passing on the price increase onto the consumer in the form of higher retail prices? The answer is nothing. If the importer does not pass on the increased tariff to the consumer, then the importer simply earns fewer profits. Most importers, however, wish to maximize profits and so for this reason higher tariffs usually mean higher prices for consumers.
- 114From a macroeconomic perspective, the balance between trade increases and trade diversion due to free trade areas is the most important question for the multilateral trading system. To the extent that trade increases outweigh trade diversion, the entire multilateral trading system is better off even if some countries lose trade opportunities. To the extent that losses from trade diversion outweigh trade increases, the preferential trade agreement then becomes a net loss for the multilateral trading system.
- 115See Terence P. Jeffrey, $365,694,500,000: U.S. Merchandise Trade Deficit With China Hit Record in 2015, CNS News, (Feb. 9, 2016), (https://perma.cc/2LDT-ADRY).
- 116See id.
- 117See id.
- 118See id.
- 119See id.
- 120See Chow & Schoenbaum, International Trade Law, supra note 20, at 30.
- 121See id.
- 122See id.
- 123See id.
- 124See id. at 45.
- 125This is a term used by critics of China. See id. at 46.
- 126See id. at 45.
- 127See id. at 45–46.
- 128See id. at 47.
- 129See id. at 46–48.
- 130See id. at 47.
- 131See id.
- 132See id.
- 133See Katherine Peralta, Outsourcing to China Cost 3.2 Million Jobs Since 2001, U.S. News & World Report, (Dec. 11, 2014), (https://perma.cc/4BTD-KHL9).
- 134See Mark Huffman, Why Cheap Chinese Products Are About to Get Cheaper, Consumer Affairs (Aug. 11, 2015), (https://perma.cc/K7W5-LDXE).
- 135See Kimberly Amadeo, How Outsourcing Jobs Affects the U.S. Economy, The Balance, (June 25, 2016), (https://perma.cc/W7UQ-9ZGH).
- 136See id.
- 137See Huffman, supra note 134.
- 138Michael Snyder, Why Are the American People Mad? Maybe It is Because Millions of Their Jobs Have Been Lost to Outsourcing and They Aren’t Coming Back, End of the American Dream (July 29, 2010), https://perma.cc/5YCL-2NHG.
- 139See Daniel Mills, China Cheats While the U.S. Suffers, Economy in Crisis (May 25, 2014), (https://perma.cc/2PEQ-AHPV).
- 140See id.
- 141See Howard, supra note 3.
- 142See supra note 15.
- 143There are a number of hot button issues on which Congress might seek concessions from China. For example, Congress might demand that China show greater respect for intellectual property rights by cracking down on trademark counterfeiting and copyright piracy, a major source of contention between the U.S. and China and that China put a stop to its currency manipulation that increases the U.S. trade deficit. For a discussion of counterfeiting, see Daniel C.K. Chow & Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Business Transactions: Problems, Cases, and Materials 537–53 (3d ed. 2015). For a discussion of China’s currency manipulation, see Daniel C.K. Chow, Can the United States Impose Trade Sanctions on China for Currency Manipulation?, 16 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript on file with the author).
- 144See M. Dana Baldwin, Addressing the Challenge of China’s Labor Cost Advantages, Center for Simplified Strategic Planning, Inc. (2016), (https://perma.cc/K4M3-B5VK).
- 145See id.
- 146See David Barboza, In Chinese Factories, Lost Fingers and Low Pay, N.Y. Times (Jan. 5, 2008), (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/05/business/worldbusiness/05sweatshop.html).
- 147See Kelsey, supra note 17 (noting that every major proposal in the TPP is targeted at China). The U.S. considers labor rights and trade to be an important trade issue as evidence by the inclusion of provisions connecting labor and trade in every recent U.S. free trade agreement. See infra Section IV.
- 148TPP, supra note 1, at art. 19.3(1).
- 149See Chow & Schoenbaum, International Trade Law, supra note 20, at 369.
- 150See id.
- 151See id.
- 152See id.
- 153See id. at 370.
- 154See id.
- 155See id.
- 156See Kimberly Ann Elliot, The ILO and Enforcement of Core Labor Standards, Institute for International Economics Policy Brief 00-6 (July 2000), https://piie.com/publications/pb/pb00-6.pdf(noting that the ILO relies primarily on “sunshine,” that is, exposing illegal labor to public scrutiny and “carrots,” that is, technical assistance in helping countries comply). By contrast, the WTO can authorize trade sanctions to enforce its obligations.
- 157See TPP, supra note 1, at art. 25.
- 158Id. at art. 19.3(2).
- 159Id. at art. 19.5(1).
- 160See Daniel C.K. Chow & Anna M. Han, Doing Business in China: Problems, Cases, and Materials 266-73 (2012).
- 161See id. at 269.
- 162Yin Lily Zheng, It’s Not What’s on Paper, But What is in Practice: China’s New Labor Contract Law and the Enforcement Problem, 8 Wash. U. Global Studies L. Rev. 595, 601–12 (2009) (describing the many obstacles to effective enforcement of China’s Labor Contract Law).
- 163See Barboza, supra note 146.
- 164See id.
- 165See Daniel C.K. Chow, The Legal System of the People’s Republic of China 224–28 (3d ed. 2015).
- 166See Chow & Schoenbaum, International Trade Law, supra note 20, at 301–18.
- 167TPP, supra note 1, at art. 20.5.
- 168See Edward Wong, Glut of Coal-Fired Plants Casts Doubt on China’s Energy Priorities, N.Y. Times (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/12/world/asia/china-coal-power-energy-policy.html?_r=0(calling into question China’s commitment to renewable energy given the continuing building of dirty fuel coal powered plants).
- 169See The consequences of climate change, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (2016), (https://perma.cc/D2V8-RRJ5).
- 170See Wong, supra note 168.
- 171See Christopher Helman, Solar Power is Booming, But Will Never Replace Coal. Here’s Why, Forbes (Apr. 24, 2014), (https://perma.cc/6B2W-T55N); see also Matthew Wald, Cost Works Against Alternative and Renewable Energy Sources in Time of Recession, N.Y. Times (Mar. 28, 2009), (http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/29/business/energy-environment/29renew.html).
- 172TPP, supra note 1, at art. 20.6.
- 173TPP, supra note 1, at art. 20.10.
- 174TPP, supra note 1, at art. 20.16.
- 175TPP, supra note 1, at art. 20.17.
- 176This is not to minimize the beneficial social effects of responsible environmental behavior. The focus on this article is on the economic effects of China’s behavior. An examination of the social and ethical issues was the topic of an independent study by the author. See Daniel C.K. Chow, How China Uses International Trade to Promote its View of Human Rights, 45 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 681 (2013).
- 177See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2015 USTR Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance (2015), (https://perma.cc/7TJE-M28R).
- 178See Chow, supra note 165 at 22.
- 179See id.
- 180Bob Davis & Brian Spegele, State Companies Emerge as Winners Following Top China Meeting, Wall St. J. (Nov. 13, 2013), (http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303559504579195551704526972).
- 181See Anti-Monopoly Law, art. 7 (promulgated by the 29th Session of the Standing Comm. Tenth Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), (https://perma.cc/Q8G4-6C65).
- 182See The State Advances, The Economist (Oct. 6, 2012), (https://perma.cc/SM3E-SDHM).
- 183See Chow, supra note 51, at 27.
- 184See Wayne Morrison, Cong. Research Serv., RL33536, China-U.S. Trade Issues 8 (2014).
- 185See PetroChina Becomes World’s Largest Listed Company, China View (Nov. 6, 2007), (http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-11/06/content_7018280.htm).
- 186See Carolyn Davis, ExxonMobil, Chevron, Phillips 66 in Top 10 of Fortune 500, NGI’s Daily Gas Price Index (Oct. 15, 2015) https://perma.cc/M3GR-VNT9(Exxon Mobil ranked No. 2 in 2015 Fortune 500).
- 187See Global 500 2014, Fortune (2014), (https://perma.cc/2WUD-ZTQM).
- 188For a general discussion of how China discriminates against MNCs and in favor of its SOEs, see Daniel C.K. Chow, How China Promotes its State-Owned Enterprises at the Expense of Multinational Companies Doing Business in China and in Other Countries, 41 N.C. J. Int’l L. 455 (2016).
- 189See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, TPP Chapter Summary: State-Owned Enterprises 2, (https://perma.cc/H2YY-3N7B).
- 190This observation is based on the author’s own working experience in China.
- 191See Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China’s Crackdown on Commercial Bribery Threatens U.S. Multinational Companies Doing Business in China, 31 Ariz. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 512, 528 (2014) (“Most people in China are resigned to accept petty corruption by SOEs, that is, the giving of kicks and bribes, as a way of doing business.”).
- 192See id. at 517–23.
- 193See id. at 518–19.
- 194See id. at 519–21.
- 195See id. at 521–22.
- 196See id. at 522.
- 197See Chow, supra note 188, at 483.
- 198See USTR 2015 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, supra note 177, at 86 (discussing U.S. government’s efforts to press China to remove subsidies to SOEs).
- 199See GATT supra note 87, at art. III.1.
- 200See id. at art. III.4.
- 201See id. at art. XVI. Article XVI is elaborated upon in World Trade Organization, Agreement Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (1994), (https://perma.cc/FDJ5-4XNC).
- 202TPP, supra note 1, at art. 17.4.
- 203TPP, supra note 1, at art. 17.5
- 204TPP, supra note 1, at art. 17.1 (“Definitions”).
- 205SCM Article 1 entitled “Definition of a Subsidy” provides in relevant part:
For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if:
(a)(1) There is a financial contribution by a government or any public body within the territory of a Member . . . where: (i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, and equity infusion), potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees); (ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax credits); (iii) a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure or purchases goods; [or] (iv) a government body makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs a private body to carry out one or more of the type of functions illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which would normally be vested in the government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices normally followed by governments.
- 206See USTR 2015 Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance, supra note 177.
- 207Barack Obama, The TPP Would Let America, not China, Lead the Way on Global Trade, Washington Post (May 2, 2016), (https://perma.cc/YW32-TQUT).
- 208See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, North American Free Trade Agreement, (https://perma.cc/23HW-3K8E).
- 209See U.S. Department of Labor, North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (1993), (https://perma.cc/RP26-LDB5).
- 210See Commission for Environmental Cooperation, North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, https://perma.cc/W49S-T5SA.
- 211See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S.-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (2007), (https://perma.cc/YA5A-724S).
- 212See id. at art. 19.1.
- 213U.S. Department of State, 2012 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2012), (https://perma.cc/S8YW-83V6).
- 214See Chinese Ministry of Foreign Commerce, China FTA Network, (https://perma.cc/7D46-3RKD).
- 215See World Bank, Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation Between the Association of South East Asian Nations and the People’s Republic of China (Nov. 2, 2002), (https://perma.cc/3X5D-XKAT).
- 216Francis Cheung and Alexious Lee, A Brilliant Plan: One Belt One Road, Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (2015), (https://perma.cc/FZM8-CRBT).
- 217For a discussion of the philosophical differences, see Daniel C.K. Chow, How China Uses International Trade to Promote its View of Human Rights, 45 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 681 (2013).
- 218Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, The Trans-Pacific Partnership, (https://perma.cc/HS9T-MXWF).
- 219Whether the TPP will be approved by the U.S. Congress now or eventually depends on a number of political factors. See supra note 57.
- 220See Howard, supra note 3.
- 221Richard Macauley, Thought the TPP was a Big Deal? China’s Rival Free Trade Pact Covers Half the World’s Population, Quartz (Oct. 8, 2015), (https://perma.cc/S4QQ-KCLF).
- 222See id.
- 223See id.
- 224See id.
- 225America’s Big Bet, The Economist (Nov. 14, 2015), (https://perma.cc/BDP2-23FJ).